(19)
(11) EP 2 746 131 A1

(12) EUROPEAN PATENT APPLICATION
published in accordance with Art. 153(4) EPC

(43) Date of publication:
25.06.2014 Bulletin 2014/26

(21) Application number: 12785414.9

(22) Date of filing: 16.05.2012
(51) International Patent Classification (IPC): 
B61L 27/00(2006.01)
H04B 17/00(2006.01)
(86) International application number:
PCT/CN2012/075559
(87) International publication number:
WO 2012/155836 (22.11.2012 Gazette 2012/47)
(84) Designated Contracting States:
AL AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MC MK MT NL NO PL PT RO RS SE SI SK SM TR

(30) Priority: 16.05.2011 CN 201110125635

(71) Applicant: Beijing National Railway Research & Design Institute of Signal & Communication Co., Ltd.
Beijing 100073 (CN)

(72) Inventors:
  • JIANG, Ming
    Beijing 100073 (CN)
  • GENG, Hongliang
    Beijing 100073 (CN)
  • LI, Qihe
    Beijing 100073 (CN)
  • HOU, Xili
    Beijing 100073 (CN)
  • ZHOU, Xingtao
    Beijing 100073 (CN)
  • WEN, Minxiong
    Beijing 100073 (CN)

(74) Representative: Pfenning, Meinig & Partner GbR 
Patent- und Rechtsanwälte Joachimstaler Strasse 12
10719 Berlin
10719 Berlin (DE)

   


(54) RAILWAY TRAIN SAFETY MONITORING AND PROCESSING METHOD BASED ON RADIO BLOCK CENTER


(57) A railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on radio block center is provided, including: the radio block center RBC detects whether communication between the RBC and an Interlocking fails or not (100); when a communication failure occurs, the RBC stops sending messages to all the railway trains in the control range of the Interlocking and all railway trains whose movement authority MA extend to the control range of the Interlocking (101). The railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on radio block center eliminates the influence on train safety when communication between the RBC and a wayside device fails in a CTCS-3 train control system, and ensures safe operation of the train and operation efficiency.




Description

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS



[0001] This application claims priority to Chinese Patent Application No. 201110125635.0, filed with the Chinese Patent Office on May 16, 2011, entitled "Railway Train Safety Monitoring and Processing Method Based on Radio Block Center", which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety.

FIELD OF THE TECHNOLOGY



[0002] The present invention relates to the field of railway train control, and more particularly, to a railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on a radio block center.

BACKGROUND



[0003] China Train Control System level 2 (CTCS-2) is a point-continued type train over-speed protection system for transmitting train operation control information based on intermittent balise and continuous track circuit, which has been successfully applied in high speed railway lines and passenger dedicated railway lines, and is suitable for a 200km/h to 250km/h railway line. However, there are too many wayside devices along railway routes, insufficient amount of information transmitted from the ground to the train and insufficient real-time performance, two-way communication between the train and the ground cannot be realized, etc.

[0004] Radio Block Center (RBC) is the core of wayside devices for CTCS-3 train control system. RBC receives information(such as train position, train operation parameter) from a CTCS-3 train control onboard subsystem through a Global System of Mobile Communication for Railways (GSM-R), and meanwhile obtains information(including track occupancy information, temporary speed restriction command, interlocking route state, emergency area protection information) provided by other devices(such as Interlocking, Temporary Speed Restriction Server, and so on) in a wayside subsystem connected thereto, and then generates train control information(such as Movement Authority (MA) and trackside description, temporary speed restriction and emergency stop) in combination with railway line data stored by itself, and transmits them to the CTCS-3 onboard subsystem via a GSM-R wireless communication system. Meanwhile, the state of the train under control also can be forwarded to other devices, such as CTC.

[0005] The existing standards only specified the information communicated between the RBC and an onboard device, without taking into consideration of the influences of other wayside devices, therefore, it is possible to have an influence on train safety operation when the RBC interacts with other wayside devices, and where the difference between the CTCS-3 level system and other systems needs to be distinguished.

SUMMARY



[0006] In view of the above disadvantages in the prior art, embodiments of the present invention provide a railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on radio block center. The railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on radio block center, provided by an embodiment of the present invention, includes:

the radio block center RBC detects whether communication between the RBC and an Interlocking fails or not;

when a communication failure occurs, the RBC stops sending messages to all railway trains in the control range of the Interlocking or trains whose movement authority(MA) extends into the control range of the Interlocking.



[0007] Based on the above embodiment, the method further includes:

if a communication failure between the RBC and a Temporary Speed Restriction Server is detected, the RBC maintains the information of temporary speed restriction received previously; or

if a communication failure between the RBC and a railway train is detected, the RBC reserves the MA of the railway train, and does not allocate routes contained in the MA to other railway trains for a predetermined time; or

if a communication failure between the RBC and a railway train is detected, and an emergency message is being sent to the railway train at this time, the RBC continues sending the emergency message for a predetermined time.



[0008] Based on the above embodiment, the method further includes:

if a handing over RBC detects that a handover process between the handing over RBC and a accepting RBC has not been started, and communication connection between the handing over RBC and the accepting RBC is disconnected, the handing over RBC monitors operation of the railway train till the border between the handing over RBC and the accepting RBC; or

if a handing over RBC detects that a handover process between the handing over RBC and a accepting RBC has already been started, and communication connection between the handing over RBC and the accepting RBC is disconnected, the handing over RBC stops sending any message to the railway train; or

if the accepting RBC detects that a handover process between the accepting RBC and the handing over RBC has already been started, but it has not yet established connection with the railway train, and communication connection between the accepting RBC and the handing over RBC is disconnected, the accepting RBC deletes information related to the railway train; or

if the accepting RBC detects that a handover process between the accepting RBC and the handing over RBC has already been started, has established connection with the railway train, and communication connection between the accepting RBC and the handing over RBC is disconnected, the accepting RBC reserves information related to the railway train.



[0009] Based on the above embodiment, the method further includes:

during an RBC-RBC handover process, if a handing over RBC detects that the communication connection between the handing over RBC and the railway train being handed over is disconnected, the handing over RBC reserves the MA of the railway train and does not allocate routes contained in the MA to other railway trains for a predetermined time, and sends a message for cancelling the handover to the accepting RBC, till the receiving of message of taking over responsibility from the accepting RBC; or

during an RBC-RBC handover process, if a handing over RBC detects a disconnection of the communication between the handing over RBC and the railway train is disconnected, and receives the message of taking over responsibility from the accepting RBC, the handing over RBC deletes the information related to the railway train; or

during an RBC-RBC handover process, if the accepting RBC cannot establish the communication connection with the railway train or receive the message for cancelling the handover sent from the handing over RBC in a predetermined time, the accepting RBC deletes information related to the railway train; or

during an RBC-RBC handover process, if the accepting RBC has established communication connection with the railway train and find that the railway train is not in the control range of the accepting RBC, the accepting RBC notifies the railway train to disconnect the communication connection after it receives the message for cancelling the handover sent from the handing over RBC.



[0010] Based on the above embodiment, the method further includes:

if restarted, the restarted RBC does not accept registration of any train before it receives all the current temporary speed restriction information sent by a Temporary Speed Restriction Server.



[0011] Based on the above embodiment, the method further includes:

when a signal authorization SA message, sent by an Interlocking, indicates that there is a route occupied within an MA range of a railway train, the RBC sends to the railway train a conditional emergency stop message CEM with an ending point being the starting point of the occupied route;

if not receiving a reply of the railway train, the RBC continues sending the CEM periodically;

if receiving a reply that the railway train does not accept the CEM, the RBC maintains the MA of the railway train;

if receiving a reply that the railway train accepts the CEM, the RBC shortens the MA of the railway train to the position of the end point.



[0012] Based on the above embodiment, the method further includes:

when an SA, sent by an Interlocking, indicates that a certain route degrades, the RBC periodically sends shortened movement authority SMA to the railway train, until the railway train replies with an acknowledgement and the RBC correspondingly shortens the reserved MA of the railway train; or

when messages sent by an Interlocking comprises an emergency area message EMA indicating a certain emergency area is activated, the RBC immediately sends unconditional emergency stop message UEM to the railway trains already in the area indicated by the EMA; or

when messages sent by an Interlocking comprises an emergency area message EMA which indicates the activation of an emergency area, the RBC sends conditional emergency stop message CEM to the railway trains which are not in the area indicated by the EMA but with the MA already extending to the indicated area.



[0013] Based on the above embodiment, the method further includes:

if the RBC receives a temporary speed restriction command sent by a Temporary Speed Restriction Server, the RBC saves the temporary speed restriction command, and timely sends to all the railway trains whose MA is influenced by the temporary speed restriction.



[0014] Based on the above embodiment, the method further includes:

when a difference between the time when the state of receiving route in front of a staff responsible mode railway train turns to be occupied and the time when the railway train reports its entering the receiving route is within a safety time, the RBC can send the MA to the railway train.



[0015] The railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on radio block center provided in this embodiment, which is applicable in the following situations: communication failure between the RBC and other devices, after the RBC being activated, handling messages sent from an external wayside device and processing train mode transition, so as to achieves train safety monitoring by radio block center and ensure safe operation of the train while without overly affecting operation efficiency.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS



[0016] FIG. 1 is a flowchart of a railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on radio block center according to an embodiment of the present invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION



[0017] In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, a clear and complete description of technical solutions of embodiments of the present invention is given by reference to accompanying drawings in the embodiment. Apparently, those described here are not exhaustive, and all the other embodiments derived by persons skilled in the art from the embodiments of the present invention without making any creative effort fall within the scope of the present invention.

[0018] In view of the disadvantages that the system specifications for the CTCS-3 train control system only specified the communication between the RBC and an onboard device, without taking into consideration of the influences of other wayside devices, safe operation of the train and operation efficiency may be influenced when a communication failure between the RBC and other devices occurs, and where the difference between the CTCS-3 system and other systems needs to be distinguished, the present invention proposes a solution, that is, a railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on radio block center in the CTCS-3 train control system. A train safety monitoring scheme is provided, which is applicable in the following situations: communication failure between the RBC and other devices; after the RBC being activated; handling message sent from an external wayside device; and processing train mode transition, so as to achieve train safety monitoring by radio block center and ensure safe operation of the train while without overly affecting operation efficiency.

[0019] FIG. 1 is a flowchart of a railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on radio block center according to an embodiment of the present invention, as shown in FIG. 1, the method includes:

Step 100, radio block center RBC detects whether communication between the RBC and an Interlocking fails or not;



[0020] On a CTCS-3 (hereinafter C3 for short) railway line, not only C3 trains but also CTCS-2 (hereinafter C2 for short) trains operate. The C2 train is not monitored by the RBC, so the RBC cannot determine MA of each train simply depending on positions of all the registered trains, but needs also depending on signal authorization SA messages sent by Interlocking, so that the RBC needs to detect whether communication between the RBC and the Interlocking fails or not; Step 101, when a communication failure with an Interlocking occurs, the RBC stops sending messages to all railway trains in the control range of the Interlocking or to all railway trains whose movement authority (MA) extend into the control range of the Interlocking.

[0021] When a communication failure between the RBC and the Interlocking is detected, the RBC cannot receive the current SA state, and thus cannot control the train any more, in order to make the train maintain safe operation while without causing too much influence on the operation efficiency, the solution adopted by the RBC is to stop sending all the messages to all trains in the control range of the Interlocking or to all railway trains whose MA extends in the control range of the Interlocking. If the train fails to receive any message from the RBC in a predetermined safety time (such as 20 seconds as currently configured), then it considers that the communication with the RBC is interrupted, and the onboard device will immediately activate protection measures to ensure safe operation of the train.

[0022] In the railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on radio block center provided in this embodiment, communication failure between the RBC and the Interlocking can be monitored and safety measure can be implemented, so that the radio block center can achieve safety monitoring of the train in the CTCS-3 train control system when a communication failure between the RBC and the Interlocking occurs, so as to ensure safe operation of the train while without overly affecting operation efficiency.

[0023] Based on the above embodiment, when a communication failure between the RBC and a Temporary Speed Restriction Server occurs, if a new temporary speed restriction command is issued but the RBC cannot get it, then safety risk appears. The solution for the problem is that, in this situation, the interface specification between the RBC and the Temporary Speed Restriction Server specifies that the Temporary Speed Restriction Server cannot issue any new temporary speed restriction command within the RBC range, and the RBC maintains a previously received temporary speed restriction, ensuring safe monitoring to the train.

[0024] In the railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on radio block center provided in this embodiment, a communication failure between the RBC and the Temporary Speed Restriction Server can be monitored and safety measure can be implemented, so that the radio block center can achieve safety monitoring to the train in the CTCS-3 train control system when a communication failure between the RBC and the Temporary Speed Restriction Server occurs, ensuring safe operation of the train.

[0025] Further, if the train fails to receive any message from the RBC beyond a configured safety time (such as 20 seconds as currently configured), then the train considers that the communication with the RBC is interrupted, but the RBC cannot determine the current state of the train, since the train may still operate according to MA previously sent by the RBC, so the RBC reserves the MA of the train without allocating routes contained in the MA to other trains temporarily to ensure safe operation of the train, until after a configured safety time (such as 5 minutes as currently configured), and then de-registers the train. If the train is communicated again within this period, the RBC continues monitoring the safe operation of the train according to the latest state reported by the train.

[0026] If the RBC is sending an emergency message to the train when the communication with the train is lost, the RBC continues sending the emergency message for a safety time.
In the railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on radio block center provided in this embodiment, communication failure between the RBC and the railway train can be monitored and safety processing measure can be performed, the CTCS-3 train control system realizes safety monitoring of the train by the radio block center when a communication failure between the RBC and the railway train occurs, and ensures safe operation of the train.

[0027] Based on the above embodiment, when a communication disconnection between the RBC and a neighboring RBC is detected, handover of the train between the RBCs will be affected. During RBC-RBC handover process, the RBC who hands the train monitor rights over to the neighboring RBC is named as a handing over RBC, while the RBC who accepts the train monitor rights is called accepting RBC.

[0028] Particularly, if a handover process between the handing over RBC and the accepting RBC has not been started, and the communication connection between the two RBCs is disconnected, the handing over RBC normally monitors the operation of the railway train till the border of the two RBCs, but doesn't extend movement authority to the control range of the accepting RBC.

[0029] When an RBC-RBC train handover process has already been started, then the communication connection between the handing over RBC and the neighboring RBC is disconnected, the handing over RBC stops sending any message to the train and makes the train take protection measures by itself.

[0030] When the RBC-RBC train handover process has already been started, but the train has not established connection with the accepting RBC yet, then the connection between the two RBCs is disconnected at this time, the accepting RBC deletes information related to the train and does not continue the handover process.

[0031] If the RBC-RBC train handover process has already been started, and the train has established connection with the accepting RBC, and then the communication connection with the handing over RBC is disconnected, the accepting RBC reserves the state of the train, and normally monitors safety operation of the train according to the position reports sent by the train. In the railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on radio block center provided in this embodiment, a communication disconnection between the RBC and its neighboring RBC can be monitored and safety processing measure can be performed, CTCS-3 train control system realizes safety monitoring of the train by radio block center when the communication connection between the RBC and the neighboring RBC interrupts, and ensures the train handover between different RBCs.

[0032] Based on the above embodiments, during the RBC-RBC train handover process, the method particularly includes:

if a communication connection between the handing over RBC and the train is disconnected during an RBC-RBC handover process, the handing over RBC take the measure as mentioned above when the disconnection of the communication with the train occurred before its receiving the takeover information from the accepting RBC, until after a configured safety time (such as 5 minutes as currently configured), and then deletes information related to the train and notifies the accepting RBC to cancel the handover;

If takeover information of the train from the accepting RBC is received in the process, it indicates that the train has been monitored by the accepting RBC, and the handing over RBC deletes information related to the train.



[0033] During a RBC-RBC handover process, if the accepting RBC still cannot establish communication with the train after a configured safety time (such as 5 minutes as currently configured) from the beginning of receiving the handover announcement information, then the accepting RBC deletes the information related to the train. If a handover cancelling message sent by the handing over RBC is received within this period, the accepting RBC directly deletes information related to the train.

[0034] If a connection with the train has been established, and the train does not enter the control range of the accepting RBC, , then the accepting RBC notifies the train to disconnect the communication connection when it received the cancellation message from the handing over RBC (e.g., due to communication disconnection between the handing over RBC and the train). In the railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on radio block center provided in this embodiment, the disconnection of the communication connection between the RBC and the train during RBC-RBC handover process can be monitored and safety processing method can be performed, CTCS-3 train control system realizes safety monitoring to the train by the radio block center when a communication connection between the RBC and the train during RBC to RBC handover process is disconnected, and ensures safe operation of the train.

[0035] Based on the above embodiment, once started, the RBC will empty all the previously received SA, temporary speed restrictions and registered trains, and so on, that is because the railway system changes dynamically, so all the route states, temporary speed restriction and train states will change over time, thus all the information received in the previous operation by the RBC may become invalid, and must be removed for safety considerations.

[0036] After started, the RBC immediately tries to establish connection with the Interlocking and the Temporary Speed Restriction Server.

[0037] If the connection with the Interlocking fails, the RBC doesn't send any message to the influenced train, to ensure the safety of the train.

[0038] As for the Temporary Speed Restriction Server, when the RBC successfully establishes connection with it, the Temporary Speed Restriction Server performs initialization to the RBC, that is, it sends all the current temporary speed restrictions to the RBC to ensure the RBC can safely monitor the train operation. If the initialization fails, the RBC doesn't accept registration of any train, avoiding safety risks.

[0039] In the railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on radio block center provided in this embodiment, communication failures between the RBC, after restarting, and other devices can be monitored and safety processing measures can be performed, so that the radio block center can achieve safety monitoring to the train in the CTCS-3 train control system when a communication failure between the RBC, after restarting, and other devices occurs, and ensure safe operation of the train.

[0040] Based on the above embodiment, when a signal authorization SA message, sent by an Interlocking, indicates that a receiving route is occupied within an MA range of a railway train, the RBC sends to the railway train a conditional emergency stop message (CEM) setting the starting point of the occupied route as the ending point of the train.

[0041] If not receiving a reply of the railway train, the RBC continues sending the CEM periodically, for example, continues sending the message in a frequency of once per 7 seconds. The train responds differently depending on its position after the CEM is received, if the train has entered the occupied route, the train notifies the RBC not to accept the CEM and will continue to operate, and the RBC maintains the previous MA of the train.

[0042] If the train doesn't arrive at the occupied route, the train notifies the RBC to accept the CEM and takes corresponding protection measures, and meanwhile the RBC shortens the MA of the train to the same point.
Further, when an SA, sent by an Interlocking, indicates that certain receiving route degrades, the RBC sends shortened movement authority (SMA) to the train in a frequency of once per 7 seconds, until the train replies with an acknowledgement. When the SMA message is received, the train immediately takes corresponding protection measures according to the message and the RBC also correspondingly shortens the reserved MA of the train.

[0043] When messages sent by an Interlocking includes an emergency area message (EMA) indicating certain emergency area is activated, the RBC immediately sends an unconditional emergency stop message (UEM) to the train already in the area, and sends a CEM to the train having not entered the area, but with a MA already extends to that area, to ensure the safety of the train.

[0044] Further, a temporary speed restriction command sent by a Temporary Speed Restriction Server is stored by the RBC, and immediately sent to the trains influenced by these temporary speed restrictions, to ensure their safety.

[0045] In the railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on radio block center provided in this embodiment, through monitoring the safety process performed by RBC according to the message sent by other wayside devices, the RBC can perform safety process in the CTCS-3 train control system according to different messages, and ensure safe operation of the train.

[0046] Based on the above embodiments, not the RBC but the driver is responsible for controlling the train in a staff responsible mode. The RBC is responsible for the safety operation of the train in a full supervision mode, and thus transition from the staff responsible mode to the full supervision mode should be processed specially.

[0047] The method adopted is that, only when a difference between the time when the state of the route in front of the train in a staff responsible mode changes from train route to occupied route and the time when the train reports that it has entered the route is within a safety time (currently, 13 seconds), the RBC can send the movement authority to the train to change the train to a full supervision mode.

[0048] In the railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on radio block center provided in this embodiment, by monitoring and transition of the train mode, the RBC can perform train mode transition in the CTCS-3 train control system, while ensuring the safe operation of the train.

[0049] It should be appreciated by persons skilled in the art that, all or a part of the steps in the method of the above embodiments may be completed by relevant hardware under the instruction of a program, and the program may be stored in a computer readable storage medium, when the program is executed, the aforementioned steps are performed. The storage medium may be, such as a read only memory (ROM)/random route memory (RAM), a floppy disk, or an optical disk.

[0050] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are merely provided for describing the technical solutions of the present invention, but not intended to limit the present invention. It should be appreciated by persons skilled in the art that although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, modifications can be made to the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments, or equivalent replacements can be made to some technical features in the technical solutions; however, such modifications or replacements do not cause the essence of corresponding technical solutions to depart from the spirit and scope of the embodiments of the present invention.


Claims

1. A railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on radio block center, comprising:

detecting, by the radio block center (RBC), whether communication between the RBC and an Interlocking fails or not;

when a communication failure occurs, stopping sending, by the RBC, messages to all railway trains in a control range of the Interlocking or to all railway trains whose movement authority (MA) extend in a control range of the Interlocking.


 
2. The railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on the radio block center according to claim 1, further comprising:

if a communication failure between the RBC and a Temporary Speed Restriction Server is detected, the RBC maintains a previously received temporary speed restriction; or

if a communication failure between the RBC and a railway train is detected, reserving, by the RBC, the MA of a railway train for a predetermined time, and not allocating routes contained in the MA to other railway trains; or

if a communication failure between the RBC and a railway train is detected when an emergency message is being sent to the railway train at this time, continuing to send, by the RBC, the emergency message for a predetermined time.


 
3. The railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on the radio block center according to claim 1, further comprising:

if a handing over RBC detects a handover process between the handing over RBC and a accepting RBC has not been started, and communication connection between the handing over RBC and the accepting RBC is disconnected, monitoring, by the handing over RBC, operation of the railway train to the border between the handing over RBC and the accepting RBC; or

if a handing over RBC detects a handover process between the handing over RBC and a accepting RBC has already been started, and communication connection between the handing over RBC and the accepting RBC is disconnected, stopping sending, by the handing over RBC, any message to the railway train; or

if the accepting RBC detects a handover process between the accepting RBC and the handing over RBC has already been started, and its connection with the railway train is not yet established, and then communication connection between the accepting RBC and the handing over RBC is disconnected, deleting, by the accepting RBC, information related to the railway train; or

if the accepting RBC detects a handover process between the accepting RBC and the handing over RBC has already been started, and the connection with the railway train is established, and then communication connection between the accepting RBC and the handing over RBC is disconnected, reserving, by the accepting RBC, information related to the railway train.


 
4. The railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on the radio block center according to claim 1, further comprising:

during an RBC-RBC handover process, if a handing over RBC detects communication connection between the handing over RBC and the railway train is disconnected, and not receiving takeover information from the accepting RBC, reserving, by the handing over RBC, the MA of the railway train for a predetermined time, not allocating routes contained in the MA to other railway trains, and sending a message for cancelling the handover to the accepting RBC; or

during an RBC-RBC handover process, if a handing over RBC detects communication connection between the handing over RBC and the railway train is disconnected, and receives train takeover information from the accepting RBC, deleting, by the handing over RBC, information related to the railway train; or

during an RBC-RBC handover process, if the accepting RBC has not yet established communication connection with the railway train or received the message for cancelling the handover sent by the handing over RBC for a predetermined time, deleting, by the accepting RBC, information related to the railway train; or

during an RBC-RBC handover process, if the accepting RBC has established communication connection with the railway train which is not in the control range of the accepting RBC, and received the message for cancelling the handover sent by the handing over RBC, notifying, by the accepting RBC, the railway train to disconnect the communication connection.


 
5. The railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on the radio block center according to claim 1, further comprising:

if the RBC is restarted, before the restarted RBC receives all current temporary speed restriction information sent by a Temporary Speed Restriction Server, it does not accept registration of any train.


 
6. The railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on the radio block center according to claim 1, further comprising:

when a signal authorization SA message, sent by an Interlocking, indicates that there is a route is occupied within a MA range of the railway train, sending, by the RBC, to the railway train a conditional emergency stop message CEM setting the starting point of the occupied route as the ending point of the train;

if not receiving a reply of the railway train, continuing, by the RBC, to send the CEM periodically;

if receiving a reply that the railway train does not accept the CEM, maintaining, by the RBC, the MA of the railway train;

if receiving a reply that the railway train accepts the CEM, shortening, by the RBC, the MA of the railway train to a position of the ending point.


 
7. The railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on the radio block center according to claim 1, further comprising:

when a SA, sent by an Interlocking, indicates that a certain route degrades, periodically sending, by the RBC, shortened movement authority SMA to the railway train, until the railway train replies with an acknowledgement and the RBC correspondingly shortens the reserved MA of the railway train; or

when messages sent by an Interlocking comprises an emergency area message EMA indicating a certain emergency area is activated, immediately sending, by the RBC, an unconditional emergency stop message UEM to the railway train already in the area indicated by the EMA; or

when messages sent by an Interlocking comprises an emergency area activation message EMA, sending, by the RBC, a conditional emergency stop message CEM to the railway train not having been in the area indicated by the EMA but the MA already extends to the indicated area.


 
8. The railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on the radio block center according to claim 1, further comprising:

if the RBC receives a temporary speed restriction command sent by a Temporary Speed Restriction Server, saving, by the RBC, the temporary speed restriction command, and timely sending to the railway train whose MA is influenced by the temporary speed restriction.


 
9. The railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on the radio block center according to claim 1, further comprising:

when a difference between a time when the state of route just in front of a railway train in a staff responsible mode changes from train route to occupied route and a time when the railway train reports that it has entered the route is within a safety time, sending, by the RBC, the MA to the railway train.


 




Drawing







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Cited references

REFERENCES CITED IN THE DESCRIPTION



This list of references cited by the applicant is for the reader's convenience only. It does not form part of the European patent document. Even though great care has been taken in compiling the references, errors or omissions cannot be excluded and the EPO disclaims all liability in this regard.

Patent documents cited in the description