[0001] The present invention in general concerns systems for monitoring the driving conditions
of a vehicle and more specifically a method for detecting harsh driving operations
according to the preamble of claim 1, and a system for monitoring the driving conditions
of a vehicle.
[0002] There is constantly increasing use of vehicles that have position, attitude or acceleration
sensors installed on-board, in order to provide accurate indications on the position
and orientation of the vehicle in space and on its movement dynamics. Such devices
not only contribute to the operativity of the on-board driving assistance systems,
but are essential for the functionality of other auxiliary systems including, to quote
one example, systems for monitoring and recording the dynamics of use of the vehicle,
such as systems used in anti-theft devices, in devices for controlling vehicles belonging
to a fleet or in devices, known by the name black box, for detecting infractions or
the dynamics of road accidents, for example to help to law enforcement or insurance
companies.
[0003] Typically, a system for monitoring and recording the dynamics of use of a vehicle
is arranged to detect the driving conditions of the vehicle (travelling speed, overall
travelling time, engine operating regime) in view of their transmission to a remote
analysis station. The data can be periodically transferred to the analysis station
through an on-board communication system or simply recorded in an impenetrable storage
medium available on-board the vehicle, from where they can be taken at a later time,
for example when the vehicle is subjected to a programmed periodic maintenance intervention.
[0004] In both of the cases described above the monitoring system is arranged to indistinctly
and continuously record all driving events of the vehicle, for the period in which
it is activated. This involves the need to transfer large amounts of data frequently,
or to foresee data storage supports of sufficient capacity to conserve the recorded
data relating to a long time period.
[0005] The present invention has been set the purpose of providing a satisfactory solution
to the problems outlined earlier, by making a method and a system for detecting harsh
driving operations that avoids the drawbacks of the prior art, allowing a system for
monitoring and recording the dynamics of use of a vehicle to consider just events
detected as irregular operations like events able to be considered by an analysis
station for further processing.
[0006] A further purpose of the invention is to provide a method for detecting harsh driving
operations with low probability of error due to false detections.
[0007] According to the present invention such a purpose is accomplished thanks to a method
for detecting harsh driving operations, having the characteristics outlined in claim
1.
[0008] A further object of the invention is a system for monitoring the driving conditions
of a vehicle, having the characteristics outlined in claim 10.
[0009] Particular embodiments form the subject of the dependent claims, the content of which
should be taken to be an integral part of the present description.
[0010] In brief, the present invention is based on the principle of verifying the occurrence
of anomalous driving conditions, such as in particular harsh driving operations linked
to sudden variations in acceleration of the vehicle, through systems for detecting
the vehicle dynamics available on-board, and detecting possible warning conditions
in the case of an aggregation of anomalous driving events over time, also in the presence
of discontinuity for short periods of time.
[0011] Advantageously, the anomalous driving conditions are detected through threshold tests
on the intensity of the measured detection parameter and on the time period for which
the detection parameter exceeds the warning threshold.
[0012] In particular, in order to avoid a multiple detection of a single event that is continuous
over time, and to better describe the evolution of the event over time, the detection
(and consequent recording) of the relevant driving condition does not end with the
detection of the event, but lasts until the end of the event itself.
[0013] In this way, the system for detecting driving conditions according to the invention
makes it possible to store and/or transmit just the relevant data able to identify
particular predetermined anomalous driving conditions, avoiding storing and/or transmitting
large volumes of data.
[0014] Further characteristics and advantages of the invention will be outlined in greater
detail in the following detailed description of an embodiment thereof, given as a
non-limiting example, with reference to the attached drawings, in which:
figure 1 is a schematic representation of a vehicle equipped with a unit for monitoring
and recording the driving conditions according to the invention;
figure 2 is a block diagram of a system for detecting harsh driving operations according
to the invention;
figures 3a and 3b are flow diagrams, overall and detailed respectively, of a method
for detecting harsh driving operations, according to the invention;
figure 4 shows a diagram indicating the variation of the harsh acceleration threshold
as the travelling speed of the vehicle varies;
figures 5a and 5b are diagrams indicating the threshold comparison and the counting
of events in the case of a harsh acceleration;
figures 6a and 6b are diagrams indicating the threshold comparison and the counting
of events in the case of a harsh turn operation; and
figures 7a and 7b are diagrams indicating the threshold comparison and the counting
of events in the case of a turn operation not recognised as a harsh operation.
[0015] In figure 1 V generally indicates a vehicle, equipped with a telematic unit T provided
to monitor and record the conditions of use of the vehicle, in particular the dynamic
driving conditions. The telematic unit is provided with means for detecting the dynamic
conditions of the vehicle, in particular adapted to measure or calculate the linear
and centripetal accelerations to which the vehicle is subjected during the different
driving conditions, in particular during harsh braking, start-up or turn operations.
[0016] Preferably, the means for detecting the dynamic conditions of the vehicle comprise
receiving means R of a positioning system, for example a GPS satellite positioning
system. Other sources of data representing the dynamic conditions of the vehicle can
be considered as an alternative to a GPS receiver, for example on-board inertial sensor
devices like accelerometers or triaxial gyroscopes, or differential odometric sensors
integrated on-board the vehicle for autonomously measuring the distances travelled
through the rotation measurements of the wheels of the vehicle.
[0017] Again in figure 1, X, Y, Z indicate the main axes of the vehicle, commonly identified
as longitudinal, transversal and vertical axis, and with respect to which the movements
of the vehicle are defined, for example the speeds, the accelerations, and the angles
of inclination thereof in all driving conditions.
[0018] The telematic unit T can be installed on-board the vehicle at the moment of its production
and interfaced with a communication line integrated on-board, for example the CAN
bus, for transferring the acquired data to other processing units of the vehicle.
Alternatively, the unit is mounted on-board the vehicle after its production and it
can be connected to other processing units through a dedicated communication line
or it can operate autonomously, for example establishing a wireless communication
towards a remote server.
[0019] As indicated in detail in the block diagram of figure 2, in addition to the GPS receiver
R the telematic unit comprises an electronic processing unit E, in turn coupled with
an interfacing communication module, generally indicated with C, for example a GSM,
GPRS or 3G modem suitable for receiving interrogation signals from a remote control
station (not depicted) and for transmitting to the aforementioned station the recorded
data representing the driving conditions that the vehicle is (was) subjected to. The
processing unit E also has memory modules M1 and M2 associated with it, typically
a random access memory module M1 for storing temporary data and for the computing
process and a flash memory module M2 for permanently storing data.
[0020] The processing unit E is a calculation unit provided to acquire data about the dynamic
behaviour of the vehicle, to compare them with the predetermined threshold values
and to permanently record, in an associated memory module, the data representing an
anomalous dynamic behaviour of the vehicle.
[0021] The processing unit E is arranged for detecting the data identifying an anomalous
driving condition from the data indicative of the dynamic behaviour of the vehicle
over time, by application of a method for detecting harsh driving operations that
will be described in detail hereafter with reference to the flow diagram of figure
3a and 3b.
[0022] For example, but not exclusively, the telematic unit T can be mounted on-board the
vehicle and intended to make a system for monitoring and recording the movements of
the vehicle, for example an accessory system to an anti-theft device or a system for
detecting the movements of a vehicle belonging to a fleet, or even a system for detecting
infractions or the dynamics of road accidents.
[0023] After a preliminary initialization step 100, the processing unit E in step 110 acquires
data representing the dynamics of the vehicle from the GPS receiver R. Such data,
typically the evolution of the position data of the vehicle over time, make it possible
to determine corresponding reference data of the accelerations of the vehicle along
the main axes X, Y, Z.
[0024] The positioning data are filtered in step 120 to eliminate the unreliable data. If
the data are not reliable, the system switches in state 130, where the method for
detecting the driving condition is reset with another acquisition of dynamic data
in step 110.
[0025] Hereafter we shall briefly mention the filtering techniques of the GPS positioning
data that are preferably applied in the system according to the invention in order
to ensure the reliability of the positioning data used to detect anomalous driving
conditions.
[0026] Since the GPS receiver is influenced by measuring errors, the detection of events
can be corrupted by incorrect data generated by the GPS receiver.
[0027] In order to improve the reliability of the detection of the events, the data acquired
by the GPS receiver are preferably filtered to avoid false alarms and ensure a more
robust detection of the events.
[0028] Firstly, the positioning data are filtered to eliminate the data acquired from the
receiver in uncertain or poor quality positioning conditions. For this reason, the
reliability parameters of the positioning data are compared with predetermined thresholds
and the data are discarded if at least one of the parameters does not respect the
relative threshold. An indicative example of the thresholds of the reliability parameters
is given hereafter:
- 3D positioning
- HDOP < 5
- Number of satellites in view > 5
- Minimum CNO of the 3 satellites with strongest signal > 35dBHz
[0029] Moreover, detections that exceed the dynamics of the vehicle, inconsistency of the
position change data of the vehicle with the speed data available on-board, sudden
degradation of the power of the positioning signal received are further indications
of the temporary unreliability of the measurements, for which reason the system temporarily
suspends the acquisition of data from the GPS receiver.
[0030] In order to remove the possible noise by which the positioning data can be affected
considering the dynamic limitations of the vehicle, a further filtering operation
is applied. Experimentally, it has been found that a filter that provides a good balance
between performance and complexity (computing cost) is a Butterworth filter of the
second order, which obtains the relationship:

where
Input and
Outdata are generically the input and output entities (specifically
Input represents the measurements of V and ω,
Outdata represents the filtered values of V and ω), and

in the acquisition of linear speed measurements, or

in the acquisition of angular speed measurements.
[0031] In the case of invalid positioning data the filter is reinitialized with the first
available valid data, according to the relationships:
OutData(i) = Input(i);
OutData(i-1) = Input(i);
OutData(i-2) = Input(i);
[0032] If the positioning data are reliable, the system actuates the classification of the
dynamic parameters monitored by comparison with predetermined detection thresholds
of anomalous driving events in step 140 and checks whether the conditions of detection
of a potentially dangerous anomalous driving condition are present, by comparison
with a duration or time threshold of the anomalous events detected, as will be described
in detail hereafter. If an anomalous driving condition is definitively detected (step
150) the system goes into the condition 160 of communication in real time of a warning
signal, or of recording the event in view of a subsequent information communication
to a remote monitoring station.
[0033] In the preferred embodiment, the system for detecting driving conditions according
to the invention is provided to identify the following driving events or operations:
harsh braking, harsh accelerations, changes in direction at high speed.
[0034] Using the GPS data it is possible to detect, in particular, the following dynamic
conditions of the vehicle of interest:
- (1) vehicle braking, where the dominant dynamic component is a linear acceleration
different from zero, negative or greatly negative;
- (2) vehicle in acceleration, where the dominant dynamic component is a linear acceleration
different from zero, positive or greatly positive;
- (3) change in direction of travel of the vehicle in speed, where the dominant dynamic
is a centripetal acceleration.
[0035] The detection of harsh driving operations is only carried out if the vehicle is travelling
at a speed greater than a minimum threshold speed (for example 5 m/s), below which
the detection of speed and direction by the GPS positioning system is no longer reliable
and it certainly would not seem appropriate to talk of a "harsh" operation.
[0036] The condition (1) of harsh braking of the vehicle is detected for operations in which
the vehicle is subjected to a negative acceleration in its direction of movement.
The parameter identifying such an operation is deceleration Acc
B, defined as:

where τ is the GPS sampling period.
[0037] The condition of sudden deceleration or braking is therefore defined by the condition:

occurring on n samples.
[0038] In a preferred embodiment, TH
B = -3,6 m/s
2 and n = 7 (for GPS detections at a frequency of 5Hz).
[0039] The condition (2) of harsh acceleration of the vehicle is identified for operations
in which the vehicle is subjected to a positive acceleration in its direction of movement.
The parameter identifying such an operation is acceleration Acc, defined as:

where τ is the GPS sampling period.
[0040] The condition of harsh acceleration or start-up is therefore defined by the condition:

occurring on n samples.
[0041] It should be noted that the maximum possible acceleration of the vehicle varies as
the speed of the vehicle (and the transmission ratio inserted) varies, for which reason
the acceleration threshold suitable for detecting a condition of harsh acceleration
is preferably defined as a function of the speed of the vehicle, for example according
to a simple relationship shown in figure 4, and identified by just two pairs of acceleration/speed
parameters:

[0042] If the travelling speed of the vehicle is less than V
2, the acceleration threshold TH
A is determined according to a linear function

where
m = (Acc
2 - Acc
1)/(V
2 - V
1) and b = Acc
2 - m * V
2
[0043] If the travelling speed of the vehicle is equal to or greater than V
2, the acceleration threshold TH
A is constant and equal to Acc
2.
[0044] In a preferred embodiment, Acc
1 = 2,6 m/s
2 @ V
1 = 3 m/s and Acc
2 = 0,5 m/s
2 @ V
2 = 35 m/s, with n = 12 (for GPS detections at a frequency of 5Hz).
[0045] The condition (3) of harsh change in direction of the vehicle is identified for operations
in which the driver turns with an excessive angular speed with respect to the current
travel speed. The parameter identifying such an operation is centripetal acceleration
Acc
c, defined as:

where V is the linear speed, expressed in [m/s] and ω is the angular speed, expressed
in [rad/s], the latter derived from the travel direction (θ) provided by the receiver
R according to the relationship:

where τ is the GPS sampling period.
[0046] Considering that the travelling speed V of the vehicle can vary between two sampling
instants of the positioning signal (of the GPS receiver) it is possible to approximate
the travel speed V of the vehicle when turning with a constant average speed in the
sampling period

[0047] The condition of harsh turning is therefore defined by the condition:

for 0 < t < T, T overall duration of the operation the minimum value of which corresponds
to two sampling periods.
[0048] In a preferred embodiment, TH
T = 4,5 m/s
2 and T corresponds to 12 sampling periods (for GPS detections at a frequency of 5Hz).
[0049] In an improved embodiment it is also possible to foresee the detection of multiple
consecutive harsh turning operations of short duration (so-called "S" manoeuvres),
but this cannot be obtained with the same control logic of the simple turning operation,
since in the case of successive turns whenever the change in direction is inverted
the method for detecting the driving condition is reset.
[0050] Figure 3b shows the detailed flow diagram of the operations for detecting harsh driving
operations, generally indicated with 140 in figure 3a.
[0051] Every manoeuvring condition monitored is subjected to the same detection logic.
[0052] From the positioning data acquired from the GPS receiver R and adjudged reliable
the linear acceleration and centripetal acceleration values are calculated. The calculated
linear acceleration values are compared in steps 1401 and 1402, respectively, with
the start-up and braking thresholds TH
A and TH
B, the centripetal acceleration value is compared in step 1403 with the relative threshold
TH
T.
[0053] For every driving condition monitored a respective events counter is defined.
[0054] If the acceleration value considered exceeds the predetermined threshold, i.e. the
outcome of the comparison is positive, the respective events counter is incremented
(steps 1411, 1412, 1413). If the acceleration value considered does not exceed the
predetermined threshold, the outcome of the comparison is negative, the respective
events counter is decremented, at the limit until it is zeroed (steps 1421, 1422,
1423).
[0055] For every driving condition monitored a counting threshold TH
count of the detected events is defined, and only when the counter of events exceeds the
respective counting threshold, a condition that is verified in steps 1431, 1432 and
1433, the operation is detected as a harsh operation (steps 1441, 1442, 1443). In
the case of harsh turning operations, the sign information of the centripetal acceleration
value is taken into account to identify the turning direction, and the inversion of
sign determines the resetting of the events counter. Advantageously, after the detection
of an event, the counter is zeroed when a subsequent detected acceleration value goes
back below the predetermined threshold value, so as to allow the detection of successive
events.
[0056] Advantageously, the step of incrementing each events counter is imposed at a different
value from, and substantially greater than, the step of decrementing the same counter,
so as to detect as anomalous also driving conditions in which the harsh operation
is suspended for a short time period, to then start again, like in the case of a start-up
operation in which the acceleration impressed on the vehicle stops at the moments
when a gear change is carried out.
[0057] For example, in the case of a start-up operation, to improve the ability to detect
a harsh acceleration operation the events counter is incremented by a value equal
to 1 every time the calculated linear acceleration exceeds the predetermined threshold,
but it is decremented by a value equal to 0.2 every time the calculated linear acceleration
does not exceed the predetermined threshold.
[0058] The diagrams of figures 5a and 5b clearly show, for a start-up operation with gear
change, the evolution over time of the acceleration impressed to the vehicle (curve
A) compared with the relative threshold TH
A, for which reason each time the threshold is exceeded determines the detection of
an anomalous dynamic condition, as well as the evolution over time of the counting
of events identifying an anomalous dynamic condition (curve E) with respect to the
warning or alarm threshold TH
count that qualifies the operation as a harsh operation.
[0059] The first samples are not considered valid due to the low speed of the vehicle. When,
in step 1401 the acceleration is detected as above the threshold value TH
A defined for the current speed of the vehicle, the events counter increments its count
in step 1411. The increment stops (after 19 seconds) when the acceleration value falls
below the threshold through a gear change (comparison in step 1401), and the counter
begins to decrement its count (step 1421), at a lower rate than the increment rate.
Once the second gear is engaged the vehicle starts to accelerate again for which reason
the detected acceleration value once again exceeds the threshold TH
A (comparison in step 1401) and the events counter starts to increment its count again
(step 1411) until the counting threshold TH
count is exceeded (comparison in step 1431), when the warning condition, due to the harsh
acceleration operation, is detected (step 1441). The counter is then zeroed when the
detected acceleration goes back below the threshold value after the detection of the
event, so as to allow the detection of subsequent events.
[0060] In this way, the system provides a more accurate detection of the operation with
respect to a rough method that bases the detection of a harsh operation simply on
whether a threshold value of the acceleration has been exceeded, and that would involve
risks of uncertainty of the decision in the case in which, as shown, the real acceleration
fluctuates around the decision threshold TH
A.
[0061] The diagrams of figures 6a and 6b show an example of detection of a harsh turning
operation, by comparison with the diagrams of figures 7a and 7b, in which an example
of a turning operation is shown that does not last sufficiently long for the events
counter to determine the detection of a warning condition.
[0062] When the centripetal acceleration (curve A) is detected above the threshold value
TH
T in step 1403 the events counter increments its count (curve E) in step 1413. The
increment stops for a short time period during the manoeuvre when the acceleration
value falls below the threshold (comparison in step 1403) for which reason the counter
starts to decrement its count (step 1423), at a lower rate than the increment rate.
Thereafter, when the centripetal acceleration is once again detected as above the
threshold TH
T in step 1403 the events counter starts to increment its count again (step 1413) until
the counting threshold TH
count is exceeded (comparison in step 1433), when the warning condition, due to the harsh
turning operation, is detected (step 1443). The counter is then zeroed when the detected
acceleration goes back below the threshold value after the detection of the event,
so as to allow the detection of subsequent events.
[0063] With reference to the diagrams of figures 7a and 7b, when the centripetal acceleration
(curve A) is detected to be above to threshold value TH
T in step 1403 the events counter increments its count (curve E) in step 1413. The
increment stops when the acceleration value falls below the threshold (comparison
in step 1403) for which reason the counter starts to decrement its count (step 1423),
at a lower rate than the increment rate, before having reached the counting threshold
TH
count (comparison in step 1433), for which reason a warning condition is not detected.
The figures also show the behaviour of the system in the case of an unreliable sample,
indicated with F. Advantageously, the count of the events counter is immediately zeroed
and the detection method is reset, so that no false detection can be incorrectly detected
or recorded.
[0064] Advantageously, as shown in the above description, the method for detecting harsh
driving operations according to the invention, through the double threshold verification,
carried out on the value of the entity representative of a dynamic condition of the
vehicle to discriminate an anomalous driving event, and on how long an anomalous driving
condition has lasted by aggregation of anomalous driving events, allows effective
identification of the warning conditions, avoiding the occurrence of false alarms
or the repeated indication of alarms depending on a single harsh operation, carried
out with discontinuity in a short time period.
[0065] Of course, without affecting the principle of the invention, the embodiments and
the details can be greatly varied with respect to what has been described and illustrated
purely as a non-limiting example, without for this reason departing from the scope
of protection of the invention defined by the attached claims.
1. A method for detecting harsh driving operations of a vehicle (V), comprising the steps
of:
- acquiring (110) data indicative of at least an entity representing the dynamic behaviour
of the vehicle (V) at predetermined sampling times; and
- comparing (1401, 1402, 1403) said data with a predetermined corresponding threshold
value, adapted to distinguish an anomalous driving event;
wherein when the acquired data exceed the corresponding threshold value a counter
of anomalous driving events is incremented (1411, 1412, 1413), said counter being
decremented (1421, 1422, 1423) from a non-zero value when the acquired data do not
exceed the threshold value, and
a harsh operation is detected (150) when the counter of anomalous driving events exceeds
(1431, 1441; 1432, 1442; 1433, 1443) a predetermined warning threshold
characterised in that the incrementing step of the counter of anomalous driving events is greater than
the decrementing step of said counter.
2. A method according to Claim 1, wherein the data indicative of the dynamic behaviour
of the vehicle (V) comprise a plurality of entities representing the dynamic behaviour
of the vehicle (V) including the linear and centripetal accelerations to which the
vehicle is subject, said accelerations being indicative of a first driving condition
of vehicle braking, of a second driving condition of start-up acceleration of the
vehicle and of a third driving condition of change of the travelling direction of
the vehicle.
3. A method according to any one of the preceding claims, wherein the predetermined threshold
value adapted to distinguish an anomalous driving event is adjustable as a function
of the travelling speed of the vehicle (V).
4. A method according to any one of the preceding claims, characterised in that it is reset whenever are acquired data indicative of the dynamic behaviour of the
vehicle (V) that are not reliable.
5. A method according to any one of the preceding claims, characterised in that it is carried out if the travelling speed of the vehicle (V) is greater than a minimum
threshold speed.
6. A method according to any one of the preceding claims, comprising computing the data
indicative of the dynamic behaviour of the vehicle (V) based on satellite positioning
data of the vehicle.
7. A method according to any one of the preceding claims, comprising detecting the data
indicative of the dynamic behaviour of the vehicle (V) by onboard inertial sensor
devices.
8. A method according to any one of the preceding claims, comprising detecting the data
indicative of the dynamic behaviour of the vehicle (V) by onboard odometric sensors.
9. A system for monitoring the driving conditions of a vehicle, comprising processing
means (E) arranged for acquiring data representing the vehicle (V) dynamics and programmed
for carrying out a method according to any one of claims 1 to 8 and for triggering
a warning about an anomalous driving condition (160), including storing or transmitting
to a remote station the data representing the vehicle dynamics, when a harsh operation
is detected.