(19)
(11)EP 2 486 694 B1

(12)EUROPEAN PATENT SPECIFICATION

(45)Mention of the grant of the patent:
13.04.2016 Bulletin 2016/15

(21)Application number: 11746842.1

(22)Date of filing:  22.02.2011
(51)International Patent Classification (IPC): 
H04L 9/14(2006.01)
H04K 1/00(2006.01)
(86)International application number:
PCT/CN2011/071167
(87)International publication number:
WO 2011/103800 (01.09.2011 Gazette  2011/35)

(54)

SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR SECURING WIRELESS TRANSMISSIONS

SYSTEM UND VERFAHREN ZUR SICHERUNG DRAHTLOSER ÜBERTRAGUNGEN

SYSTÈME ET PROCÉDÉ POUR L'EXÉCUTION DE TRANSMISSIONS SANS FIL SÉCURISÉES


(84)Designated Contracting States:
AL AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MC MK MT NL NO PL PT RO RS SE SI SK SM TR

(30)Priority: 26.02.2010 US 714095

(43)Date of publication of application:
15.08.2012 Bulletin 2012/33

(73)Proprietor: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Longgang District Shenzhen, Guangdong 518129 (CN)

(72)Inventors:
  • LIU, Tie
    College Station Texas 77843 (US)
  • BLANKENSHIP, Yufei
    Kildeer Illinois 60047 (US)

(74)Representative: Epping - Hermann - Fischer 
Patentanwaltsgesellschaft mbH Schloßschmidstraße 5
80639 München
80639 München (DE)


(56)References cited: : 
WO-A2-2008/036633
CN-A- 101 594 227
US-A1- 2008 219 447
CN-A- 1 428 026
US-A1- 2002 080 719
US-A1- 2010 022 184
  
  • ASHISH KHISTI ET AL: "Secure Broadcasting Over Fading Channels", IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY, IEEE PRESS, USA, vol. 38, no. 6, 1 June 2008 (2008-06-01), pages 2453-2469, XP011215608, ISSN: 0018-9448
  • A. D. WYNER: "The Wire-Tap Channel", THE BELL SYSTEM TECHNICAL JOURNAL, vol. 54, no. 8, 1 October 1975 (1975-10-01), pages 1355-1387, XP55038949,
  
Note: Within nine months from the publication of the mention of the grant of the European patent, any person may give notice to the European Patent Office of opposition to the European patent granted. Notice of opposition shall be filed in a written reasoned statement. It shall not be deemed to have been filed until the opposition fee has been paid. (Art. 99(1) European Patent Convention).


Description

TECHNICAL FIELD



[0001] The present invention relates generally to wireless communications, and more particularly, to a system and method for securing wireless transmissions.

BACKGROUND



[0002] In general, securing transmitted information typically involves the application of a security technique to make it difficult, if not impossible, for an eavesdropper to detect the actual information content of a transmission made to a legitimate receiver. Normally, security may be provided in higher layers of a network, such as in an application layer, wherein a security application may be used to apply the security to the information content of the transmission prior to the actual transmission taking place. For example, the security application may be a program executed by a user who wishes to secure the transmission. Alternatively, the security application may be a hardware security unit that may be used to secure transmissions made by a transmitter used by the user.

[0003] However, the higher layer security techniques may usually require that a secret key(s) be shared by a transmitter (the user) and a receiver (the legitimate receiver). Sharing the secret key(s) may be problematic since the security of the security techniques may only be as good as the security present in the sharing of the secret key(s).

[0004] Document D1 (WO2008/036633A2) describes a system and method for providing opportunistic security for physical communication channels. In a first time period ("reliable" or "secret" time period) in which signal quality on the main channel is better than signal quality on the eavesdropper channel, symbols that are randomly selected from a set of symbols are transmitted. In a second time period ("unreliable" or "non-secret" time period) in which signal quality on the main channel is not better than signal quality on the eavesdropper channel, coding information associated with the randomly selected symbols is transmitted. Then, the randomly selected symbols are reconciled using the coding information to produce a reconciled bit sequence. After a universal hash function is applied to the reconciled bit sequence, a secure key is distilled. In this way, the sender and the receiver are allowed to generate the same key, rather than having the sender transmit the key to the receiver, as occurs in conventional technologies.

[0005] Document D2 (ASHISH KHISTI ET AL., "Secure Broadcasting Over Fading Channels," IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY, IEEE PRESS, USA, vol.38, no.6, 1 JUNE 2008, pages 2453-2469) describes broadcasting confidential messages to multiple receivers under an information-theoretic secrecy constraint. For fading channels, D2 analyzes a fast-fading model in which the transmitter knows the instantaneous channels of all the legitimate receivers but not of the eavesdropper, but the eavesdropper has full information about all channels of all receivers. D2 shows a common message can be reliably and securely transmitted at a rate independent of the number of receivers using a suitable binning strategy, and for the case of independent messages, D2 shows that an opportunistic architecture achieves the secrecy sum-capacity in the limit of large number of receiver. Further, D2 discloses that transmission can be performed when all the users have a channel gain above a threshold, but this will only achieve a rate that vanishes with the number of users.

[0006] Document D3 (US2008/219447A1) describes a system and method of secure coding for physical layer communication channels. D3 describes some embodiments the same as those in D1, which shows that a key is generated at both the sender and the receiver by combining information transmitted during a reliable time period (transmission of random symbols) with information transmitted during a unreliable time period (coding information used to reconcile the correlated symbols). D3 further describes that in the case that the main message channel which is between a friendly transmitter and a friendly receiver is always reliable, a message to be transmitted can be encoded with a secure error correcting code (SECC) to ensure security. The SECC has a set of defined characteristics related to an signal-to-noise ratio of the main channel and a signal-to-noise ratio of the eavesdropper channel, such that when the eavesdropper device is more than a predetermined distance Z from the sender, at least a predefined fraction of the message is unreliable, where the predefined fraction of unreliable bits renders the eavesdropper unable to reliably decode the coding information.

[0007] Document D4 (A.D. Wyner, "The Wire-Tap Channel," The Bell System Technical Journal, vol.54, no.8, 1 October 1975, pages 1355-1387) describes encoding data in such a way that the wire-tapper's level of confusion will be as high as possible. D4 shows there is a trade-off between the transmission rate and the equivocation of the data as seen by the wire-tapper, and if the equivocation of the data as seen by the wire-rapper is equal to the entropy of the data source, the transmission is accomplished in perfect secrecy.

[0008] US 2002/0080719 A1 describes that a base station schedules transmission of data packets to a user equipment unit, UE, over a downlink traffic channel when the uplink channel over which the UE sends ARQ type signals to the base station has a signal-to-interference ratio greater than a predetermined threshold.

SUMMARY



[0009] These and other problems are generally solved or circumvented, and technical advantages are generally achieved, by embodiments of a system and method for securing wireless transmissions.

[0010] In accordance with an aspect of the invention, a method for transmitting secure messages by a transmitter is provided. The method includes encoding a message with a secrecy code to produce L output codewords, where L is an integer greater than 1, and for each output codeword of the L output codewords, transmitting the each output codeword to a communications device in response to determining that a channel quality of a channel between the transmitter and the communications device satisfies a criterion. The secrecy code includes a first security code and a second security code. The first security code encodes the message to produce an intermediate secure codeword which is partitioned into L segments of coded bits, and the second security code encodes a segment of coded bits into an output codeword.

[0011] In accordance with another aspect of the invention, a method for receiver operation is provided. The method includes receiving a secure transmission that includes L vectors of received signals, where L is an integer greater than 1, and decoding a secure message from the L vectors of received signals. Each vector of received signals is received in a different transmission, and the decoding makes use of a secrecy code which comprises a first security code and a second security code. Decoding a secure message comprises: generating an intermediate secure codeword from the L vectors of received signals based on the second security code; and producing (620) the secure message from the intermediate secure codeword based on the first security code.

[0012] In accordance with another aspect of the invention, a transmitter is provided. The transmitter includes a scheduler coupled to a message input, a security unit coupled to the scheduler, a security code store coupled to the security unit, and a transmit circuit coupled to the security unit. The scheduler arranges a timing of transmissions of secure messages to a receiver. The scheduling of the timing is based on a channel quality of a channel between the transmitter and the receiver. The security unit encodes a message provided by the message input into L output codewords using a secrecy code, where L is an integer greater than 1. The secrecy code includes a first security code and a second security code. The security code store stores the secrecy code, and the transmit unit prepares an output codeword for transmission. The first security code encodes the message to produce an intermediate secure codeword which is partitioned into L segments of coded bits, and the second security code encodes a segment of coded bits into an output codeword.

[0013] An advantage of an aspect of the invention is that security may be achieved even when, on average, a channel between the transmitter and an eavesdropper is equivalent or even better than a channel between the transmitter and a legitimate receiver.

[0014] A further advantage of an aspect of the invention is that by spreading information bits over multiple transmissions that are transmitted independently of each other, security may be maintained even if the eavesdropper intercepts up to a determined number of transmissions. The determined number of transmissions may be a design parameter of the security system and may be adjusted depending on desired security level, data rate, and so on.

[0015] The foregoing has outlined rather broadly the features and technical advantages of the present invention in order that the detailed description of the embodiments that follow may be better understood. Additional features and advantages of the embodiments will be described hereinafter which form the subject of the claims of the invention. It should be appreciated by those skilled in the art that the conception and specific embodiments disclosed may be readily utilized as a basis for modifying or designing other structures or processes for carrying out the same purposes of the present invention. It should also be realized by those skilled in the art that such equivalent constructions do not depart from the invention as set forth in the appended claims.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS



[0016] For a more complete understanding of the embodiments, and the advantages thereof, reference is now made to the following descriptions taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, in which:

Figure 1 is a diagram of a wiretap channel model;

Figure 2 is a diagram of a channel gain curve of a legitimate channel used to transmit multiple secure messages;

Figure 3a is a diagram of a portion of a transmitter with physical layer security;

Figure 3b is a diagram of a portion of a receiver with physical layer security;

Figure 4a is a flow diagram of transmitter operations in transmitting a secure message;

Figure 4b is a flow diagram of transmitter operations in transmitting the L segments of the secure message;

Figure 5 is a diagram of a channel gain curve of a legitimate channel used to transmit multiple codewords of a single secure message;

Figure 6a is a flow diagram of receiver operations in receiving a secure message;

Figure 6b is a flow diagram of receiver operations in providing channel quality information to a transmitter; and

Figure 7 is a plot of interception probability for a range of K for two different secrecy rates.


DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF ILLUSTRATIVE EMBODIMENTS



[0017] The making and using of the embodiments are discussed in detail below. It should be appreciated, however, that the present invention provides many applicable inventive concepts that can be embodied in a wide variety of specific contexts. The specific embodiments discussed are merely illustrative of specific ways to make and use the invention, and do not limit the scope of the invention.

[0018] The embodiments will be described in a specific context, namely a wireless communications system with multiple receivers, at least one of which is a legitimate receiver and at least one of which is an eavesdropper, such as a Third Generation Partnership Project Long Term Evolution (3GPP LTE) compliant communications system, a WiMAX compliant communications system, or so forth.

[0019] Figure 1 illustrates a wiretap channel model 100. Wiretap channel model 100 includes a transmitter 105 that transmits a message (information) to a legitimate receiver 110 over a first communications channel (channel 1) 115. However, due to a broadcast nature of wireless communications, an eavesdropper 120 may also receive the message over a second communications channel (channel 2) 125. First communications channel 115 may be referred to as a legitimate channel, while second communications channel 125 may be referred to as an eavesdropper channel.

[0020] Fading is a fundamental nature of wireless communications. Radios from multiple transmission paths add constructively or destructively at the receiver, leading to a time-varying channel, for example, when either a transmitter or a receiver is in motion. An often-adopted model in design and analysis is a so-called block fading model, in which the channel is assumed to be constant within each coherent period and changes independently from one coherent period to another.

[0021] In standard communications without secrecy constraints, fading may be very detrimental, particularly when channel state information (CSI) is not available at the transmitter. However, when CSI is known at the transmitter, CSI may be utilized to boost the performance of the communications.

[0022] According to an embodiment, a system and method for reducing an interception probability of wireless communications by exploiting the fading nature of a wireless channel and a transmitter's knowledge of a legitimate channel, e.g., channel 115, is provided.

[0023] Without loss of generality, the embodiments use assumptions including fading processes of the legitimate channel and the eavesdropper channels are independent of each other; and the transmitter has certain knowledge of the legitimate channel. As is usually the case, the transmitter is assumed to have no knowledge (except, potentially some statistical knowledge) of the eavesdropper channel.

[0024] Figure 2 illustrates a channel gain curve 200 of a legitimate channel used to transmit multiple secure messages. Channel gain may be an indicator of a channel's quality. As shown in Figure 2, channel gain may vary, increasing and decreasing, over time. At certain times, such as times corresponding to peaks 205 through 208, channel gain curve 200 may exceed a threshold τ (shown as dashed line).

[0025] The threshold τ may be used to ensure that a transmission to the legitimate receiver occurs when the legitimate channel is at or near its peak quality. In general, if the quality of the legitimate channel is better than the quality of the eavesdropper channel when the transmission is made, secrecy codes may be used to protect transmission from being eavesdropped by the eavesdropper. On the other hand, if the quality of the legitimate channel is lower than the quality of the eavesdropper channel when the transmission is made, the eavesdropper may be able to intercept the transmission made on the legitimate channel. Since the transmitter may not have knowledge of the eavesdropper channel, the threshold τ may be set high to help ensure that the transmitter transmits only when quality of the legitimate channel is high and more likely to be better than the quality of the eavesdropper channel.

[0026] According to an embodiment, the transmitter may elect to transmit to the legitimate receiver only when the channel gain exceeds threshold τ. Therefore, when the channel gain exceeds the threshold τ, the transmitter may transmit a secure message to the legitimate receiver, and when the channel gain is below the threshold τ, the transmitter may not transmit a secure message to the legitimate receiver. As shown in Figure 2, the transmitter may transmit a different secure message to the legitimate receiver at an occurrence of each peak. However, the transmitter may transmit unsecure message to the legitimate receiver at any time, provided that the transmitter is permitted to transmit at that time. For example, peak 205 may be used to transmit secure message A, peak 206 may be used to transmit secure message B, and so forth. The different secure messages may be decoded as they are received at the legitimate receiver.

[0027] Suppose that a target secrecy rate is Rs when the transmitter decides to transmit, and that a secrecy code is used. While any secrecy code may be used, a secrecy-capacity-achieving code is preferred. In general, a secrecy-capacity-achieving code may be a secrecy code optimized to achieve a highest possible secrecy rate. An example of a secrecy-capacity-achieving code may be a binning code with an appropriate codebook.

[0028] With the use of a secrecy-capacity-achieving code, the communications are secure if and only if

where gE is the channel gain for the eavesdropper channel at the time of transmission, N0 is the power of the background noise, and P is the transmit power. Thus, an interception probability pINT of the communications is expressible as

where the probability Pr(.) is evaluated over the distribution of gE.

[0029] Equation (1) shows that the interception probability, i.e., the security of the overall transmission scheme, may be dependent on a channel realization of the eavesdropper channel at each transmission instance. Although the transmitter may employ a secrecy code at each transmission, the code design may rely on a strong assumption that the eavesdropper channel is of a certain quality, which may or may not be true at an instance of transmission. Thus, the uncertainty of the eavesdropper channel may limit the ability of the secrecy code to provide secrecy to occasions when Equation (1) is not satisfied, which may be unpredictable in nature. Therefore, the secrecy provided may be inadequate if pINT is not sufficiently small.

[0030] According to Equation (2), in order to reduce the interception probability, either the secrecy rate Rs may be reduced or the threshold τ may be increased. However, increasing the threshold τ may reduce a transmission frequency since times when the channel quality exceeds the threshold i may decrease, leading to a reduction in an overall secrecy rate.

[0031] Figure 3a illustrates a portion of a transmitter 300 with physical layer security. Messages, in the form of bits, symbols, or packets, for example, destined for a plurality of receivers served by transmitter 300 may be sent to a scheduler 305, which decides which message(s) to which receiver(s) should be transmitted in a given transmission opportunity. Messages for receivers selected to receive transmissions may be provided to a security unit 310 which may provide physical layer security by coding each of the messages using a secrecy code, where the secrecy code comprises a first security code and a second security code. A message is encoded into L segments of coded bits using a first security code and then each of the L segments of coded bits is encoded with a second security code, wherein the first and the second security codes used may be selected based on a desired security level for messages and/or receivers. Here L is an integer value greater than one.

[0032] The message may be encoded using the first security code to produce an intermediate secure codeword, which is partitioned into L segments of coded bits. One example of the first security code is a secure network code. In one embodiment, the first security code encodes the message with a sequence of bits K1, which is not related to the message. The first security code generates the intermediate secure codeword based on a linear coding of the message and the sequence K1. The bit sequence K1 can be viewed as a type of secret key, intentionally inserted to provide randomness in the intermediate secure codeword and to confuse an eavesdropper. Preferably, sequence K1 is randomly generated by the transmitter and not shared with any receiver. Sequence K1 may be separately generated for each message, and not shared between messages, e.g., a unique K1 may be generated for a message and used only in the coding of the message.

[0033] The L segments of coded bits (from the coding of the message by the first security code) may be coded using the second security code having a sufficient security to produce L output codewords. The L output codewords may then be transmitted over the wireless channel. Generally, the second security code encodes an i-th segment of coded bits with a sequence of bits K2i which is not related to the i-th segment of coded bits to produce an i-th output codeword, where i is an integer value, i = 1,...,L. Similar to sequence K1, sequence K2i can be viewed as a type of secret key used by the second security code. Preferably, sequence K2i is randomly generated by the transmitter and not shared with any receiver. Sequence K2i may be separately generated for each segment of coded bits, and not shared between segments of coded bits, e.g., a unique K2i may be generated for a segment of coded bits and used only in the coding of the segment of coded bits.

[0034] The second security code generates the i-th output codeword based on a linear coding of the i-th segment of coded bits and the sequence K2i. The code design guarantees that the entire message is secure against the eavesdropper as long as no more than K output codewords of the message are intercepted, where K and L are both integer values and K is less than or equal to L. According to an embodiment, each of the L output codewords may then be transmitted to a legitimate receiver when a channel gain of a channel to the legitimate receiver exceeds a threshold, threshold τ, for example.

[0035] Generally, L may correspond to a number of transmissions over which each message is spread. L may be prespecified and may be based on factors such as a desired code rate, transmission latency, amount of information to be secured, available channel bandwidth, desired security level, and so forth. A discussion regarding the selection of the first and the second security code, L, and a variety of other security code parameters, such as K, is provided below. As an example, security unit 310 may use as the second security code, a binning code, to code each of the L segments of coded bits of the message to produce an output codeword. Alternatively, security unit 310 may use any other security codes (secrecy-capacity-achieving or even non-secrecy-capacity-achieving codes) to code each of the L segments of coded bits of the message. The first and the second security codes used by security unit 310 are also known at the legitimate receiver. The first and the second security codes used in security unit 310 may be stored in a security code store 315.

[0036] In addition to deciding which messages to which receivers should be transmitted, scheduler 305 may schedule the transmission of the L output codewords of the message based on channel state information (explicit or implicit) of the legitimate channel. According to an embodiment, the channel state information of the legitimate channel may be explicitly fedback by the legitimate receiver, either specifically for security purposes or part/all of feedback to be also used for other purposes, or implicitly known at the transmitter.

[0037] After the L codewords of the message have been secured and then scheduled, transmit circuitry 320 may be used to process the L output codewords for transmission. Operations performed by transmit circuitry 320 may include conversion to an analog representation of the selected codeword, filtering, amplifying, interleaving, coding and modulating, beam forming, and so forth. Some of the operations performed by transmitter 300, such as secrecy coding, beam forming, and so on, may make use of channel quality feedback information provided by receivers served by transmitter 300. The representation of the communications channel may also be used by scheduler 305 in its selection of the receivers.

[0038] Figure 3b illustrates a portion of a receiver 350 with physical layer security. Information transmitted by a transmitter may be received by receiver 350 by way of an antenna(s). Receiver 350 receives signals of a secure transmission from the transmitter as a vector of received signals. Receiver 350 may continue to receive signals until L secure transmissions have been received, resulting in L vectors of received signals which correspond to a message. The vector of received signals may be provided to receive circuitry 355, which may process the received information. According to an embodiment, receive circuitry 355 may wait until receiver 350 receives all L vectors of received signals of a message prior to proceeding with processing the received information. Alternatively, receive circuitry 355 may process each one of the L vectors of received signals as it is received, only stopping processing when reaching an operation that requires information contained in additional vectors of received signals of the message in order to proceed. Operations performed by receive circuitry 355 may include filtering, amplification, error detection and correction, modulation, analog-to-digital conversion, and so forth.

[0039] A security unit 360 decodes a secure message from the L vectors of received signals of the L secure transmissions, where the decoding makes use of a secrecy code comprising a first security code and a second security code. A security code store 365 may be used to store the first security code and the second security code. Security unit 360 may be used to convert (decode) the L vectors of received signals (after processing by receive circuitry 355) into estimates of L segments of coded bits. Each of the L segments of coded bits may have been secured by the transmitter using binning codes (or some other secrecy-capacity-achieving or non-secrecy-capacity-achieving codes), i.e., the second security code discussed previously. In other words, the receiver decodes a vector of received signals of a message into an estimate of a segment of coded bits using the second security code. Estimates of the L segments of coded bits may then be combined into an estimate of the intermediate secure codeword. The estimate of the intermediate secure codeword (decoded by security unit 360) may then be converted to an estimate of the original message using the first security code as discussed previously. The estimate of the original message may then be provided to a baseband processor 370 to provide final conversion into information that may be used by a processor 375. A memory 380 may be used to store the information, if necessary.

[0040] Corresponding to the second security code used in the transmitter, receiver 350 may generate an estimate of a segment of coded bits from a vector of received signals using a linear decoder. The receiver may also generate the estimate of the original message from the estimate of the intermediate secure codeword using a linear decoder corresponding to the first security code.

[0041] A channel quality feedback unit 385 may be used to provide information related to a communications channel between the transmitter and receiver 350, such as CSI, back to the transmitter. In general, the channel quality feedback unit 385 transmits a feedback message to the transmitter, where the feedback message comprises a security indicator, and the security indicator provides channel quality information. The information related to the communications channel may assist in the securing of information transmitted by transmitter 300 to receiver 350 as well as improve overall data transmission performance.

[0042] Figure 4a illustrates a flow diagram of transmitter operations 400 in transmitting a secure message. Transmitter operations 400 may be indicative of operations taking place in a transmitter, such as transmitter 105, as it transmits a secure message(s) to a legitimate receiver, such as legitimate receiver 110. The secure message(s) transmitted by the transmitter may be secured using a secrecy code, where the secrecy code comprises a first security code and a second security code. As an example, the transmitter may employ a secure network code as the first security code. The second security codes may be binning codes or any other secrecy-capacity-achieving or non-secrecy-capacity-achieving codes. Transmitter operations 400 may occur while the transmitter is in a normal operating mode and while the transmitter has secure messages to transmit to the legitimate receiver.

[0043] Transmitter operations 400 may begin with the transmitter receiving a message to transmit, wherein the message is to be transmitted in a secure fashion (block 405). The message, for example, a security key(s), personal information, financial information, or so forth, may be provided by an application executing on an electronic device coupled to the transmitter, received in another message, retrieved from a memory or storage, or so forth.

[0044] The message may then be encoded using a first security code to produce L segments of coded bits (block 410). The encoding of the message with the first security code produces L individual segments of coded bits, where L is a non-negative integer value typically greater than one. The coding of the first security code may be such that a subset of the L individual segments of coded bits must be received prior to decoding at least a portion of the message. The use of the first security code may help to improve the overall security of the transmission of the message. Each of the L segments of coded bits may subsequently be encoded into a secure output codeword. The L output codewords are then transmitted to a receiver. Each code segment may be equal in size or they may be different in size. As an example, the transmitter may employ a secure network code as the first security code, which may allow the transmitter to spread the information bits contained in the message into L separate transmissions.

[0045] By encoding the message across multiple (e.g., L) segments of coded bits, it may be possible to select a first security code such that even if an eavesdropper intercepts up to a number of the transmissions (segments of coded bits), e.g., K, where K is a security parameter of the first security code and is a non-negative integer value less than or equal to L, the eavesdropper may not be able to decode any portion of the message. Contrasted with simply encoding the message for a single transmission, where the eavesdropper may be capable of decoding the message in its entirety if it is able to intercept the transmission, with encoding the message across multiple transmissions, the eavesdropper must intercept more than K transmissions before it may be able to decode any portion of the message.

[0046] A simple version of secure network coding considers the following secrecy communications scenario: the transmitter transmits L output codewords over L time instances, each of which has a rate R and can be received by the legitimate receiver without any error. The eavesdropper may receive at most K out of the L packets without being able to intercept any portion of the message. It may be shown that the maximum rate per packet at which the transmitter may securely communicate to the legitimate receiver is expressible as



[0047] Furthermore, the secrecy rate of the communications may be achieved using a linear code to generate the L output codewords. The secrecy code may be referred to as a "K-out-of-L" secure code.

[0048] Let Rs be the targeted secrecy rate when the transmitter decides to transmit with coding over L peaks. Then the use of the "K-out-of-L" secure code to encode the message will guarantee that as long as no more than K packets (or transmissions) are intercepted, the secure communications may achieve a rate of Rs per packet (transmission).

[0049] The L segments of coded bits may be equal or substantially unequal in size. If a segment of coded bits is shorter than others, the segment of coded bits may be padded so that all of the segments of coded bits are equal in size. For example, the secure message may be partitioned into L segments of coded bits with each segment of coded bits being smaller in size than a data payload of a packet; the segments of coded bits may then be padded with additional information or null data to fill the data payload of a packet. According to an embodiment, the value of L may be set based on a number of factors, including a desired message latency, data transfer rate, desired security level, expected message size, and so forth. For example, a large value of L may increase the security of the secure message, however, message latency may also increase since a larger number of transmissions are needed to transmit the secure message in its entirety. Additionally, large values of L may decrease data transfer rate.

[0050] With the message encoded using the first security code to produce L segments of coded bits, the transmitter may then encode each of the L segments of coded bits using a second security code to produce L output codewords (block 415) and transmit the L output codewords of the secure message to the legitimate receiver, wherein the L output codewords are transmitted in L transmissions (block 420). Collectively, encoding the message with the first security code to produce L segments of coded bits (block 410) and encoding the L segments of coded bits with the second security code to produce L output codewords (block 415) may be referred to as encoding the message with a secrecy code (combination 417).

[0051] According to an embodiment, the transmitter may transmit each of the L output codewords one at a time to the legitimate receiver when the channel quality (e.g., channel gain) exceeds a threshold, such as threshold τ. Whenever the transmitter transmits to the legitimate receiver (when the channel gain is greater than the threshold, for example) using a security code (preferably a secrecy-capacity-achieving code), the communications occur at rate



[0052] According to an embodiment, the threshold τ may be dynamically adjusted to meet secrecy rate requirements. For example, if the message is relatively short, the threshold may be increased to increase overall security at the expense of the secrecy rate. While, if the message is long, the threshold may be decreased to reduce overall security while increasing the secrecy rate.

[0053] Figure 4b illustrates a flow diagram of transmitter operations 450 in transmitting the L output codewords of the secure message. Transmitter operations 450 may begin with the transmitter performing a check to determine if the channel quality satisfies a criterion, e.g., the channel quality exceeds the threshold τ (block 455). According to an embodiment, the transmitter may determine if the channel quality exceeds the threshold τ by using feedback information provided by the legitimate receiver. For example, the legitimate receiver may feedback information that is explicitly used for security. The explicit security feedback may be as simple as a one-bit value regarding the channel quality. The legitimate receiver may feedback to the transmitter a "1" to indicate that the channel quality is greater than the threshold τ and a "0" to indicate that the channel quality is not greater than the threshold τ. If the channel quality exceeds the threshold τ, one of the L output codewords of the secure message may be transmitted (block 460).

[0054] According to an alternative embodiment, the transmitter may use feedback intended for other uses for security purposes. For example, in a 3GPP LTE compliant communications system, a channel quality indicator (CQI) may be fedback by user equipment (UE) periodically or aperiodically to an eNB (a communications controller containing the transmitter) so that the eNB may make scheduling decisions. The CQI may also be utilized by the eNB to make a judgment similar to determining if the channel quality exceeds the threshold τ. As an example, the eNB may send a secure message only if the CQI is above a certain level.

[0055] According to another alternative embodiment, the transmitter may make use of implicit channel knowledge to determine if the channel quality exceeds the threshold. For example, channel quality knowledge may be available to the transmitter without feedback. In a time division duplexed (TDD) communications system, the eNB may be able to estimate the channel quality of a downlink channel based on an uplink sounding signal transmitted to the eNB by the legitimate receiver, taking advantage of channel reciprocity, for example.

[0056] Figure 5 illustrates a channel gain curve 500 of a legitimate channel used to transmit multiple output codewords of a single message. Channel gain may be an indicator of a channel's quality. As shown in Figure 5, channel gain curve 500 may vary, increasing and decreasing over time. At certain times, such as times corresponding to peaks 505 through 508, channel gain curve 500 may exceed a threshold τ (shown as dashed line). Each peak corresponds to a time when the transmitter may be able to transmit an output codeword of the secure message. For example, at peak 505 the transmitter may transmit a first output codeword of secure message A (shown as message A1), at peak 506 the transmitter may transmit a second output codeword of secure message A (shown as message A2), and so forth.

[0057] Referring back to Figure 4a, after the transmitter has transmitted all L output codewords of the secure message, transmitter operations 400 may then terminate.

[0058] Figure 6a illustrates a flow diagram of receiver operations 600 in receiving a secure message. Receiver operations 600 may be indicative of operations taking place in a receiver, such as legitimate receiver 110, as it receives a secured message(s) from a transmitter, such as transmitter 105. The secured message(s) received by the receiver may be secured using a secrecy code comprising a first security code and a second security code. The second security code may be a physical layer security code such as a binning code or any other secrecy-capacity-achieving or non-achieving code. Receiver operations 600 may occur while the receiver is in a normal operating mode and while the transmitter has secure messages to transmit to the receiver.

[0059] Receiver operations 600 may begin with the receiver receiving a transmission from the transmitter (block 605). As discussed previously, the transmitter may partition and encode a secure message into L output codewords to help increase the security of the secure message and then transmit one of the L output codewords each time that it transmits to the receiver. At the receiver, the receiver may need to wait until it has received all L output codewords of the secure message prior to attempting to decode the secure message.

[0060] After receiving each of the L output codewords, the receiver may recover a segment of coded bits from the received output codeword by decoding the received output codeword with the second security code (block 610). Then, the receiver may perform a check to determine if it has received all L output codewords of the secure message (block 615). If the receiver has not received all L output codewords of the secure message, then the receiver may return to block 605 to receive additional output codewords. Although the receiver may receive both secure messages and non-secure messages from the transmitter, the receiver knows which transmission belongs to the secure message, for example, by checking a flag in the transmission.

[0061] If the receiver has received all L output codewords of the secure message, then the receiver may combine the L segments of coded bits of the secure message into an intermediate secure codeword and then decode the intermediate secure codeword to obtain the original secure message (block 620). The receiver may make use of a decoder complementary to an encoder, which encoded the secure message into the intermediate secure codeword using a first security code, partitioned the intermediate secure codeword into L segments of coded bits, and then encoded each of the L segments of coded bits into an output codeword. Receiver operations 600 may then terminate.

[0062] Figure 6b illustrates a flow diagram of receiver operations 650 in providing channel quality information to a transmitter. Receiver operations 650 may be indicative of operations occurring in a receiver, such as legitimate receiver 110, as the receiver provides channel quality information to a transmitter, such as transmitter 105. Receiver operations 650 may occur while the receiver is in a normal operating mode and while the transmitter has secure messages to transmit to the receiver.

[0063] Receiver operations 650 may begin with the receiver performing a check to determine if the channel quality exceeds a threshold (block 655). For example, the receiver may check to determine if the channel gain exceeds the threshold. If the channel quality does not exceed the threshold, then the receiver may return to block 655 to repeat the check. If the channel quality does exceed the threshold, then the receiver may feedback an indicator to the transmitter; the indicator indicating that the channel quality does exceed the threshold (block 660).

[0064] The indicator may be feedback in a feedback message specifically intended for security use or the indicator may be included along with or combined with other feedback information. Receiver operations 650 may then terminate.

[0065] According to an alternative embodiment, the receiver feedbacks an indicator indicating the channel quality regardless of whether the channel feedback exceeds the threshold or not. For example, the indicator may be set to a first value to indicate that the channel quality exceeds the threshold and the indicator may be set to a second value to indicate that the channel quality does not exceed the threshold.

[0066] When a secrecy-capacity-achieving code is used to protect each data transmission, a probability that each transmission is intercepted may be given as:



[0067] The communications may become insecure when more than K data transmissions have been intercepted. Therefore, the interception probability pINT may be given as:



[0068] When K = 0, no coding is performed across the different transmission opportunities corresponding to when the channel quality exceeds the threshold, and the interception probability pINT given in Equation (4) reduces to the case without the first security code, where a secure message is coded and transmitted for a single transmission opportunity. In general, a smaller interception probability may be obtained by optimizing over K.

[0069] Figure 7 illustrates a data plot 700 of interception probability for a range of K for two different secrecy rates. A first curve 705 corresponds to interception probability for a secrecy rate of 0.05 bits/s/Hz and a second curve 710 corresponds to interception probability for a secrecy rate of 0.10 bits/s/Hz. Data for the curves were determined for a communications system where both the legitimate channel and the eavesdropper channel were assumed to be in Rayleigh fading, with an average received signal-to-noise ratio P/N0 for the eavesdropper set at 0 dB. The threshold τ is 2, therefore an average received signal-to-noise ratio /N0 for the legitimate receiver is about 3 dB. Furthermore, the probability of transmission is approximately 14 percent. Additionally, L was set to 20.

[0070] As shown in Figure 7, by properly selecting an appropriate value for K, the technique disclosed in Figure 4a (corresponding to values of K > 0) may substantially reduce the probability of interception over the technique discussed in Figure 2 (corresponding to K = 0). For a given set of (τ, Rs, K) as K increases, an actual transmission rate

increases, and p0 increases according to Equation (3) for a given eavesdropper channel condition gE. However, a larger value of K may also reduce the number of terms in the summation in Equation (4). Therefore, the parameters should be chosen properly to achieve maximum security, e.g., valleys of the curves shown in Figure 7.

[0071] Although the embodiments and their advantages have been described in detail, it should be understood that various changes, substitutions and alterations can be made herein without departing from the invention as defined by the appended claims. Moreover, the scope of the present application is not intended to be limited to the particular embodiments of the process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, means, methods and steps described in the specification. As one of ordinary skill in the art will readily appreciate from the disclosure of the present invention, processes, machines, manufacture, compositions of matter, means, methods, or steps, presently existing or later to be developed, that perform substantially the same function or achieve substantially the same result as the corresponding embodiments described herein may be utilized according to the present invention. Accordingly, the appended claims are intended to include within their scope such processes, machines, manufacture, compositions of matter, means, methods, or steps.


Claims

1. A method for transmitting secure messages by a transmitter (105), the method comprising:

encoding (417) a message with a secrecy code to produce L output codewords, wherein L is an integer greater than 1; and

for each output codeword of the L output codewords, transmitting (420) the each output codeword to a communications device (110) in response to determining that a channel quality of a channel between the transmitter (105) and the communications device (110) satisfies a criterion.

characterized in that:

the secrecy code comprises a first security code and a second security code, the first security code encodes the message to produce an intermediate secure codeword which is partitioned into L segments of coded bits, and the second security code encodes a segment of coded bits into an output codeword.


 
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the first security code encodes the message with a sequence of bits K1 which is not related to the message.
 
3. The method of claim 2, wherein the first security code generates an intermediate secure codeword based on a linear coding of the message and the sequence K1, and wherein the intermediate secure codeword is partitioned into the L segments of coded bits.
 
4. The method of claim 1, wherein the second security code encodes an i-th segment of coded bits with a sequence of bits K2i which is not related to the i-th segment of coded bits, where i is an integer value.
 
5. The method of claim 1, wherein the first security code comprises a secure network code and the second security code comprises a binning code.
 
6. The method of claim 1, wherein the criterion is that the channel quality exceeds a threshold, and wherein determining that a channel quality satisfies a criterion comprises:

receiving a signal from the communications device; and

determining the channel quality based on the received signal.


 
7. The method of claim 6, wherein determining the channel quality comprises:

computing a reverse channel quality between the communications device and the transmitter; and

determining the channel quality from the reverse channel quality.


 
8. A method for receiver operation, the method comprising:

receiving (605, 615) a secure transmission that includes L vectors of received signals, where L is an integer greater than 1, and wherein each vector of received signals is received in a different transmission; and

decoding (610, 620) a secure message from the L vectors of received signals,

characterized in that:

the decoding makes use of a secrecy code which comprises a first security code and a second security code, and

decoding a secure message comprises:

generating (610) an intermediate secure codeword from the L vectors of received signals based on the second security code; and

producing (620) the secure message from the intermediate secure codeword based on the first security code.


 
9. The method of claim 8, wherein generating an intermediate secure codeword comprises decoding (610) a vector of received signals of a secure transmission into a segment of coded bits using the second security code.
 
10. The method of claim 9, wherein generating (610) an intermediate secure codeword further comprises:

repeating the decoding a vector of received signals until L segments of coded bits are generated from the L vectors of received signals; and

combining the L segments of coded bits into the intermediate secure codeword.


 
11. The method of claim 8, further comprising transmitting (660) a feedback message to a transmitter from which the vectors of received signals were received, wherein the feedback message comprises a security indicator.
 
12. A transmitter (300) comprising:

a scheduler (305) coupled to a message input, the scheduler configured to arrange a timing of transmissions of secure messages to a receiver, wherein the scheduling of the timing is based on a channel quality of a channel between the transmitter and the receiver;

a security unit (310) coupled to the scheduler, the security unit configured to encode a message provided by the message input into L output codewords using a secrecy code, where L is an integer greater than 1;

a security code store (315) coupled to the security unit, the security code store configured to store the secrecy code; and

a transmit circuit (320) coupled to the security unit, the transmit unit configured to prepare an output codeword for transmission,

characterized in that:

the secrecy code comprises a first security code and a second security code, the first security code encodes the message to produce an intermediate secure codeword which is partitioned into L segments of coded bits, and the second security code encodes a segment of coded bits into an output codeword.


 
13. The transmitter of claim 12, wherein the scheduler (305) is configured to schedule a transmission of an output codeword when the channel quality exceeds a threshold.
 
14. The transmitter of claim 12, wherein the first security code generates an intermediate secure codeword based on a linear coding of the message and a sequence of bits not related to the message, and the second security code encodes a segment of the intermediate secure codeword into an output codeword.
 


Ansprüche

1. Verfahren zum Senden von sicheren Nachrichten durch einen Sender (105), wobei das Verfahren Folgendes umfasst:

Codieren (417) einer Nachricht mit einem Geheimhaltungscode, um L Ausgabe-Codeworte zu produzieren, wobei L eine ganze Zahl größer als 1 ist; und

für jedes Ausgabe-Codewort aus den L Ausgabe-Codeworten Senden (420) jedes Ausgabe-Codeworts zu einem Kommunikationsgerät (110) in Reaktion auf das Bestimmen, dass eine Kanalqualität des Kanals zwischen dem Sender (105) und dem Kommunikationsgerät (110) ein Kriterium erfüllt,

dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass:

der Geheimhaltungscode einen ersten Sicherheitscode und einen zweiten Sicherheitscode umfasst, wobei der erste Sicherheitscode die Nachricht codiert, um ein sicheres Zwischen-Codewort zu produzieren, das in L Segmente aus codierten Bits unterteilt ist, und der zweite Sicherheitscode ein Segment codierter Bits in ein Ausgabe-Codewort codiert.


 
2. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, wobei der erste Sicherheitscode die Nachricht mit einer Folge von Bits K1 codiert, die in keiner Beziehung zu der Nachricht steht.
 
3. Verfahren nach Anspruch 2, wobei der erste Sicherheitscode ein sicheres Zwischen-Codewort basierend auf einem linearen Codieren der Nachricht und der Folge K1 erzeugt und wobei das sichere Zwischen-Codewort in L Segmente aus codierten Bits unterteilt ist.
 
4. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, wobei der zweite Sicherheitscode ein i-tes Segment aus codierten Bits mit einer Folge aus Bits K2i codiert, die in keiner Beziehung zu dem i-ten Segment codierter Bits steht, wobei i ein ganzzahliger Wert ist.
 
5. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, wobei der erste Sicherheitscode einen sicheren Netzcode umfasst und der zweite Sicherheitscode einen "Binning Code" umfasst.
 
6. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, wobei das Kriterium ist, dass die Kanalqualität einen Schwellenwert übersteigt, und wobei das Bestimmen, dass eine Kanalqualität ein Kriterium erfüllt, Folgendes umfasst:

Empfangen eines Signals von dem Kommunikationsgerät; und

Bestimmen der Kanalqualität basierend auf dem empfangenen Signal.


 
7. Verfahren nach Anspruch 6, wobei das Bestimmen der Kanalqualität Folgendes umfasst:

Berechnen einer Rückkanalqualität zwischen dem Kommunikationsgerät und dem Sender; und

Bestimmen der Kanalqualität aus der Rückkanalqualität.


 
8. Verfahren zum Betreiben eines Empfängers, wobei das Verfahren Folgendes umfasst:

Empfangen (605, 615) einer sicheren Übertragung, die L Vektoren von empfangenen Signalen enthält, wobei L eine ganze Zahl größer als 1 ist und wobei jeder Vektor empfangener Signale in einer unterschiedlichen Übertragung empfangen wird; und

Decodieren (610, 620) einer sicheren Nachricht aus den L Vektoren empfangener Signale;

dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass:

das Decodieren einen Geheimhaltungscode verwendet, der einen ersten Sicherheitscode und einen zweiten Sicherheitscode umfasst, und

das Decodieren einer sicheren Nachricht Folgendes umfasst:

Erzeugen (610) eines sicheren Zwischen-Codeworts aus den L Vektoren empfangener Signale basierend auf dem zweiten Sicherheitscode; und

Produzieren (620) der sicheren Nachricht aus dem sicheren Zwischen-Codewort basierend auf dem ersten Sicherheitscode.


 
9. Verfahren nach Anspruch 8, wobei das Erzeugen eines sicheren Zwischen-Codeworts das Decodieren (610) eines Vektors empfangener Signale einer sicheren Übertragung in ein Segment aus codierten Bits unter Verwendung des zweiten Sicherheitscodes umfasst.
 
10. Verfahren nach Anspruch 9, wobei das Erzeugen (610) eines sicheren Zwischen-Codeworts ferner Folgendes umfasst:

Wiederholen des Decodierens eines Vektors empfangener Signale, bis L Segmente aus codierten Bits aus den L Vektoren empfangener Signale erzeugt sind; und

Kombinieren der L Segmente aus codierten Bits in das sichere Zwischen-Codewort.


 
11. Verfahren nach Anspruch 8, das ferner das Senden (660) einer Rückmeldungsnachricht zu einem Sender, von dem die Vektoren der empfangenen Signale empfangen wurden, umfasst, wobei die Rückmeldungsnachricht ein Sicherheitskennzeichen umfasst.
 
12. Sender (300), der Folgendes umfasst:

einen Scheduler (305), der mit einem Nachrichteneingang gekoppelt ist, wobei der Scheduler konfiguriert ist, eine Zeitplanung der Übertragungen von sicheren Nachrichten zu einem Empfänger zu terminieren, wobei das Festlegen der Zeitplanung auf einer Kanalqualität eines Kanals zwischen dem Sender und dem Empfänger basiert;

eine Sicherheitseinheit (310), die mit dem Scheduler gekoppelt ist, wobei die Sicherheitseinheit konfiguriert ist, eine Nachricht, die durch den Nachrichteneingang bereitgestellt ist, in L Ausgabe-Codeworte unter Verwendung eines Geheimhaltungscodes zu codieren, wobei L eine ganze Zahl größer als 1 ist;

einen Sicherheitscodespeicher (315), der mit der Sicherheitseinheit gekoppelt ist,

wobei der Sicherheitscodespeicher konfiguriert ist, den Geheimhaltungscode zu speichern; und

eine Sendeschaltung (320), die mit der Sicherheitseinheit gekoppelt ist, wobei die Sendeeinheit konfiguriert ist, ein Ausgabe-Codewort zum Senden vorzubereiten,

dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass:

der Geheimhaltungscode einen ersten Sicherheitscode und einen zweiten Sicherheitscode umfasst, wobei der erste Sicherheitscode die Nachricht codiert, um ein sicheres Zwischen-Codewort zu produzieren, das in L Segmente aus codierten Bits unterteilt ist, und der zweite Sicherheitscode ein Segment codierter Bits in ein Ausgabe-Codewort codiert.


 
13. Sender nach Anspruch 12, wobei der Scheduler (305) konfiguriert ist, eine Übertragung eines Ausgabe-Codeworts zu terminieren, wenn die Kanalqualität einen Schwellenwert übersteigt.
 
14. Sender nach Anspruch 12, wobei der erste Sicherheitscode ein sicheres Zwischen-Codewort basierend auf einer linearen Codierung der Nachricht und einer Folge von Bits, die nicht in Beziehung zu der Nachricht steht, erzeugt und der zweite Sicherheitscode ein Segment des sicheren Zwischen-Codeworts in ein Ausgabe-Codewort codiert.
 


Revendications

1. Procédé de transmission de messages sécurisés par un émetteur (105), le procédé comprenant :

le codage (417) d'un message avec un code secret afin de produire L mots de code de sortie, dans lequel L est un entier supérieur à 1 ; et

pour chaque mot de code de sortie des L mots de code de sortie, transmettre (420) chaque mot de code de sortie à un dispositif de communication (110) en réponse à la détermination du fait qu'une qualité d'un canal entre l'émetteur (105) et le dispositif de communication (110) respecte un critère,

caractérisé en ce que :

le code secret comprend un premier code de sécurité et un second code de sécurité, le premier code de sécurité code le message afin de produire un mot de code sécurisé intermédiaire qui est partitionné en L segments de bits codés, et le second code de sécurité code un segment de bits codés en un mot de code de sortie.


 
2. Procédé selon la revendication 1, dans lequel le premier code de sécurité décode le message avec une séquence de bits K1 qui n'est pas liée au message.
 
3. Procédé selon la revendication 2, dans lequel le premier code de sécurité génère un mot de code sécurisé intermédiaire sur la base d'un codage linéaire du message et de la séquence de bits K1 et dans lequel le mot de code sécurisé intermédiaire est partitionné en les L segments de bits codés.
 
4. Procédé selon la revendication 1, dans lequel le second code de sécurité code un i-ème segment de bits codés avec une séquence de bits K2i qui n'est pas liée au i-ème segment de bits codés, où i est une valeur entière.
 
5. Procédé selon la revendication 1, dans lequel le premier code de sécurité comprend un code de réseau sécurisé et le second code de sécurité comprend un code de tri en classes.
 
6. Procédé selon la revendication 1, dans lequel le critère est que le qualité de canal dépasse un seuil et dans lequel la détermination du fait qu'une qualité de canal respecte un critère comprend :

la réception d'un signal en provenance du dispositif de communication ; et

la détermination de la qualité de canal sur la base du signal reçu.


 
7. Procédé selon la revendication 6, dans lequel la détermination de la qualité de canal comprend :

le calcul d'une qualité de canal inverse entre le dispositif de communication et l'émetteur ; et

la détermination de la qualité de canal à partir de la qualité de canal inverse.


 
8. Procédé de mise en fonctionnement d'un récepteur, le procédé comprenant :

la réception (605, 615) d'une transmission sécurisée qui comprend L vecteurs de signaux reçus, où L est un entier supérieur à 1 et dans lequel chaque vecteur de signaux reçus est reçu dans une transmission différente, et

le décodage (610, 620) d'un message sécurisé à partir des L vecteurs de signaux reçus,

caractérisé en ce que :

le décodage fait appel à un code secret qui comprend un premier code de sécurité et

un second code de sécurité, et

le décodage d'un message sécurisé comprend :

la génération (610) d'un mot de code sécurisé intermédiaire à partir des L vecteurs de signaux reçus sur la base du second code de sécurité ; et

la production (620) du message sécurisé à partir du mot de code sécurisé sur la base du premier code de sécurité.


 
9. Procédé selon la revendication 8, dans lequel la génération d'un mot de code sécurisé intermédiaire comprend le décodage (610) d'un vecteur de signaux reçus d'une transmission sécurisée en un segment de bits codés au moyen du second code de sécurité.
 
10. Procédé selon la revendication 8, dans lequel la génération (610) d'un mot de code sécurisé intermédiaire comprend en outre :

la répétition du décodage d'un vecteur de signaux reçus jusqu'à ce que L segments de bits codés soient générés à partir des L vecteurs de signaux reçus ; et

la combinaison des L segments de bits codés en le mot de code sécurisé intermédiaire.


 
11. Procédé selon la revendication 8, comprenant en outre la transmission (660) d'un message de rétroaction à un émetteur en provenance duquel les vecteurs de signaux reçus ont été reçus, dans lequel le message de rétroaction comprend un indicateur de sécurité.
 
12. Emetteur (300) comprenant :

un planificateur (305) relié à une entrée de message, le planificateur étant configuré pour organiser un cadencement de transmissions de message sécurisés vers un récepteur, dans lequel la planification du cadencement a pour une base une qualité de canal d'un canal entre l'émetteur et le récepteur ;

une unité de sécurité (310) reliée au planificateur, l'unité de sécurité étant configurée pour coder un message fourni par l'entrée de message en L mots de code de sortie au moyen d'un code secret, où L est un entier supérieur à 1 ;

une mémoire de code de sécurité (315) reliée à l'unité de sécurité, la mémoire de code de sécurité étant configurée pour stocker le code secret ; et

un circuit de transmission (320) relié à l'unité de sécurité, l'unité de transmission étant configurée pour préparer un mot de code de sortie pour sa transmission,

caractérisé en ce que :

le code secret comprend un premier code de sécurité et un second code de sécurité, le premier code de sécurité code le message afin de produire un mot de code de sécurité intermédiaire qui est partitionné en L segments de bits codés, et le second code de sécurité code un segment de bits codés en un mot de code de sortie.


 
13. Emetteur selon la revendication 12, dans lequel le planificateur (305) est configuré pour planifier une transmission d'un mot de code de sortie lorsque la qualité de canal dépasse un seuil.
 
14. Emetteur selon la revendication 12, dans lequel le premier code de sécurité génère un mot de code sécurisé intermédiaire sur la base d'un codage linéaire du message et d'une séquence de bits non liée au message, et le second code de sécurité code un segment du mot de code sécurisé intermédiaire en un mot de code de sortie.
 




Drawing

















Cited references

REFERENCES CITED IN THE DESCRIPTION



This list of references cited by the applicant is for the reader's convenience only. It does not form part of the European patent document. Even though great care has been taken in compiling the references, errors or omissions cannot be excluded and the EPO disclaims all liability in this regard.

Patent documents cited in the description




Non-patent literature cited in the description