Embodiments herein relate generally to a wireless device, a method in the wireless device, a first network node and a method in the first network node. More particularly the embodiments herein relate to enabling trusted communication between a wireless device entity and a second network node via the first network node.

AAA, which is short for Authentication, Authorization and Accounting, is a protocol for controlling a wireless device's (or its user's) access to network resources. AAA is important for efficient network management and security.

Authentication may be described a process by which a wireless device and a network check if the other party has an authority to communicate with each other, i.e. the process of adding or denying individual wireless device access to a network and its resources. Authentication on both sides should be passed for the communication to proceed, i.e. the wireless device and network mutually authenticate each other. For example, a user must enter a valid user name and password before access is granted. The process of authentication is based on each wireless device or its user having a unique set of criteria for gaining access. An AAA server compares a user's authentication credentials with other user credentials stored in a database. If the credentials match, the user is granted access to the network. If the credentials are at variance, authentication fails and network access is denied.

A wireless device or its user may be given different authorization levels that limit its access to the network and associated resources. Authorization may be based on geographical location restrictions, date or time-of-day restrictions, frequency of logins or multiple logins by single individuals or entities. Other associated types of authorization services may comprise route assignments, Internet Protocol (IP) address filtering, bandwidth traffic management and encryption.

Today, most solutions build on wireless device or end-user authentication. Authentication of the wireless device or end-user only works if the wireless device or end-user is not "evil", meaning that it does not try to fool the server or network node, i.e. that it is not associated with a fraud third party.

Sven Bugiel et al: "Practical and lightweight domain isolation on Android", Security and Privacy in Smartphones and Mobile Devices, ACM, 17 October 2011 discloses a security framework for practical and lightweight domain isolation on Android to mitigate unauthorized data access and communication among applications of different trust levels. The framework enables isolation at different levels of the Android software stack.

Collin Mulliner et al: "Taming Mr Hayes: Mitigating Signaling Based Attacks on Smartphones", 42nd Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN), 2012, IEEE, 25 June 2012 discloses a protection system that partitions the phone software stack into the application operating system and the communication partition. Communication to the cellular network is mediated by a flexible monitoring and enforcement system running on the communication partition. The protection system mitigates all currently known signaling based attacks. In addition, the system can protect users from cellular Trojans.

An objective of embodiments herein is therefore to obviate at least one of the above disadvantages and to provide improved communication between the wireless device entity and a second network node.

According to a first aspect, the object is achieved by a method in a wireless device for enabling trusted communication between the wireless device entity and a second network node via a first network node, as defined in claim 1.

According to a second aspect, the object is achieved by a method in the first network node for enabling trusted communication between the wireless device entity and the second network node via the first network node, as defined in claim 9.

According to a third aspect, the object is achieved by the wireless device according to claim 17.

According to a fourth aspect, the object is achieved by the first network node according to claim 25.

Since the first network node receives information, via the secure communication channel, indicating that the wireless device entity is comprised in a trusted zone, the first network node knows that this is the real wireless device. The first network node can then open a network node port which is reserved only for communication between the wireless device entity and the second network node. The network node port is blocked from access by other wireless device entities in non-trusted zones of the wireless device. Thereby, the wireless device entity and the second network node can communicate with each other in a way that is trusted.

Embodiments herein afford many advantages, of which a non-exhaustive list of examples follows:
An advantage of at least some of the embodiments herein is that they provide a method to secure authentication of the wireless device entity which is close to fool proof.

Another advantage of at least some of the embodiments herein is that they are easy to implement and does not require any extra signaling, i.e. existing signaling is used.

The embodiments herein are not limited to the features and advantages mentioned above. A person skilled in the art will recognize additional features and advantages upon reading the following detailed description.

The embodiments herein will now be further described in more detail in the following detailed description by reference to the appended drawings illustrating the embodiments and in which:

Fig. 1

is a schematic block diagram illustrating embodiments of a communication system.

Fig. 2

is a signaling diagram illustrating embodiments of a method in the communication system.

Fig. 3

is a signaling diagram illustrating embodiments of a method in the communication system.

Fig. 4

is a flow chart illustrating embodiments of a method in a wireless device.

Fig. 5

is a schematic block diagram illustrating embodiments of a wireless device.

Fig. 6

is a flow chart illustrating embodiments of a method in a first network node.

Fig. 7

is a schematic block diagram illustrating embodiments of a first network node.

The drawings are not necessarily to scale and the dimensions of certain features may have been exaggerated for the sake of clarity. Emphasis is instead placed upon illustrating the principle of the embodiments herein.

As mentioned above, today most authentication procedures build on wireless device or end-user authentication. The embodiment herein instead uses authentication of a certain wireless device entity comprised in the wireless device.

If a certain wireless device entity comprised in a wireless device shall communicate with a server/node in the network, it must be secured that the wireless device entity is the real entity and not a fraud third party entity. In other words, the communication between the wireless device entity and the second network node can be trusted.

Figure 1 depicts a communication network 100 in which embodiments herein may be implemented. The communication network 100 may in some embodiments apply to one or more radio access technologies, wired or wireless, such as for example Long Term Evolution (LTE), LTE Advanced, Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA), Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), or any other Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) radio access technology, or other radio access technologies such as WiFi and Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN).

The communication network 100 comprises a wireless device 101 comprising a wireless device entity 101a. The wireless device 101 may be a device by which a subscriber may access services offered by an operator's network and services outside the operator's network to which the operator's radio access network and core network provide access, e.g. access to the Internet. The wireless device 101 may be any device, mobile or stationary, enabled to communicate over a radio channel in the communication network, for instance but not limited to e.g. user equipment, mobile phone, smart phone, sensors, meters, vehicles, household appliances, medical appliances, media players, cameras, Machine to Machine (M2M) device or any type of consumer electronic, for instance but not limited to television, radio, lighting arrangements, tablet computer, laptop or Personal Computer (PC). The wireless device 101 may be portable, pocket storable, hand held, computer comprised, or vehicle mounted devices, enabled to communicate voice and/or data, via the radio access network, with another entity, such as another wireless device or a server.

The wireless device entity 101a, also referred to as a client, is located in a trusted zone of the wireless device 101. The wireless device entity 101a is located in the trusted zone and thereby acts as it is located there. The wireless device entity 101a may be a Central Processing Unit (CPU), a software, a firmware etc. The trusted zone is at least partly trusted by a first network node 103, i.e. it is at least semi-trusted. The zone may also be referred to as an area, a sector, a part, a region, a location or a collection of entities of the wireless device 101. That the zone is trusted refers to that the first network node 103 can be certain of, i.e. trust, that the wireless device entity 101a, which is comprised in the trusted zone, is a real wireless device entity and not a fraud or fake third party entity. For example, the trusted zone may be a modem part of the wireless device 101, which is considered to be a secure and trusted location of the wireless device 101 compared to the operating system or applications. The modem part may be located below a High Level Operating System (HLOS) (such as Android) in the wireless device 101. The modem part of the wireless device 101 may perform 3GPP signaling which is considered to be secure. Furthermore, a trusted zone may be a zone that is not easy to tamper with. For example, a trusted zone such as a modem zone is not easy to root, but a non-trusted zone such as e.g. an Android zone is easy to root and change code in. Entities in non-trusted parts of the wireless device 101 may be easily manipulated such that the communication from the entities in the non-trusted parts cannot be trusted by the first network node 103. The wireless device entity 101a may be uniquely identified with an entity ID. The trusted zone may also be referred to as a reliable zone, a dependable zone, a secure zone etc.

The wireless device entity 101a may be comprised in the wireless device 101 at manufacturing of the wireless device 101 or at some updating of the wireless device 101.

The wireless device 101 is adapted to be connected to the first network node 103. The first network node 103 may be a Packet data network GateWay (PGW), a Gateway General packet radio service Support Node (GGSN) or a co-located PGW and GGSN network node. The first network node 103 may therefore also be referred to as a gateway node. The PGW, also referred to as a PDN gateway, provides connectivity from the wireless device 101 to external Packet Data Networks (PDNs), i.e. it is the point of entry and exit of data traffic for the wireless device 101 for an LTE area. The wireless device may be connected to more than one PGW for accessing multiple PDNs. The PGW performs policy enforcement, packet filtering for each user, charging support, lawful interception, packet screening, and it acts as the anchor for mobility between 3GPP and non-3GPP technologies. The PGW may perform the same functions as the GGSN in GPRS. The GGSN enables transmission of Internet Protocol (IP) packets to external PDNs, such as e.g. the Internet, for a 3G area.

The first network node 103 may comprise at least one network node port 103a which may be dedicated to or reserved for certain types of communication, to certain applications, processes, wireless devices or network nodes etc. One purpose of the network node port 103a is to uniquely identify different applications or processes running on a single computer and thereby enable them to share a single physical connection to e.g. a packet-switched network like the Internet. The network node port 103a may be associated with an IP address of the host, as well as the type of protocol used for communication. The network node port 103a may be identified with a port number. The port number together with the IP address of the host of the communication completes the destination address for a communication session. The each network node port 103a may be opened or closed. The network node port 103a may be for example a Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) port, a User Datagram Protocol (UDP) port or a combined TCP and UDP port. TCP and UDP are transport layer protocols of the Internet protocol suite.

The wireless device 101 and the first network node 103 are adapted to communicate with each other using a secure communication channel. The secure communication channel may be Non Access Stratum (NAS) signaling. NAS signaling may be used to convey non-radio signaling in the communication network 100 and messages sent using NAS are encrypted using security algorithm. This secure communication channel is not used for the trusted communication between the wireless device entity 101a and the second network node 105. The trusted communication uses any communication channel to which the reserved network node port 103a is associated.

The first network node 103 is adapted to be connected to a second network node 105. The second network node 105 may be a network server or any other suitable network node or entity. In some embodiments, the first network node 103 and the second network node 105 are separate standalone network nodes. In other embodiments, the first network node 103 and the second network node 105 are co-located in one network node, i.e. the same network node. For example, the first network node 103 may be a GGSN and the second network node 105 is a node entity comprised in the GGSN.

It should be noted that the communication links between the wireless device 101, the wireless device entity 101a, the first network node 103 and the second network node 105 may be of any suitable kind including either a wired or wireless link. The links may use any suitable protocol depending on type and level of layer (e.g. as indicated by the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model) as understood by the person skilled in the art.

The method for enabling trusted communication between the wireless device entity 101a and the second network node 105 via the first network node 101 according to some embodiments will now be described with reference to the signaling diagram depicted in Figure 2. The method comprises the following steps, which steps may as well be carried out in another suitable order than described below.

The wireless device entity 101a blocks other entities in non-trusted zones of the wireless device 101 to access a specific network node port 103a in the first network node 103 which is reserved for the trusted communication between the wireless device entity 101a and the second network node 105. In some embodiments, a whole non-trusted zone may be blocked from accessing the reserved network node port 103a. For example, the wireless device entity 101a prohibits HLOS such as Android to use a specific TCP/UDP-port 103a. As a consequence of the prohibition, the first network node 103 can trust that all communication from this network node port 103a is done from the wireless device entity 101a.

This step 200 may be performed at start of the method or at any other suitable place in the method exemplified in figure 2. The non-trusted zones may be blocked as long as the service and/or the wireless device entity 101a in the wireless device 101 are active.

The wireless device 101 transmits a message to the first network node 103 using the secure communication channel. The message comprises information indicating that the wireless device entity 101a is comprised in the trusted zone of the wireless device 101. The trusted zone is at least partly trusted by the first network node 103. The wireless device entity 101a resides in a trusted zone of the wireless device 101 where the wireless device entity 101a can add information to messages on the secure communication channel. This information is used to identify that the wireless device entity 101a resides in the trusted zone. Even though the wireless device entity 101a adds the information to the message, it is the wireless device 101 which transmits the message over the secure communication channel. Non-trusted zones of the wireless device 101 do not have access to the secure communication channel, non-trusted zones such as e.g. a HLOS.

The information indicating that the wireless device entity 101a is comprised in the trusted zone may be of any suitable format such as e.g. an Information Element (IE), a text string, a flag etc.

The information in this step 201 may be triggered by that the wireless device 101 is powered on and is setting up a connection towards the network, for instance a PDP context activation procedure. At power on, the wireless device 101 can be put into flight mode and the first network node 103 sets up any connection towards network.

The first network node 103 receives the message from the wireless device 101 from step 201 and determines that communication from the wireless device entity 101a may be trusted since it has received information indicating that the wireless device entity 101a is comprised in the trusted zone.

In some embodiments, the first network node 103 obtains information indicating that a subscription associated with the wireless device 101 is valid. In other words, the first network node 103 obtains information whether the user is authorized to use the wireless device entity 101a in the wireless device 101. In addition, parameters/settings may be shared between the first network node 103 and the wireless device entity 101a that is part of the subscription. The first network node 103 may obtain this information from e.g. a policy node such as a Policy and Charging Rules Function (PCRF), a Policy and Charging Enforcement Function (PCEF), a Home Location Register (HLR), a Home Subscriber Server (HSS), a Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) server or any other suitable network node.

In some embodiments, the first network node 103 opens at least one network node port 103a which is to be reserved for the trusted communication between the wireless device entity 101a and the second network node 105, i.e. the network node port 103a changes its state from closed to open. Any other network nodes and other entities in the wireless device 101 are denied access to this reserved network node port 103a.

The determination of which network node port 103a that should be reserved for the trusted communication may be performed in different ways. For example, information indicating at least one random port may be sent in the NAS communication between the wireless device 101 and the first network node 103. This random port is the port that is reserved for the trusted communication. In another example, the network vendor and the vendor of the wireless device 101 and/or the vendor of the wireless device entity 101a agrees upon which network node port 103a that should be reserved for the secure communication.

In some embodiments, the first network node 103 sends, to the wireless device 101, a confirmation of that the network node port 103a has been opened so that the wireless device entity 101a can communicate with the second network node 105.

An alternative to sending a confirmation is that the wireless device 101 itself performs a test if the network node port 103a has been opened.

The wireless device entity 101a and the second network node 105 communicate with each other. The communication is trusted. The trusted communication may be conveyed via the reserved network node port 103a. For example, the trusted communication may be transmitted by the wireless device entity 101a to inform the second network node 105 about which application that is running in the wireless device 101. The second network node 105 can adjust the bandwidth according to the application. With the embodiments herein, the second network node 105 can trust that the communication comes from the true wireless device entity 101a and not from a fraud third party entity which tries to fool the second network node 105 to provide increased bandwidth although it is not necessary. This requires that non-trusted zones in the wireless device 101 are blocked from using the reserved network node port 103a, which is performed in step 200.

The trusted communication may also be referred to as reliable communication, dependable communication, secure communication etc.

The method for enabling trusted communication between the wireless device entity 101a and the second network node 105 via the first network node 101 according to some embodiments will now be described with reference to the signaling diagram depicted in Figure 3. In figure 3, the communication network 100 is exemplified to implement WCDMA and the first network node 103 is represented by a GGSN. In figure 3, the first network node 103 is seen to communicate with a PCRF 108 (the PCRF 108 was not seen in figure 1 or 2). The method comprises the following steps, which steps may as well be carried out in another suitable order than described below.

This step corresponds to step 200 in figure 2. The wireless device entity 101a blocks other entities in non-trusted zones of the wireless device 101 to access a specific network node port 103a in the GGSN 103 which is reserved for the trusted communication between the wireless device entity 101a and the second network node 105. In some embodiments, a whole non-trusted zone in the wireless device 101 may be blocked. For example, the wireless device entity 101a prohibits HLOS such as Android to use a specific TCP/UDP-port 103a. As a consequence of the prohibition, the GGSN 103 can trust that all communication from this network node port 103a is done from the wireless device entity 101a.

This step 301 may be performed at start of the method or at any other suitable place in the method exemplified in figure 3. The non-trusted zones may be blocked from accessing the reserved network node port 103a as long as the service and/or the wireless device entity 101a in the wireless device 101 are active.

This step corresponds to step 201 in figure 2. The wireless device 101 transmits a message to the GGSN 103 using the NAS signal as the secure communication channel. The message may be a PDP context activation message comprising information which indicates that the wireless device entity 101a is located in the zone which is at least partly trusted by the GGSN 103. This information may be in the form of an Information Element (IE) where the value "yes" indicates that the wireless device entity 101a is located within the trusted zone, e.g. wireless device entity available=yes.

When the wireless device entity 101a resides in the trusted zone such as for example the modem part of the wireless device 101 it has the ability to write into e.g. the Protocol Configuration Options (PCO) used in the PDP context activation message. A message telling the GGSN 103 that the wireless device entity 101 resides in the trusted zone of the wireless device 101 might then be sent in the operator specific part of the PCO.

This step corresponds to step 202 in figure 2. The GGSN 103 receives the message in step 302 and extracts the information indicating that the wireless device entity 101a is in the trusted zone. Thereby the GGSN 103 determines that it can trust that the wireless device entity 101a is running in the wireless device 101, i.e. that communication from the wireless device entity 101a can be trusted.

This step corresponds to step 203 in figure 2. In some embodiments, it might be necessary for the GGSN 103 to check a subscription associated with the wireless device 101. In such embodiments, the GGSN 103 uses the Gx interface between the GGSN 103 and a PCRF 108 to transmit the PDP activation message to the PCRF 108 to request information whether the subscription is valid or not. The PDP activation may be sent using the Diameter protocol.

This step corresponds to step 203 in figure 2. The PCRF 108 may check the validity of the subscription associated with the wireless device 101.

This step corresponds to step 203 in figure 2. The PCRF 108 may send a response to the GGSN 103 using the Gx interface. The response may be in the form of a Credit Control Request Initial (CCR I) message. The CCR I message comprises the information of the validity of the subscription. Thus, the GGSN 103 knows whether the wireless device 101 has a valid subscription or not.

This step corresponds to step 204 in figure 2. The GGSN 103 opens a connection from wireless device entity 101a to the second network node 105. The GGSN 103 opens the connection by opening the specific network node port 103a which is reserved for the trusted communication between the wireless device entity 101a and the second network node 105, since the GGSN 103 knows, from the NAS signaling, that the wireless device entity 101a is in the trusted zone. In some embodiments, a further criterion for opening the network node port 103a is that the wireless device 101 has a valid subscription. There may be one or more network node ports 103a which are reserved for this communication.

In some embodiments, the GGSN 103 transmits a PDP context create response using the NAS signaling as the secure communication channel towards the wireless device 101. The PDP context create response is a response to the PDP activation message in step 302.

This step corresponds to step 206 in figure 2. The wireless device entity 101a and the second network node 105 communicate with each other, i.e. exchange data with each other in way that it can be trusted that the communication really comes from the true wireless device entity 101a and not any fraud third party. This may also be seen as a fire wall protection. The trusted communication may be conveyed via the reserved network node port 103a which was opened in step 307.

The method described above will now be described seen from the perspective of the wireless device 101. Figure 4 is a flowchart describing the present method in the wireless device 101, for enabling trusted communication between the wireless device entity 101a and the second network node 105 via the first network node 103. The wireless device 101 and the first network node 103 are adapted to communicate using the secure communication channel. The first network node 103 and the second network node 105 may be co-located in one network node or the first network node 103 and the second network node 105 may each be standalone network nodes. The method comprises the following steps to be performed by the wireless device 101, which steps may be performed in any suitable order than described below:

This step corresponds to step 200 in figure 2 and step 301 in figure 3. In some embodiments, the wireless device 101 blocks other wireless device entities in a non-trusted zone of the wireless device 101 from accessing a network node port 103a comprised in the first network node 103. The network node port 103a is reserved for the trusted communication between the wireless device entity 101a and the second network node 105. The nun-trusted zone is not trusted by the first network node 103.

This step corresponds to step 201 in figure 2 and to step 302 in figure 3. The wireless device 101 transmits a message to the first network node 103 using the secure communication channel. The message comprises information indicating that the wireless device entity 101a is comprised in a trusted zone of the wireless device 101. The trusted zone is at least partly trusted by the first network node 103. The at least partly trusted zone may be a modem. The message may be a PDP context activation message. The information may be comprised in a PCO part of the PDP context activation message. Even though the PDP context activation is a message type associated with 3G, the PDP context activation message may also be used for other types of communication technology such as e.g. LTE and Wifi. Instead of the PDP context activation, any other suitable message type may be used.

This step corresponds to step 205 in figure 2 and step 306 in figure 3. In some embodiments, the wireless device 101 receives a reply from the first network node 103. The reply comprises a confirmation of that the network node port 103a has been opened so that the wireless device entity 101 can communicate with the second network node 105 in a trusted way. The network node port 103a is to be reserved for the trusted communication between the wireless device entity 101a and the second network node 105.

The reply may be comprised in a PDP context create response message. Even though PDP context create response is a message type associated with 3G, the PDP context create response may also be used for other types of communication technology such as e.g. LTE and Wifi. Instead of the PDP context create response, any other suitable message type may be used.

An alternative to sending a confirmation is that the wireless device 101 itself performs a test if the network node port 103a has been opened.

This step corresponds to step 206 in figure 2 and step 309 in figure 3. In some embodiments, the wireless device 101 communicates with the second network node 105 via a network node port 103a comprised in the first network node 103. The network node port 103a is reserved for the trusted communication between the wireless device entity 101a and the second network node 105.

To perform the method steps shown in figures 2, 3 and 4 for enabling trusted communication between the wireless device entity 101a and the second network node 105 via the first network node 103, the wireless device 101 comprises an arrangement as shown in Figure 5. As mentioned above, the wireless device 101 and the first network node 103 are adapted to communicate using a secure communication channel. In some embodiments, the first network node 103 and the second network node 105 are co-located in one network node. In other embodiments, the first network node 103 and the second network node 105 are each standalone network nodes.

The wireless device 101 comprises a transmitter 501 which is adapted to transmit a message to the first network node 103 using the secure communication channel. The message comprises information indicating that the wireless device entity 101a is comprised in a trusted zone of the wireless device 101. The trusted zone is at least partly trusted by the first network node 103. The at least partly trusted zone may be a modem. The transmitted message may be a PDP context activation message. The information may be comprised in a PCO part of the PDP context activation message.

The wireless device entity 101a comprised in the wireless device 101 is adapted to transmit trusted communication to the second network node 105 via the network node port 103a comprised in the first network node 103. The network node port 103a is reserved for the trusted communication between the wireless device entity 101a and the second network node 105. The wireless device entity 101a may be further adapted to receive trusted communication from the second network node 105 via the network node port 103a comprised in the first network node 103.

The wireless device 101 may comprise a receiver 503 which is adapted to receive a reply from the first network node 103. The reply comprises a confirmation of that the network node port 103a has been opened so that the wireless device entity 101 can communicate with the second network node 105 in a trusted way. The network node port 103a is to be reserved for the trusted communication between the wireless device entity 101a and the second network node 105. The reply may be comprised in a PDP context create response message.

The wireless device 101 may comprises a blocking unit 504 adapted to block other wireless device entities in a non-trusted zone of the wireless device 101 from accessing the reserved network node port 103a comprised in the first network node 103. The network node port 103a is reserved for the trusted communication between the wireless device entity 101a and the second network node 105. The non-trusted zone is not trusted by the first network node 103.

The wireless device 101 may further comprise a memory 505 comprising one or more memory units. The memory 505 is arranged to be used to store data, received data streams, power level measurements, messages, replies, communication, information about trusted and non-trusted zones, information about a user associated with the wireless device 101, threshold values, time periods, configurations, scheduling, and applications to perform the methods herein when being executed in the wireless device 101.

The method described above will now be described seen from the perspective of the first network node 103. Figure 6 is a flowchart describing the present method in the first network node 103 for enabling trusted communication between the wireless device entity 101a and the second network node 105 via the first network node 103. The wireless device 101 and the first network node 103 are adapted to communicate using the secure communication channel. The first network node 103 and the second network node 105 may be co-located in one network node, or the first network node 103 and the second network node 105 may each be standalone network nodes. The method comprises the following steps to be performed by the first network node 103, which steps may be performed in any suitable order than described below:

This step corresponds to step 201 in figure 2 and to step 302 in figure 3. The first network node 103 receives a message from the wireless device 101 using the secure communication channel. The message comprises information indicating that the wireless device entity 101a is comprised in a trusted zone of the wireless device 101. The trusted zone is at least partly trusted by the first network node 103. The received message may be a PDP context activation message. The information indicating that the wireless device entity 101a may be comprised in the wireless device 101 is comprised in the PCO part of the PDP context activation message.

This step corresponds to step 202 in figure 2 and step 303 in figure 3. In some embodiments, the first network node 103 determines that communication from the wireless device entity 101a can be trusted since it has received the information indicating that the wireless device entity 101a is comprised in the trusted zone of the wireless device 101.

This step corresponds to step 203 in figure 2 and to steps 303 and 305 in figure 3. In some embodiments, the first network node 103 obtains information indicating that a subscription associated with the wireless device 101 is valid.

This step corresponds to step 204 in figure 2 and step 307 in figure 3. In some embodiments, when the communication from the wireless device entity 101a is determined to be trusted, the first network node 103 opens the network node port 103a comprised in the first network node 103. The network node port 103a is to be reserved for the trusted communication between the wireless device entity 101a and the second network node 105, i.e. blocked for entities in non-trusted zones of the wireless device 101.

This step corresponds to step 205 in figure 2 and step 306 in figure 3. In some embodiments, the first network node 103 transmits a reply to the wireless device 101. The reply comprises a confirmation of that the network node port 103a has been opened so that the wireless device entity 101 can communicate with the second network node 105. The reply may be comprised in a PDP context create response message.

This step corresponds to step 206 in figure 2 and step 309 in figure 3. In some embodiments, the first network node 103 provides the trusted communication between the wireless device entity 101a and the second network node 105 via the opened network node port 103a.

To perform the method steps shown in figures 2, 3 and 6 for enabling trusted communication between the wireless device entity 101a and the second network node 105 via the first network node 103, the first network node 103 comprises an arrangement as shown in Figure 7. As mentioned above, the wireless device 101 and the first network node 103 are adapted to communicate using the secure communication channel. In some embodiments, the first network node 103 and the second network node 105 are co-located in one network node. In other embodiments, the first network node 103 and the second network node 105 are each standalone network nodes.

The first network node 103 comprises a receiver 701 which is adapted to receive a message from the wireless device 101 using the secure communication channel. The message comprises information indicating that the wireless device entity 101a is comprised in a trusted zone of the wireless device 101. The trusted zone is at least partly trusted by the first network node 103. The received message may be a PDP context activation message. The information indicating that the wireless device entity 101a is comprised in the wireless device 101 may be comprised in a PCO part of the PDP context activation message. The receiver 701 may be further adapted to receive the trusted communication from the wireless device entity 101a and the second network node 105 via an opened network node port 103a.

The first network node 103 comprises a determining unit 703 which is adapted to determine that communication from the wireless device entity 101a can be trusted since it has received the information indicating that the wireless device entity 101a is comprised in the trusted zone of the wireless device 101.

The first network node 103 may comprise an opening unit 705 which is adapted to open a network node port 103a which is to be reserved for the communication between the wireless device entity 101a and the second network node 105 when the communication from the wireless device entity 101a is determined to be trusted.

The first network node 103 may comprise a transmitter 708 adapted to transmit a reply to the wireless device 101. The reply comprises a confirmation of that the network node port 103a has been opened so that the wireless device entity 101a can communicate with the second network node 105. The reply may be comprised in a PDP context create response message. The transmitter 708 may be further adapted to transmit the trusted communication from the wireless device entity 101a and the second network node 105 via the opened network node port 103a.

The first network node 103 may further comprise an obtaining unit 710 adapted to obtain information indicating that a subscription associated with the wireless device 101 is valid.

The first network node 103 may further comprise a memory 713 comprising one or more memory units. The memory 713 is arranged to be used to store data, received data streams, power level measurements, messages, replies, communication, information about trusted and non-trusted zones, information about a user associated with the wireless device 101, threshold values, time periods, configurations, scheduling, and applications to perform the methods herein when being executed in the first network node 103.

The present mechanism for enabling trusted communication between the wireless device entity 101a and the second network node 105 via the first network node 103 may be implemented through one or more processors, such as a processor 510 in the wireless device arrangement depicted in Figure 5 and a processor 715 in the first network node arrangement 800 depicted in Figure 7, together with computer program code for performing the functions of the embodiments herein. The processor may be for example a Digital Signal Processor (DSP), Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) processor, Field-programmable gate array (FPGA) processor or microprocessor. The program code mentioned above may also be provided as a computer program product, for instance in the form of a data carrier carrying computer program code for performing the embodiments herein when being loaded into the wireless device 101 and/or the first network node 103. One such carrier may be in the form of a CD ROM disc. It is however feasible with other data carriers such as a memory stick. The computer program code can furthermore be provided as pure program code on a server and downloaded to the wireless device 101 and/or the first network node 103.

Summarized, the embodiment herein builds on that if a wireless device entity 101a in the modem or other trusted zones of the wireless device 101 can be seen as fool proof unbreakable, then it is possible to utilize a secure communication channel to authenticate that this wireless device entity 101a resides in the wireless device 101. One such near fool proof unbreakable wireless device entity 101a is if a wireless device entity 101a resides in the firmware or software in the modem part below HLOS (such as Android) in the wireless device 101.

The embodiments herein are not limited to the above described embodiments. Various alternatives, modifications and equivalents may be used. Therefore, the above embodiments should not be taken as limiting the scope of the embodiments, which is defined by the appending claims.

It should be emphasized that the term "comprises/comprising" when used in this specification is taken to specify the presence of stated features, integers, steps or components, but does not preclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, integers, steps, components or groups thereof. It should also be noted that the words "a" or "an" preceding an element do not exclude the presence of a plurality of such elements. The term "configured to" used herein may also be referred to as "arranged to" or "adapted to".

It should also be emphasised that the steps of the methods defined in the appended claims may, without departing from the embodiments herein, be performed in another order than the order in which they appear in the claims.