[0001] The invention relates to a field vital output device for directly interfacing a control
logic unit with at least one or more wayside units, such as relays, contacts, lamps
and the like, which device comprises:
at least one input for the control signals generated by the control logic unit;
at least one output port for transmission of a wayside unit actuating signal, which
output port is and/or may be connected to said wayside unit;
means for enabling/disabling said output port to transmit the wayside unit actuating
signal;
means for generating the wayside unit actuating output signal, which are connected
to said output port;
which control signals, generated by the control logic unit, control the means for
enabling/disabling the output port of the output device to allow/prevent transmission
of the wayside unit actuating signal.
[0002] These systems are well known and, in railway applications or the like, consist of
railway safety relays. They are used, for instance, for actuating remote safety relays,
which are situated at or near the wayside units, such as particularly the relays used
for remote parallel information transmission.
[0003] Prior art railway safety relays and thermal cutout circuits have a complex and bulky
construction and do not ensure electrical insulation between field devices, i.e. wayside
units and electronic devices. Furthermore, prior art railway safety relays require
regular maintenance.
[0004] Therefore, the invention is based on the problem of providing a stationary output
device for actuating field devices, such as wayside units or the like, which may be
used instead of prior art railway safety relays, and provide at least the same or
better safety standards as compared with prior art relays.
[0005] The invention fulfils the above objects by providing an output device as described
hereinbefore, having:
a switching element that can set the wayside unit actuating signal transmission enabled/disabled
state of the output port;
electronics for detecting such state from the control imposed by the control logic
unit, the output signal generating means being designed to be vitally disabled when
the enabled/disabled state of said port does not correspond to the control condition
imposed by the control logic.
[0006] Thanks to this particular configuration, the conventional enabling/disabling means,
typically fail-safe railway relays, may be replaced by commercial non-fail-safe electromechanical
enabling/disabling means, such as force guided relays, without affecting the required
safety standard, thereby reducing the volume for the requested function, and avoiding
regular maintenance needs. This is achieved by associating the electromechanical means
to electronics that, using an efficient mechanism for vital control of the switching
state, allows to disable the output device whenever it comes to an unsafe permissive
state.
[0007] Advantageously, the electromechanical switching element comprises at least one input
and at least one output. The input-to-output relation is a function of the port enabled/disabled
state and is vitally detectable by the electronics by comparison of the output of
the switching element with a check code transmitted to its input.
[0008] According to one embodiment, the switching element has at least one pair of relay
contacts, also known as auxiliary contacts, which are electrically connected to the
input and the output of the switching element respectively. This pair of contacts
is mechanically connected to the port enabling/disabling means, which are advantageously
a second pair of relay contacts, so-called main contacts, which are electrically connected
to the output signal generating means and the output port respectively. The two pairs
of contacts are mechanically interconnected so that switching of one pair causes switching
of the other, and are typically part of the same relay, which is also known as a force
guided relay for its mechanical characteristic of only allowing rigid movements between
the contacts. This allows to assess the closed/open state of the main contacts, and
of the port, by analyzing the open/closed state of the auxiliary contacts. The auxiliary
contacts are not energized by the wayside unit control voltage, thence their state
may be easily detected by determining whether or not a control signal transmitted
to one contact reaches the other contact of the pair. If the closed/open state of
the auxiliary contacts, and therefore the enabled/disabled state of the port, is not
consistent with the transmitted actuating control, the vital supply voltage is promptly
cut off, and the port output is set to a safe non permissive state, corresponding
to a de-energized condition of the wayside unit.
[0009] In a particularly advantageous configuration, the main contacts are normally open
when idle (i.e. when no control is transmitted thereto) to ensure a safe non permissive
state when the port is not selected/enabled, whereas the auxiliary contacts are normally
closed when idle. Furthermore, the mechanical linkage among the contacts prevents
them from being simultaneously closed/open. Thus, the logic port enabled state is
reversed with respect to the state of the auxiliary contacts, which provides further
protection against short-circuit failures.
[0010] When the output signal is a bipolar signal, e.g. when the wayside units are actuated
by DC voltage, the device may also include a signal polarity selection circuit, which
may also accomplish the task of the output port enabling/disabling means. The use
of multiple relay contacts, belonging either to the same relay or to different relays,
allows to separately enable/disable each of the output signal poles and also to exchange
polarities by using an antiparallel assembly of multiple relays designed to be controlled
in a mutually exclusive manner. This does not affect the safety level, the enabled/disabled
state of each contact being repeatedly vitally read.
[0011] The device operates in a safe manner, as the mechanisms for checking the actual port
enabled/disabled state are directly operative on the function of vitally enabling
output signal generation, and typically consist of DC/DC or DC/AC converters which
are pulse-driven under the control of a DC enabling signal.
[0012] The device may advantageously comprise an overcurrent protection circuit, typically
between the signal generator and the enabling/disabling relays, which is calibrated
to prevent the generated output signal from reaching the output port, typically using
a manually or software-wise resetting double break mechanism, as soon as a current
absorption above a given trigger value is detected. This provides an additional safety
mechanism for the device, particularly against short-circuit failures, such as those
caused by cable insulation losses, especially if the output ports of the uncontrolled
devices are normally short-circuited, e.g. by means of force guided relays. The combination
of the overcurrent protection and short-circuit functions is particularly effective
in protecting the wayside units from undue actuation, e.g. caused by double, separate,
ordered contact failures, i.e. involving a short-circuit between cables directed to
different units. These failures cause an uncontrolled unit to be in parallel with
a controlled unit and to be unduly actuated as a result. However, since each uncontrolled
unit is short-circuited due to the short circuit on the corresponding vital output
device, the port that delivers the required power to actuate the unit is also short-circuited,
thereby generating an increase of the delivered current, which causes overcurrent
protection to be triggered before any undue actuation.
[0013] The device typically has a local unit interfacing with the central logic unit for
controlling the device. The local unit is configured to convert the port enabling/disabling
controls from the central logic unit to corresponding relay switching controls and
is interfaced with the overcurrent protection circuit to disable the relay switching
controls whenever the protection circuit is triggered. The local unit further comprises
electronics for vital detection of the wayside unit actuating signal transmission
enabled/disabled state of the output port. Advantageously, the port enabled/disabled
state is detected by circulation of functional check codes (codewords) from the central
logic unit to the local unit. The local unit turns the codewords into input signals
for the switching element, reads the output thereof and codes such output into corresponding
codewords to be transmitted back to the central logic unit. Thus, the central unit
can assess the port state by checking the open/closed states of the contacts of the
switching element, i.e. the auxiliary contacts of the enabling/disabling relay. Particularly,
in the specific case of auxiliary contacts that are normally open when idle, the port
is in the enabled state when the codewords do not circulate through said contacts.
[0014] In a further aspect, the invention relates to a vital input and/or output field system
comprising:
a control logic unit for processing data and/or performing other control tasks, which
logic unit comprises means for generating unique codes for functional check of the
processing and/or receiving and/or transmitting steps being performed (so-called codewords)
and a port for the transmission of the codewords generated at each step;
a fail-safe protection unit, with a memory containing a program for checking the functional
steps of the logic unit and a program for checking the correctness of functional check
codes (codewords) and the time sequence thereof, which protection unit communicates
through a transmitting and/or receiving port with the logic unit and generates enabling
signals when the codewords are correct;
a vital output device which communicates with the logic unit to receive control signals
and/or transmit state/diagnostic signals based on the control codewords and interfaces
with the protection unit to receive the vital enabling signal based on the result
of codeword correctness and sequence checks.
[0015] The protection unit preferably comprises a power source which is controlled to deliver
vital supply voltage to the output device in response to checkword/codewords correctness
and sequence checks. The vital supply voltage is cut off when the enabled/disabled
state of the output device does not correspond to the control condition imposed by
the control logic.
[0016] For increased reliability and safety, the system is preferably of the redundant type,
which means that all wayside units or at least some of them are controlled by a pair
of parallel equivalent vital output devices. The system comprises a vital redundancy
management circuit which is configured to exclusively enable the first or second device
respectively, to ensure safe actuation of the wayside unit in case of malfunction
of either device.
[0017] According to an embodiment, the system comprises two or more vital output devices
for directly interfacing a control logic unit with two or more wayside units, such
as relays, contacts, lamps and the like, which devices comprise:
an overcurrent protection circuit, which is calibrated to prevent the generated output
signal from reaching the output port of the device if current absorption exceeds a
given trigger value;
a relay having at least one pair of normally open contacts, which can short-circuit
the output port, when controlled to do so,
which system is configured to short circuit the output ports of uncontrolled devices
so that the overcurrent protection circuit of the controlled port can be triggered
to prevent any insulation loss of the cables directed to the unit from causing undue
actuation of uncontrolled units.
[0018] Particularly, the system is configured to protect the units from undue actuation
caused by double separate ordered contact on multipolar cables and the relays used
to short circuit the ports are force guided by auxiliary contacts to allow rereading
of the actual enabled state, by codeword circulation.
[0019] In another aspect, the invention relates to a system for safe digital information
exchange between a control logic unit and one or more remote wayside units, by means
of electrically insulated control conductors, which information is transmitted by
the logic unit to the remote unit/s in the form of controls for forcing the presence/absence
of voltage corresponding to the type of binary information desired on one or more
ports that can be accessed by the remote unit/s. The energized/de-energized state
of the port/s is determined by enabling/disabling one or more force guided relays
in electric communication with voltage generating means. The enabled/disabled state
of said relay/s is reread by the control logic by circulation of codewords for vitally
disabling such generating means when the enabled/disabled state of the relay/s does
not correspond to the control condition imposed by the control logic due to the presence
of failures or undesired potentials possibly induced on control conductors due to
degradation of ground and mutual insulation of conductors.
[0020] Particularly, the system is configured to cyclically check the insulation of control
conductors by repeated vital reading of the actual enabled state of a remote port
after transmission of a predetermined sequence of enabling codewords to the control
conductors.
[0021] Further features and improvements will form the subject of the dependent claims.
[0022] The features of the invention and the advantages derived therefrom will be more apparent
from the following detailed description of the annexed drawings, in which:
Fig. 1 is a simplified block diagram of a subsystem for safe management of field vital
input/output.
Fig. 2 is a diagram of the vital output device of the invention with reference to
a single output port.
Fig. 3 is the block diagram of relay-driven actuation and polarity selection stage.
Fig. 4 is the block diagram of the vital power supply stage.
fig. 5A is a block diagram of a first embodiment of the overcurrent protection stage.
Fig. 5B shows a second embodiment of the overcurrent protection stage.
Fig. 6 is the block diagram of central control logic.
Fig. 7 shows an example of a double separate ordered contact between two wayside units.
Fig. 8 is a simplified block diagram of a redundant subsystem for safe management
of field vital input/output.
[0023] While the example of the figures mainly relates to the field of railways, and particularly
to an output device and the associated control and/or monitoring system, for controlling
wayside units of a railway station system, this invention shall not be intended to
be limited thereby, as it is applicable to any output device that has to accomplish
fail-safe functions and use non fail-safe hardware for accomplishing its remote unit
actuation functions.
[0024] Referring to Fig. 1, the subsystem of this block diagram, known as ZLC, i.e. Zone
Logic Computer, comprises a control logic unit 1, which interfaces with one or more
wayside units 3, such as relays, contacts, lamps or the like, through a Field Vital
Input/Output FVIO. The device 2 is designed both to interpret the control signals
from the logic 1 and convert them into safe actuation signals 9 for the wayside unit
3 (Field Vital Output function, i.e. FVO 102), and to safely read data 10 from the
wayside unit 3 (Field Vital Input function, i.e. FVI 202). The device 2 interfaces
with the logic unit 1 by one or more data buses, two data buses being shown in Fig.
1, for output 4 and input 5 respectively. At its input, the device 2 receives power
6 for its internal digital circuits (+5V), AC voltage 7, typically 220 VAC, for generating
the actuation signal and a DC voltage 8 (12 VIT) for vitally enabling the generation
of such actuation signal.
[0025] Fig. 2 is a block diagram of the vital output device FVO 102 with reference to a
single output port. In one embodiment, the device 102 comprises 8 overcurrent-protected
output modules which, depending on the control from the logic 1, can provide a positive
or negative DC voltage (typically ±48V, ±144V) or an AC voltage (typically 150 Vac),
for actuating the wayside unit 3.
[0026] The voltage for actuating the wayside unit connected to the output port 9 is generated
by the module 10 which comprises, in a preferred embodiment, switching converters
that can convert the input AC voltage 7 into the desired output voltage V when the
vital signal 8 is enabled. The generator 10 comprises four converters to provide DC
voltages of 24V, 48V and 144V and an AC voltage of 150 V respectively. The circuit
110 selects the appropriate output voltage by actuating the corresponding converter.
According to an embodiment, such selection occurs by grouping ports: preferably eight
modules, or six and two modules, or four and four modules. Thus, each port may be
freely configured as needed. For safety, such configuration is performed manually
by the installation and/or testing operator during installation and/or testing, by
using jumpers or connectors on the motherboard of the module 110. Fig. 4 shows the
structure of the generator module 10, which is well known in the art, in greater detail.
Once the input AC voltage 7 has been high frequency filtered by the filter EMC 210
and has passed the overcurrent protection stage 310, it reaches the rectifier 410,
typically a diode bridge, and then the AC/DC or AC/AC conversion stage. Conversion
occurs by switching, as is known in the art, and is PWM driven under the control of
the DC enabling signal 8. Particularly, the enabling signal is operative on the pulsed-driving
stage to prevent generation of driving pulses when vital power +12VIT is not present.
The diagram of Fig. 4 is complemented by additional overcurrent protection components
910 and insulation components 710. In a first example, the insulation measurement
circuit is the one designated by 103 in Fig. 2.
[0027] Otherwise, a circuit for checking ground insulation 620 may be used, which is interfaced
with the local logic through a diagnostic circuit 70. Any ground insulation loss measurement
device may also be used, provided that it complies with EEC standard EN 61557-8.
[0028] The output voltage from the generator 10 reaches the overcurrent protection circuit
20 which disables the output whenever current absorption exceeds the trigger value.
As described in greater detail hereafter, a solid state double break switch 320' and
a double measurement circuit 120', as shown in Figures 5A and 5B, may be possibly
provided.
[0029] Two maximum current thresholds are provided, depending on overcurrent time. The first
threshold (known as "thermal" threshold) is lower than the second threshold (known
as "magnetic" threshold) but may be held for a longer time. The solid state switches
310 and the relays 130 and 230 of Fig. 3 may be disabled under the control of the
ZLC control logic software, which may break both phases of the signal (double-break)
and directly remove the port enabling control, when the "thermal" current threshold
is exceeded: this condition is communicated by the central control logic by corresponding
codewords.
[0030] When the "magnetic" current threshold is exceeded it is the local logic (designated
as 20 in Fig. 2) that causes the solid state switches 320 and/or 320', referring to
the variants of Figures 5A and 5B respectively, and possibly the relays 130 and 230
of Fig. 3, to break both signal phases (double-break). Such condition is indicated
by a LED on the front panel 80 and is diagnosed by the module 70 through the local
logic 60. For manual reset of overcurrent protection, a button is provided on the
panel 80 which enables the modules of the overcurrent device 20 again. Reset may be
also controlled remotely, by software means.
[0031] The trigger value of the protection circuit 20 is defined by local configuration,
as a function of the output voltage and the type of controlled unit. For example,
a default "thermal" value of 0.1 A corresponds to the 48V outputs.
[0032] Referring to the embodiment of Figure 5B, the overcurrent protection function 20
is provided by current measurement (sensing) circuits 120, and a static switch 320,
which is set to the open state by the circuit 220, when the sensed current exceeds
the trigger threshold.
[0033] In the variant embodiment of Figure 5A, the overcurrent protection function 20 is
provided by current measurement (sensing) circuits 120, 120' on both power conductors,
and a double static switch 320, 320' which is set to the open state by the circuit
220, when the sensed current exceeds the trigger threshold.
[0034] According to another feature, a test is regularly provided to check overcurrent protection
effectiveness, which test is controlled by the central logic SW (software) before
ports are enabled. Particularly referring to the variant embodiment of the figure,
before enabling any port, the SW closes a dummy load of known value is closed for
a short time, to cause the "thermal" current threshold to be exceeded, and checks
that the local sensing circuit detects this situation by dedicated codewords, and
then the SW opens the switch 320 and checks that the sensed current changes back to
zero. If one of these conditions is not fulfilled, the overcurrent protection circuit
does not operate properly and the corresponding port is not enabled.
[0035] After appropriate high frequency noise filtering by the filter 50, to meet the electromagnetic
compatibility standard EN50121-4, the output voltage from the overcurrent protection
module 20 reaches the output of the port 9 through the relay-driven actuation and
polarity selection stage 30 which form the core of the device.
[0036] Referring to Fig. 3, the relay-driven actuation and polarity selection stage 30 comprises
a pair of force guided relays 130 and 230, each having two pairs of main contacts
133-134, 135-126 and 233-234, 235-236, which are normally open when idle, i.e. are
able to break the circuit when no driving signal 137, 237 is detected. Each relay
130, 230 further comprises a pair of auxiliary Drive-Sense contacts (131-132, 231-232),
which are normally closed when idle. The components 138 and 238 reverse the output
signal with respect to the input to protect against short circuit failures between
Drive 131, 231 and Sense 132, 232.
[0037] Force guided relays, such as those compliant with EN 50205 and UIC736e, sold by ELESTA
relays GmbH, are so called because they have mechanically linked contacts, so that
switching of one pair of contacts causes switching of the other pair/s of contacts.
Particularly, normally open and normally closed contacts cannot be closed at the same
time. According to the above mentioned standard, if one pair of normally closed contacts
does not open when the relay is actuated, e.g. due to contacts being joined together,
all the remaining normally open contacts of the relay must not close or must be spaced
at least 0.5 mm apart. This allows to reliably assess the closed/open state of the
main contacts 133-134, 135-126 and 233-2234, 235-236, by analyzing the open/closed
state of the respective Drive/Sense auxiliary contacts 131-132, 231-232. The auxiliary
contacts are not energized, thence their state may be easily detected by determining
whether or not a control signal transmitted to the Drive terminal reaches the Sense
terminal, particularly with a opposite polarity, due to the reversal 138, 238.
[0038] The pair of force guided relays 130, 230 has the function of actuating the device,
i.e. of transmitting the voltage generated by the module 10 to the output port 9,
and of reversing the polarity thereof. The two relays 130, 230 are connected with
parallel inputs 133/233, 135/235 and antiparallel outputs 134/236, 136/234, to provide
a bipolar output signal which is in phase with the input signal, if the relay 130
is actuated, or in counterphase with the input signal, if the relay 230 is actuated.
[0039] The two relays 130, 230 are actuated by a high logic signal "1" on the control terminals
137, 237. The driving logic is configured to actuate the two relays 130, 230 when
the ON+ and ON- controls 530, 430 are at the high logic level "1" and in the enabled
"overcurrent protection" signal conditions respectively. This signal comes from the
block 20, upstream from the stage 30, and is disabled, i.e. assumes the low logic
value "0", when overcurrent protection is triggered, whereas the controls 530 and
430 come from the central logic unit 1 through the local logic 60. The driving signals
137, 237 of the relays 130 and 230 come from the AND ports 630 and 730 respectively,
which have the "overcurrent protection" signal 330 at their outputs, as well as the
ON+ signal 530 and ON- signal 430 respectively. If overcurrent protection is triggered,
then the relay drive is disabled whatever the control condition on the terminals 430
and 530. If protection is not triggered, the two relays 130, 230 may be controlled
by sending a high logic level signal on ON+ or ON-. The local control logic 60 shall
ensure that these controls are mutually exclusive, to prevent both relays 130, 230
from being in a simultaneously actuated condition, which would cause the port to be
shorted. Should such short-circuit occur due to a failure, safety would be ensured
anyway by overcurrent protection, which causes both relays 130, 230 to be disabled,
by disabling the signal 330.
[0040] A third relay NCC 40 provides the "neutral closed circuit" function, when the port
is not actuated, i.e. when both ON+ and ON- controls 530, 430 are at the low logic
level "0" and the board is operating, as two boards belonging to the systems N and
R respectively (see Fig. 8) may be connected in parallel to the same units. This condition
ensures that no failure or off condition of one of the systems causes the relay to
close (undue NCC). This normally open forced guide relay 40 is driven 140 by a logic
port NOR 830 having the ON+ and ON- signals 530, 430 as inputs. Actuation of the relay
causes the port to be shorted, thereby ensuring effective protection against cable
insulation loss failures, as better shown hereafter. The actuation state of the NCC
relay 40 may be diagnosed from its auxiliary contact (not shown).
[0041] Safety of the device is assured by a dynamic mechanism for controlling the actuation
state of the relays 130, 230, which is directly operative on the function of vitally
enabling 8 the actuation signal generator 10. If the closed/open state of the auxiliary
contacts 131-132 and 231-232, and therefore the opened/closed state of the main contacts
133-134, 135-136 and 233-234, 235-236 is not consistent with the transmitted actuating
control 530, 430, the vital supply voltage 8 is promptly cut off, and the port output
9 is set to a safe non permissive state, corresponding to a de-energized condition
of the wayside unit 3.
[0042] For the purposes of vital check, the two relays 130 and 230 are independently managed
by the local logic 60 through the Drive+/Sense+ circuits 131-132 and Drive-/Sense-
circuits 231-232, under the control of the central logic 1 of the ZLC subsystem. Checking
occurs by circulating a binary check word (codeword), generated by the logic 1 of
the ZLC system, through the (normally closed) auxiliary contact, corresponding to
the (normally open) main contact of the relevant relay 130, 230. When the port is
not controlled, the codeword circulates through the closed contacts and is reread
and denied by the logic. Codeword denial protects against short circuit failures between
Drive and Sense.
[0043] If the codeword read by the logic 1 does not correspond to the transmitted codeword,
the ZLC system disables vital power 7 to the subsystem in use, and the relevant output
ports 9 are not powered. The system is set to unpowered port conditions, in a response
time of less than 200 ms. The wayside units 3 with which the FVO subsystem 102 interfaces
shall ensure they will not be set to a permissive state for a time not shorter than
such safe response time.
[0044] The central logic 1, as exemplified in Fig. 6, is a vital computer logic, such as
the one disclosed in
WO03093999, and is basically composed of two main sections:
- A control section 101, which consists of a microprocessor system, including the required
peripherals (program memory, Random Access Memory (RAM), serial interfaces, auxiliary
clock and reset signal generating circuits, watchdogs), for interfacing both with
the vital output devices 102 through the bus 401 and with other subsystems through
the bus 501;
- A vital protection section 201, i.e. a checking and protecting unit which uses hardware
blocks and safety code-related software blocks which form a system for certifying
the check codes or words being generated by the control section 101 based on the feedback
transmitted thereto by the vital output devices 102, controlled by said section 101,
to control the compatibility with the received control and the proper execution of
the controlled function. The protecting unit has the function of ensuring the achievement
of a safety state in case of failures in the control section. The safety architecture
of the vital computer module 1 is of the reactive type; the protection section 201
has the task of identifying any behavior susceptible of affecting the safety of the
control section 101 and to force the system into a safety state in a given time. The
protection section is designed with fail-safe techniques.
[0045] The control section 101 and the protection section 201 are managed by two independent
processors, which communicate by a Dual Port RAM 301. More specifically, the control
section 101 generates codewords to feed the protection section 201, which cyclically
consumes the codewords and detects possible control process errors.
[0046] The protection section 201 vitally generates the voltage 8 required to enable the
voltage generators 10 on the vital output device 102. The checks performed by the
protection section 201 are both logic and time checks; the protection section periodically
receives codewords from the control section 101, which codewords are used to confirm
proper performance of all safety-related operations, and checks the validity thereof.
If codewords are logically correct, they arrive in well defined time ranges and the
self-diagnostic process of the protection section 201 detects no failure, then the
protection section 201 provides vital power supply 8, otherwise, it removes such power
supply, and prevents any signal transmission to the wayside units.
[0047] Thanks to this vital check mechanism, the output device 102 can safely deliver the
power required to actuate the wayside unit 3, without using expensive and bulky fail-safe
railway relays.
[0048] The following table summarizes the possible failure types, as well as their effects:
| |
Control |
Failure |
Expected port state |
Actual port state |
Vitally detected failure |
| 1 |
ON + |
RL1 always closed |
+V |
+V |
NO |
| 2 |
ON + |
RL1 always open |
+V |
Unpowered |
NO |
| 3 |
ON + |
RL2 always open |
+V |
+V |
NO |
| 4 |
ON + |
RL2 always closed |
+V |
0V
DC port: Overcurrent protection triggered |
YES
Detected by vital control on RL2 |
| 5 |
ON + |
RL1, RL2 always open |
+V |
Unpowered |
NO |
| 6 |
ON + |
RL1, RL2 always closed |
+V |
0V
DC port: Overcurrent protection triggered |
YES
Detected by vital control on RL2 |
| 7 |
ON - |
RL1 always closed |
-V |
0V
DC port: Overcurrent protection triggered |
YES
Detected by vital control on RL1 |
| 8 |
ON - |
RL1 always open |
-V |
-V |
NO |
| 9 |
ON - |
RL2 always open |
-V |
Unpowered |
NO |
| 10 |
ON - |
RL2 always closed |
-V |
-V |
NO |
| 11 |
ON - |
RL1, RL2 always open |
-V |
Unpowered |
NO |
| 12 |
ON - |
RL1, RL2 always closed |
-V |
0V
DC port: Overcurrent protection triggered |
YES
Detected by vital control on RL1 |
| 13 |
Uncontrolled port |
RL1 always closed |
Disabled |
+V |
YES
Detected by vital control on RL1 |
| 14 |
Uncontrolled port |
RL1 always open |
Disabled |
Unpowered |
NO |
| 15 |
Uncontrolled port |
RL2 always open |
Disabled |
Unpowered |
NO |
| 16 |
Uncontrolled port |
RL2 always closed |
Disabled |
-V |
YES
Detected by vital control on RL2 |
| 17 |
Uncontrolled port |
RL1, RL2 always open |
Disabled |
Unpowered |
NO |
| 18 |
Uncontrolled port |
RL1, RL2 always closed |
Disabled |
0V
DC port: Overcurrent protection triggered |
YES
Detected by vital control on RL1, RL2 |
[0049] As shown above, there are two types of failures that cannot be detected by the vital
control:
- failures in which the port state is consistent with the expected state as a function
of the control;
- failures in which the port state is "unpowered".
[0050] Therefore, in both cases, the undetected failure condition is not inconsistent with
safety requirements.
[0051] Insulation is a critical aspect in high safety applications, such as railway applications.
Any voltage induced on the cables as a result of an insulation loss may cause undesired
actuation of wayside units, which may even have fatal consequences (like those possibly
ensuing from the actuation of a switch or a train stop lamp). Therefore, the vital
output device 102 of the invention is designed to be interfaced with diagnostic devices
601, 103 for measuring ground insulation losses, pursuant to EEC standard EN 61557-8.
Insulation loss checks may be performed either at the supply cables and at wayside
cables. In the former case, the measuring device indicates ground insulation losses
of the group of ports having the same power source, in the latter, insulation loss
is indicated for each port. In both cases, the control unit can promptly disable the
relevant port.
[0052] In addition to the above, any undesired control induced by noise on the cables that
interface the control unit 1 with the vital output device 102 is prevented by the
vital port state control mechanism, whereas the combination of the above discussed
overcurrent 20 and short-circuit 40 protection functions is particularly effective
in protecting the wayside units from undue actuation, e.g. caused by double separate
ordered contact failures (d.s.o.c.), as schematically shown in Fig. 7. These failures
involve a short circuit between cables directed to different units and cause an uncontrolled
unit (unit2) to be in parallel with a controlled unit (unit1) and to be unduly actuated
as a result. However, since each uncontrolled unit is short-circuited due to the short
circuit on the corresponding vital output device 40 (NCC), the port (OUT#1) that delivers
the required power to actuate the unit is also short-circuited, thereby generating
an increase of the delivered current (Imax), which causes overcurrent protection 20
to be triggered before any undue actuation.
[0053] Referring to Fig. 7, to prevent any undue actuation of the unit2, the overcurrent
protection 20 trigger value shall be such that the residual voltage at the ends of
the unit2 is lower than its minimum actuation threshold. The residual voltage value
at the ends of the unit is closely related to the length of the cable section, whose
resistance is designated by R.
[0054] For an even safer protection, the NCC relay state is controlled by the ZLC logic
SW by circulation of codewords through one of the auxiliary contacts of such relay.
[0055] For increased reliability and safety, the ZLC subystem is preferably of the hot backup
redundant type, which means that the wayside unit 3 is driven by a pair of equivalent
subsystems as described and shown in Fig. 1. Fig. 8 is a block diagram of this redundant
subsystem. N and B designate Normal and Backup respectively. Each of the N and B subsystems
can safely provide the same functions. Particularly, they operate in parallel, i.e.
they transmit the same controls and perform the same processing, although only the
input/output port of one of the two devices 2, 2', typically the N device, is enabled.
Should a malfunction occur to one of the two subsystems, a vital redundancy management
circuit (not shown) enables the other subsystem to assure safe actuation of the wayside
unit 3.
[0056] Redundancy is particularly advantageous in case of failure of the short circuit protection
circuit 40 of one of the ports of the vital output device 102. The same function may
be thus accomplished by the short circuit protection circuit of the output device
of the parallel redundant subsystem associated to the unit, which further increases
the safety of the whole ZLC subsystem.
[0057] Obviously, the invention is not limited to the above description and figures, but
may be greatly varied, especially as regards construction, without departure from
the inventive teaching disclosed above and claimed below.
1. A field vital output device for directly interfacing a central control logic unit
with at least one or more wayside units, such as relays, contacts, lamps and the like,
which device comprises:
at least one input for the control signals generated by the control logic unit;
at least one output port for transmission of a wayside unit actuating signal, which
output port is and/or may be connected to said wayside unit;
means for enabling/disabling said output port to transmit the wayside unit actuating
signal;
means for generating the wayside unit actuating output signal, which are connected
to said output port;
which control signals, generated by the control logic unit, control the means for
enabling/disabling the output port of the output device to allow or prevent transmission
of the wayside unit actuating signal,
characterized in that the device further comprises:
a switching element that can set the wayside unit actuating signal transmission enabled/disabled
state of said port;
electronics for detecting said state from the control imposed by the control logic
unit, said output signal generating means being designed to be vitally disabled when
the enabled/disabled state of said port does not correspond to the control condition
imposed by the control logic.
2. A device as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that the switching element comprises at least one input and at least one output, the input-to-output
relation being a function of the port enabled/disabled state, said state being vitally
detectable by the electronics by comparison of the output of the switching element
with a check code transmitted to its input.
3. A device as claimed in claim 2, characterized in that the switching element has at least one pair of relay contacts, which is mechanically
linked to the port enabling/disabling means, the contacts of the pair being electrically
connected to the input and the output of the switching element respectively.
4. A device as claimed in claim 3, characterized in that the port enabling/disabling means comprise at least one relay having at least one
pair of contacts, which are electrically connected to the output signal generating
means and the output port respectively, said pair of contacts being mechanically linked
to the pair of contacts of the switching element, so that switching of one pair causes
switching of the other pair.
5. A device as claimed in claim 4, characterized in that one pair of contacts is normally closed when idle, and the other is normally open
when idle, the contacts being mechanically linked together so that they cannot be
closed/open at the same time.
6. A device as claimed in claim 5, characterized in that the contacts of the switching element are normally closed when idle, and the contacts
of the port enabling/disabling means are normally open when idle.
7. A device as claimed in one or more of the preceding claims 4 to 6, characterized in that the contacts of the switching element and the contacts of the port enabling/disabling
means are part of a single relay, particularly a so-called force guided relay which,
when actuated, switches the contacts to a reversed state with respect to the idle
state.
8. A device as claimed in one or more of the preceding claims, characterized in that it comprises a circuit for selecting the output signal polarity.
9. A device as claimed in claim 8, characterized in that the output port enabling/disabling means include said polarity selection circuit.
10. A device as claimed in one or more of the preceding claims, characterized in that the output signal is a bipolar signal and the port enabling/disabling means comprise
a first relay having pairs of normally open contacts to enable/disable the first of
the two output signal poles.
11. A device as claimed in claim 10, characterized in that the port enabling/disabling means comprise a second relay having pairs of normally
open contacts to enable/disable the second of the two output signal poles.
12. A device as claimed in claim 10, characterized in that the relay comprises at least two pairs of normally open contacts to enable/disable
each pole of the output signal.
13. A device as claimed in claim 12, characterized in that the port enabling/disabling means comprise a second relay having at least two pairs
of normally open contacts, which is mounted in parallel to the first relay, with reversed
inputs or outputs to provide, when actuated, a reversed polarity signal to the output
port, the two relays being driven in a mutually exclusive manner.
14. A device as claimed in one or more of the preceding claims 10 to 13, characterized in that the relay/s comprise at least one pair of normally closed auxiliary contacts, which
are mechanically forced to open when the corresponding main contacts close.
15. A device as claimed in one or more of the preceding claims, characterized in that the output signal generating means have at least one input for a vital enabling signal
for enabling/disabling output signal generation.
16. A device as claimed in claim 15, characterized in that the output signal generating means comprise at least one DC/DC or DC/AC converter
which is provided in combination with vital enabling/disabling means.
17. A device as claimed in claim 16, characterized in that the vital enabling/disabling means generate a vital enabling signal, which is operative
on pulsed-driving of said at least one converter, to prevent generation of driving
pulses when vital power supply is not present.
18. A device as claimed in one or more of the preceding claims, characterized in that it comprises an overcurrent protection circuit, said protection circuit being calibrated
to prevent the generated output signal from reaching the output port of the device
if current absorption exceeds a given trigger value.
19. A device as claimed in claim 18, characterized in that the overcurrent protection circuit is located downstream from the output signal generating
means, and is configured to disable the device output by double-break of the circuit
that connects the output signal generating means with the output port enabling/disabling
means.
20. A device as claimed in claim 18 or 19, characterized in that the overcurrent protection circuit comprises at least one static switch having a
manual or software-controlled reset arrangement.
21. A device as claimed in one or more of the preceding claims, characterized in that it comprises at least one switch element that can short-circuit the output port,
when controlled to do so.
22. A device as claimed in claim 21, characterized in that said switch element is a relay, particularly a force guided relay having at least
one pair of normally open contacts.
23. A device as claimed in one or more of the preceding claims, characterized in that it has a local unit interfacing with the central logic unit for controlling the device.
24. A device as claimed in claim 23, characterized in that the local unit is configured to convert the port enabling/disabling controls from
the central logic unit into corresponding relay switching controls.
25. A device as claimed in claim 24, characterized in that the local unit interfaces with the overcurrent protection circuit to disable the
relay switching controls whenever the overcurrent protection circuit is triggered
due to a local decision and/or to a central logic unit SW decision.
26. A device as claimed in claims 23 to 25, characterized in that the local unit comprises electronics for vital detection of the wayside unit actuating
signal transmission enabled/disabled state of the output port.
27. A device as claimed in claim 26, characterized in that the port enabled/disabled state is detected by circulation of codewords from the
central logic unit to the local unit, which local unit turns said codewords into input
signals for the switching element, reads the element output and codes said output
into corresponding codewords to be transmitted back to the central logic unit.
28. A device as claimed in claim 27, characterized in that the port state is detected by checking the open/closed state of the switching element
contacts, the port being in the enabled state when said contacts are open.
29. A field vital input and/or output system comprising:
a control logic unit for processing data and/or performing other control tasks, which
logic unit comprises means for generating unique codes for functional check of the
processing and/or receiving and/or transmitting steps being performed (so-called codewords)
and a port for the transmission of the codewords generated at each step;
a fail-safe protection unit, with a memory containing a program for checking the functional
steps of the logic unit and a program for checking the correctness of functional check
codes (codewords) and the time sequence thereof, which protection unit communicates
through a transmitting and/or receiving port with the logic unit and generates enabling
signals when the codewords are correct;
a vital output device as claimed in one or more of the preceding claims, which device
communicates with the logic unit to receive control signals and/or transmit state/diagnostic
signals based on the control codewords and interfaces with the protection unit to
receive the vital enabling signal based on the result of codeword correctness and
sequence checks.
30. A system as claimed in claim 29, characterized in that the protection unit preferably comprises a power source which is controlled to deliver
vital supply voltage to the output device in response to checkword/codewprds correctness
and sequence checks.
31. A system as claimed in claim 30, characterized in that the vital supply voltage is cut off when the enabled/disabled state of the output
device does not correspond to the control condition imposed by the control logic.
32. A system as claimed in one or more of the preceding claims 29 to 31, characterized in that it comprises a second vital output device as claimed in one or more of the preceding
claims 1 to 28, having its output ports in parallel to the first device, the system
comprising a vital redundancy management circuit which is configured to exclusively
enable the first or second device respectively, to ensure safe actuation of the wayside
unit that is or may be connected to such ports, in case of malfunction of either device.
33. A system as claimed in one or more of the preceding claims 29 to 32,
characterized in that it comprises two or more vital output devices as claimed in one or more of claims
1 to 28, for directly interfacing a control logic unit with two or more wayside units,
such as relays, contacts, lamps and the like, which devices comprise:
an overcurrent protection circuit, which is calibrated to prevent the generated output
signal from reaching the output port of the device if current absorption exceeds a
given trigger value;
a relay having at least one pair of normally open contacts, which can short-circuit
the output port, when controlled to do so,
which system is configured to short circuit the output ports of uncontrolled devices
so that the overcurrent protection circuit of the controlled port can be triggered
to prevent any insulation loss of the cables directed to the unit from causing undue
actuation of uncontrolled units.
34. A system as claimed in claim 33, characterized in that it is configured to protect the units from undue actuation caused by double separate
ordered contact failures on multipolar cables.
35. A system as claimed in claim 33 or 34, characterized in that the relays used to short circuit the ports are force guided relays having auxiliary
contacts for reading the actual enabled state by circulation of codewords.
36. A system for safe digital information exchange between a control logic unit and one
or more remote wayside units, by means of electrically insulated control conductors,
which information is transmitted by the logic unit to the remote unit/s in the form
of controls for forcing the presence/absence of voltage corresponding to the type
of binary information desired on one or more ports that can be accessed by the remote
unit/s, characterized in that
the presence/absence of voltage at the port/s is determined by enabling/disabling
one or more force guided relays in electric communication with means for generating
said voltage, the enabled/disabled state of said relay/s being reread by the control
logic by circulation of codewords for vitally disabling the generating means when
the enabled/disabled state of the relay/s does not correspond to the control condition
imposed by the control logic due to the presence of failures or undesired potentials
possibly induced on control conductors due to degradation of ground and mutual insulation
of conductors.
37. A system as claimed in claim 35, characterized in that it is configured to cyclically check the insulation of control conductors by repeated
vital reading of the actual enabled state of a remote port after transmission of a
predetermined sequence of enabling codewords to the control conductors.
38. A system as claimed in claim 36 or 37, characterized in that it also has one or more of the features as claimed in claims 29 to 35.
39. A system as claimed in one or more of the preceding claims 36 to 38, characterized in that it is provided in combination with a vital output device as claimed in claims 1 to
28.