RELATED APPLICATIONS
FIELD OF THE DISCLOSURE
[0002] The systems, methods and apparatuses described herein relate to prevention of unauthorized
cartridges or unauthorized refill of authorized cartridges.
BACKGROUND
[0003] With computers becoming household items, printers and copy machines have also become
prevalent among households. Printers and copy machines, however, use toner or ink
very quickly. As a consequence, the cartridges typically need to be replaced or refilled
very often. The manufacturers of printers and copy machines often rely on the sale
of replacement cartridges to generate a healthy revenue. However, the strong demand
for cartridges has created a big market for unauthorized cartridges and/or unauthorized
refills. These unauthorized cartridges and unauthorized refills adversely financially
impact the manufacturers of printers and copy machines.
[0004] Some manufacturers install a chip on their cartridges to record the amount of ink
or toner in the cartridge. However, the chip can be reset by a refill kit sold by
unauthorized dealers or in some situations, the chip can be replaced with another
chip supplied in the refill kit. Either way, the existing technology has severe shortcomings
in dealing with unauthorized cartridges and/or unauthorized refills. Therefore, there
is a need in the art to provide systems, methods and apparatuses that prevent uses
of unauthorized cartridges and/or unauthorized refills.
US 2004/0049468 A1 relates to a consumable authentication method for validating the existence of an
untrusted chip. A random number is encrypted using a first key and sent to an untrusted
chip. In the untrusted chip it is decrypted using a secret key and re-encrypted together
with a data message read from the untrusted chip. This is decrypted so that a comparison
can be with the generated random number and the read data message.
US 2009/0319802 A1 relates to a method of manufacturing a series of integrated circuits having related
functionality, the method including the steps of: (a) determining an identifier; (b)
permanently storing the identifier on one of the integrated circuits; (c) repeating
steps (a) and (b) for each integrated circuit in the series; and wherein the identifiers
for the series are determined in such a way that knowing the identifier of one of
the integrated circuits does not improve the ability of an attacker to determine the
identifier of any of the other integrated circuits.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0005]
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of an exemplary system for using an exemplary cartridge
according to the present disclosure.
FIG. 2 is a block diagram of an exemplary system for refilling an exemplary cartridge
according to the present disclosure.
FIG. 3A is a flow diagram of an exemplary process for refilling an exemplary cartridge
according to the present disclosure.
FIG. 3B is a flow diagram of an exemplary process for an exemplary refill device to
refill an exemplary cartridge according to the present disclosure.
FIG. 3C is a flow diagram of an exemplary process for an exemplary central server
to authorize a refill according to the present disclosure.
FIG. 3D is a block diagram of an exemplary data structure for a refill request according
to the present disclosure.
FIG. 4A is a flow diagram of an exemplary process performed by a printing device during
a printing operation.
FIG. 4B is a flow diagram of an exemplary process performed by a cartridge during
a print operation.
FIG. 5 is a block diagram of another exemplary system for using an exemplary printing
device according to the present disclosure.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0006] Certain illustrative aspects of the systems, apparatuses, and methods according to
the present invention are described herein in connection with the following description
and the accompanying figures. Other advantages and novel features of the invention
may become apparent from the following detailed description when considered in conjunction
with the figures.
[0007] In the following detailed description, numerous specific details are set forth in
order to provide a thorough understanding of the invention. In other instances, well
known structures, interfaces, and processes have not been shown in detail in order
not to unnecessarily obscure the invention. However, it will be apparent to one of
ordinary skill in the art that those specific details disclosed herein need not be
used to practice the invention and do not represent a limitation on the scope of the
invention, except as recited in the claims. It is intended that no part of this specification
be construed to effect a disavowal of any part of the full scope of the invention.
Although certain embodiments of the present disclosure are described, these embodiments
likewise are not intended to limit the full scope of the invention.
[0008] The present disclosure comprises systems, methods and apparatuses for prevention
of using unauthorized cartridges or unauthorized refill of authorized cartridges.
While the present invention is described and explained in the context of refill of
an ink or toner printer or copier cartridge, it is to be understood that it is not
so limited and may be applicable to any systems, methods and apparatuses directed
to preventing unauthorized use and/or refill on an apparatus. Moreover, while the
specification generally refers to toner cartridges, it is to be understood that the
concepts discussed herein apply to any apparatuses that dispense material (e.g., ink,
toner) to print text and/or graphics on paper.
[0009] In one embodiment, a cartridge may be provided with a chip. The chip may comprise
an encryption key and a computation engine. The encryption key may be a public key
corresponding to a private key stored at a central server and may be used to verify
a refill authorization signed by the central server during a refill operation. The
computation engine may be configured for fast computation of a pre-defined calculation
operation and may be used to prove to a printing device that the cartridge is an authorized
cartridge.
[0010] In another embodiment, a method for authorizing a refill may be provided. The method
may comprise receiving a request from a cartridge to refill the cartridge, generating
a request for refill and sending the request for refill to a central server for authorization.
The request for refill may include a nonce received from the cartridge, a container
identifier uniquely identifying a toner container that may be used to dispense toner
for the refill and a device identifier uniquely identifying the refill device. The
method may further comprise receiving a reply from the central server, determining
that the reply is an authorization, performing the refill and forwarding the reply
to the cartridge. In some embodiments, the request for refill may further include
information about the type of toner requested and amount of toner requested.
[0011] In yet another embodiment, a method for performing a print job using an authorized
cartridge may be provided. The method may comprise generating an initial operation
input value at a printing device, sending the initial operation input value to a cartridge,
receiving a response from the cartridge, verifying the response containing a calculation
result that matches an expected value (which also may be referred to as a verification
value) and the response being received within a pre-defined time threshold, and performing
the print job when the verification is successful. In some embodiments, the initial
operation input value may be a nonce generated by the printing device. In some other
embodiments, the initial operation input value may be a number derived from the nonce
using a pre-defined computation function.
[0012] FIG. 1 shows a block diagram of an exemplary system 100 for using an exemplary cartridge
110 according to the present disclosure. The exemplary cartridge 110 may be used by
an exemplary printing device 140 to print documents. The exemplary cartridge 110 may
comprise a chip 115. The chip 115 may comprise a non-volatile memory 120, a random
number generator (RNG) 122, a key 124, a signature verification module 126 and a computation
module 128. In some embodiments, the cartridge 110 may also include a cartridge identifier,
for example, a cartridge serial number, that can be used to uniquely identify the
cartridge. In one non-limiting embodiment, the cartridge identifier may be stored
in the non-volatile memory 120. In some embodiments, the chip 115 may be tamper-resistant
so that the non-volatile memory 120 and other components of the chip 115 could not
be easily modified.
[0013] The printing device 140 may comprise a RNG 142 and a computation module 144. Each
of the RNGs 122 and 142 may be a hardware-based (such as, for example, a thermal-noise
based, oscillator-jitter-based, or Zener noise-based generator), or software-based
(such as, for example, linear congruential generator, Mersenne Twister generator,
or cryptographic generator such as Blum-Blum-Shub, Yarrow or Fortuna) random number
generator. The RNGs 122 and 142 may be used to generate nonces for secure communication
with other devices (e.g., between the cartridge 110 and the printing device 140, between
the cartridge 110 and a refill device as shown in FIG. 2, etc.). In embodiments in
which the RNG 122 or 142 is software based, its initial state may be set to different
values for different chips at the time of manufacture (or prior to first use). For
example, in some embodiments it may be performed during standard chip testing procedures
(such as IEEE 1149.1-based testing). Additionally, the chip 115 may collect and supply
the RNG 122 or 142 with additional randomness obtained from various data, states and/or
events. By way of example and not limitation, a subset of the bits constituting commands
sent to the chip 115, the temperature of the chip 115 at a particular point in time,
and/or the number of clock counts of a counter (not shown) between certain events
may be obtained and supplied to the RNG as sources of randomness. In some embodiments,
the chip 115 may process a command to add randomness. Such a command may have as a
parameter, for example, comprising an externally generated random number. When such
a command is received, the chip 115 may use the random number received to update the
current state of the RNG.
[0014] The exemplary cartridge 110 and the printing device 140 may be coupled by an interface
130. The interface 130 may be a wired connection (such as serial, parallel, Ethernet,
or USB), or a wireless connection (such as Bluetooth, near field communications, infrared,
or various flavors of IEEE 802.11), and/or any suitable custom connection. In one
embodiment, for example, the interface 130 may be a Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI)
Bus.
[0015] The non-volatile memory 120 may store a number representing the amount of toner in
the cartridge 110. In one non-limiting embodiment, the initial value of the number
representing the amount of toner may be set at the time the toner cartridge 110 is
filled for the first time. In another non-limiting embodiment, an initial value representing
the amount of toner in the cartridge may be programmed into or stored in the memory
120 at the time that the chip 115 or cartridge 110 is manufactured. For example, in
some embodiments it may be performed during standard chip testing procedures (such
as IEEE 1149.1-based testing). In such an embodiment, the initial value need not be
set at the same time the cartridge is filled for the first time but may be interpreted
as corresponding to the amount of toner in a fully filled cartridge.
[0016] In some further embodiments, the cartridge 110 can only be filled once and cannot
be refilled. In these embodiments, the chip 115 may have an on-chip fuse (or anti-fuse)
which is permanently and irreversibly programmed after the initial value representing
the amount of toner is written (and/or command(s) to add randomness is processed).
When the fuse or anti-fuse is permanently and irreversibly programmed, the chip 115
may stop responding to requests to write the initial amount of toner and/or to commands
to add randomness.
[0017] In yet another non-limiting embodiment, the initial state of the memory 120 after
manufacture and prior to any initialization, wherein this state is the same for all
the memories 120 incorporated into the chips 115, may be interpreted as corresponding
to the amount of toner in a fully filled cartridge. By way of example, if an EEPROM
or a flash memory is used to implement the non-volatile memory 120, as a result of
the manufacturing process all of the bits of the EEPROM or flash memory may have the
same value (for example, all the bits may be set to 1). In such an embodiment, the
default state (e.g., when all the bits are set to 1) may be interpreted as corresponding
to the amount of toner in a fully filled cartridge.
[0018] The key 124 may be a public encryption key of a public/private key pair. For example,
the key 124 may be an Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) public key (e.g., ECC-224),
or an RSA public key. The signature verification module 126 may implement a signature
verification algorithm based on the public key 124. For example, the signature verification
module 126 may implement a secure hash algorithm (e.g., SHA-0, SHA-1, or SHA-2) and/or
ECC verification.
[0019] The computation module 128 may be a dedicated computation module that is configured
to perform one or more pre-defined calculation operations and to be able to perform
the pre-defined operations very quickly. For example, the computation engine 128 may
be implemented in an Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) favoring speed
of processing and may be much faster than a corresponding field programmable gate
arrays (FPGAs) implementation. The ASIC implementation may also be much faster than
software emulation using the combination of general purpose CPUs and/or graphical
processing units (GPUs). In one non-limiting embodiment, the computation module 128
may be configured for computing recursively a hash value from an initial input value
received by the computation module 128. For example, using an initial value V
0 as an input parameter, a hash function H may be computed to obtain value V
1 (e.g., V
1 = H(V
0)). The hash function may be any hash function such as, for example, SHA-1, or SHA-256.
Then the hash function H may be applied to the value V
1 to obtain V
2 (e.g., V
2 = H(V
1)). Such a process may be repeated N times (wherein N may be any integer greater than
one) to obtain a resulting value V
N, wherein V
N = H(V
N-1). In one embodiment the hash function H may be pre-defined (e.g., by chip manufacturers
or cartridge manufacturers), while the number N and initial value V
0 may be provided at runtime (e.g., during refill or print operations).
[0020] The computation module 144 may be configured to perform the same calculation operations
as the computation engine 128 and may be used by the printing device 140 to verify
a calculation result returned by the cartridge 110 during an operation. The computation
speed of the computation module 144, however, does not need to be as fast as the computation
module 128. In one or more embodiments, the computation module 144 may be implemented
in hardware (e.g., ASIC or FPGA) or software (e.g., software emulator running on a
general purpose CPU and/or GPU).
[0021] In one or more embodiments, identical chips 115 may be used in a plurality of cartridges
(e.g., in a set of cartridges manufactured in a batch) to reduce manufacturing cost.
In some other embodiments, the chips 115 may be changed often to ensure better security.
In yet some other embodiments, only the public keys 124 may be changed periodically
but other components of the chips 115 may be identical between different batches.
With respect to any of the embodiments, it may be advantageous to mix chips from different
batches before distribution so that cartridges sold in the same geographic area come
from different batches.
[0022] FIG. 2 is a block diagram of an exemplary system 200 for refilling the exemplary
cartridge 110 according to the present disclosure. The refilling system 200 may comprise
a refill device 210 and a central server 230 in addition to the exemplary cartridge
110 (which is the same as that of the system 100). The refill device 210 may comprise
a container 212 of toner for cartridge refill. The container 212 may have a container
identifier 213 (e.g., a serial number) that can uniquely identify the container 212.
The refill device 210 may also comprise a key 214 and a device identifier 216. The
key 214 may be a private key of a public/private key pair. The private key may be,
for example, an RSA or ECC private key, which may be used for signing data sent from
the refill device 210. The device identifier 216 may be a unique identifier for the
refill device 210 (e.g., a device serial number) to uniquely identify the refill device
210. In addition, in some embodiments, the refill device 210 may also store a copy
of the public keys 124 of the cartridge 110.
[0023] The central server 230 may have a database 235 and a key 237. The database 235 may
store information about authorized refill devices. The stored information may include,
for example, the device identifiers (e.g., the device identifier 216), public keys
that correspond to the private key of the refill devices (e.g., the public key corresponding
to the private key 214), information about current operators and/or owners of the
refill devices, container identifiers (e.g., the container identifier 213) of each
container acquired for each refill device, and the amount of toner remaining in each
container. In a non-limiting embodiment, the public keys 214 may serve as unique identifiers
for respective refill devices 210. The key 237 may be the private key that corresponds
to the public key 124 stored at the cartridge 110 (and at the refill device 210 in
some embodiments). In some embodiments, the key 237 may be stored in a database (e.g.,
the database 235 or another database accessible by the central server 230).
[0024] As shown in FIG. 2, the cartridge 110 may communicate with the refill device 210
for refill operations and the refill devices 210 may communicate with the central
server 230. The communication connection between the refill device 210 and cartridge
110 may be a wired connection (such as serial, parallel, Ethernet, and USB), or a
wireless connection (such as Bluetooth, near field communications, infrared, various
flavors of IEEE 802.11), and/or any suitable custom connection. The communication
connection between the refill device 210 and the central server 230 may include any
suitable connections, for example, wired and/or wireless connections, and may include
the Internet.
[0025] FIG. 3A is a flow diagram of an exemplary process 300 for refilling an exemplary
cartridge according to the present disclosure. At block 302, the cartridge 110 may
establish a communication/data connection to the refill device 210. At block 304,
the cartridge chip 115 may receive a request from the refill device 210 to refill
the cartridge 110. In an alternative embodiment, the cartridge chip 115 may generate
a request to the refill device 210 to refill the cartridge 110. The request whether
sent or received may, for example, initiate setting an amount of toner to the cartridge
chip 115. At block 306, the cartridge chip 115 may generate a nonce using the RNG
122, and send the generated nonce to the refill device 210. The nonce may be of any
length and in one embodiment may be 128 bits. In one embodiment, if the cartridge
110 stores its cartridge identifier, the cartridge identifier may also be sent along
with the nonce to the refill device 210.
[0026] At block 308, the cartridge chip 115 may receive a reply from the refill device 210.
As will be described below, the reply may be generated by a central server such as
the central server 230 and forwarded to the cartridge 110 by the refill device 210.
At block 310, the cartridge chip 115 may validate the signature of the reply using
the key 124 (e.g., by using the signature validation module 126) and validate that
the received nonce (in the reply) is the same as the nonce generated at block 306.
In one embodiment, the cartridge chip 115 may also ensure that the time period from
sending the nonce until receiving the reply may be within a pre-defined threshold.
The pre-defined threshold may be any amount of time and in one embodiment may be 15
seconds. If all validations are successful, the chip 115 may write the amount of toner
(e.g., the amount of toner requested in a request for refill sent by the refill device
to the central server) into the non-volatile memory 120.
[0027] FIG. 3B is a flow diagram of an exemplary process 315 for an exemplary refill device
to refill an exemplary cartridge according to the present disclosure. At block 320,
the refill device 210 may establish a communication/data connection to a cartridge
such as the cartridge 110. At block 322, the refill device 210 may generate a request
to refill the cartridge and send the request to the cartridge. In an alternative embodiment,
the refill device may receive from the cartridge a request to refill the cartridge.
The request whether sent or received may, for example, initiate setting an amount
of toner to the cartridge chip 115. At block 324, the refill device 210 may receive
a nonce from the cartridge 110. In one non-limiting embodiment, the refill device
210 may also receive the cartridge identifier if the cartridge sends its cartridge
identifier.
[0028] At block 326, the refill device 210 may generate a request for refill and send it
to an authorization server (e.g., the central server 230). FIG. 3D shows an exemplary
data structure for a request for refill 360 according to the present disclosure. As
shown in FIG. 3D, the request for refill 360 may include a nonce 362, toner requested
364, a container identifier 366, a refill device identifier 368, and an amount of
toner requested 370. The nonce 362 may be the nonce received from the cartridge 110
(e.g., the nonce generated at block 315 at the chip 115). The toner requested 364
may include information about the particular type of toner requested, for example,
"blue toner type BT-198." The container identifier 366 may be the identifier of the
container that the refill device may use to dispense the toner from (e.g., the container
identifier 213 of the container 212). The refill device identifier 368 may be the
device identifier of the refill device submitting the request for refill (e.g., the
device identifier 216). The amount of toner 370 may be a number representing the amount
of toner that needs to be dispensed into the cartridge to be refilled. In one embodiment,
the request for refill 360 may be signed by the refill device 210 using the refill
device's private key (e.g., the key 214). The signature may be sent along with the
request for refill to the central server 230. In some embodiments, the cartridge identifier
received from the cartridge may also be included in the request for refill 360.
[0029] At block 328, the refill device 210 may receive a reply from the authorization server
(e.g., the central server 230) and determine whether the reply is an authorization
or denial of authorization. If the reply is a denial of authorization, the process
315 may be aborted at block 334. For example, the refill device 210 may report an
error message to an operator of the device and end the refill process 315. If the
reply is an authorization, the process 315 may proceed to block 332, at which the
refill device 210 may forward the reply to the cartridge 110 and also perform the
physical act of refilling the cartridge. In some embodiments, the reply may be encrypted
by the authorization server, for example, using the authorization server's private
key. The refill device 210 may use one or more of the following ways to determine
whether the reply is an authorization. For example, the refill device 210 may have
a copy of the public key 124 that corresponds to the authorization server's private
key and may use its copy of the public key 124 to decrypt the reply. Alternatively,
the authorization server may send an additional message with the reply that indicates
that the request has been granted. In one embodiment, the additional message may be
signed by the refill device 210's public key (taken from the database 235). In another
example, the reply to be forwarded to the cartridge 110 may be a part of a larger
message sent to the refill device 210. The larger message may be signed by a public
key of the refill device 210. In yet another example, the refill device 210 may receive
all data over a secure connection (e.g., SSL), and the received data may contain both
a message for the cartridge 110 and the permission for refill.
[0030] FIG. 3C is a flow diagram of an exemplary process 340 for authorizing a refill according
to the present disclosure. At block 342, the central server 230 may receive a request
for refill (e.g., a request comprising or including the request for refill 360) sent
from the refill device 210. At block 344, the process 340 may decide whether the request
for refill should be authorized. The central server 230 may verify that the refill
device 210 (identified by the device identifier 368 in the request) may be an authorized
refill device and associated with an authorized owner or operator, that the refill
device 210 may indeed have an authorized toner container (identified by the container
identifier 366 in the request), and that the authorized toner container has a sufficient
amount of toner to satisfy the amount of toner requested. For example, the central
server 230 may query its database 235 using the device identifier 368 and container
identifier 366 for the verification. In one non-limiting embodiment, if the cartridge
identifier is also included in the request for refill, the central server 230 may
have access to a database storing cartridge identifiers for authorized cartridges.
In this case, the central server 230 may also verify that the cartridge is an authorized
cartridge by searching its database for authorized cartridges.
[0031] In some embodiments, the central server 230 may take into account any potential physical
inaccuracies in determining whether there is a sufficient amount of toner in the container.
For example, the central server 230 may assume that the container 212 may actually
have slightly more toner than the information stored in the database 235 indicates.
In some embodiments, the central server 230 may store a public key corresponding to
the private key 214 of the refill device 210. In these embodiments, if the request
for refill 360 is signed by the private key 214, the central server 230 may use the
public key to verify the signature. The public key may be stored in the database 235
or in another database.
[0032] If all of the verifications are successful, the process 340 may proceed to block
346, at which the central server 230 may generate a reply to authorize the refill
and send the authorization to the refill device 210. If any one of the verifications
fails, the process 340 may proceed to block 348, at which the central server 230 may
generate a reply to deny the refill. In one non-limiting embodiment, the reply may
include the nonce 362 received in the request and may be signed by the private key
237 stored at the central server 230. Also, in some embodiments, the reply may additionally
be encrypted using the private key 237 (so that only the cartridge chip 115 may recognize
the authorization by decrypting the reply using the key 124, which may be the public
key corresponding to the key 237 as described above).
[0033] In some embodiments, to enable detection of unauthorized refilling, each chip 115
may have a globally unique private key and a chip ID. The private key may have a corresponding
public key stored at the central server 230 or stored at a third party but accessible
by the central server 230. The chip 115 may use this private key to sign a request
for refill 360 or sign just part of such a request (e.g., only signing the nonce 362).
The signature and the chip ID may be sent, together with the request for refill, to
the server 230. The central server 230 may keep records for all refill activities
associated with each chip ID. When a request to refill is received, the server 230,
using the chip ID, may obtain the public key corresponding to the private key and
verify the signature. If the signature verification fails, the request for refill
may be denied. If the signature verification passes, this refill activity may be added
to the database for the chip ID.
[0034] Further, records of the refill activities associated with a requesting chip may be
analyzed. For example, if the historical information shows that a particular chip
signs too many requests for refill (e.g., within a certain period of time), this may
indicate that this particular chip has been cloned, and, therefore, requests signed
by the private key associated with the chip ID of this particular chip should be rejected.
[0035] FIG. 4A is a flow diagram of an exemplary process 400 performed by a printing device
during a printing operation. At block 402, the printing device 140 may generate a
random number for a print job. For example, a print job from a computer (not shown)
may be received by the printing device 140. The printing device 140 may estimate how
much toner it needs to perform this job and generate a random number R using the RNG
142. The estimated amount of toner needed may be referred to as DINC. At block 404,
the printing device 140 may generate or obtain an operation input value RR. In some
embodiments, the operation input value RR may be a set of random bits. For example,
the random number R generated in block 402 may be used as RR. That is, RR=R, in which
case the block 404 may be skipped. In some other embodiments, the operation input
value RR may not be a pure random number. For example, one bit of RR (e.g., the highest
bit or the lowest bit) may always be set to 1 but all other bits may be random. In
yet other embodiments, the operation input value RR may be an element of a finite
field or some other construction, which may be fully or in part built based on the
random number R as an input.
[0036] At block 406, the printing device 140 may send a command and the operation input
value RR (or the random number R if the optional block 404 is skipped) to the cartridge
chip 115 (e.g., via the interface 130). The command may request the cartridge chip
115 to reduce the amount of toner recorded in memory 120 by DINC. The operation input
value RR may be used by the cartridge chip 115 to perform a predefined operation and
return a response based on that operation to the printing device.
[0037] At block 408, the printing device 140 may receive a response back from the cartridge
chip 115. The response, for example, may include a calculation result generated by
the computation module 128. Then at block 410, the printing device 140 may determine
whether the response matches an expected value and, optionally, may determine whether
the response is received within a pre-defined time threshold. The pre-defined time
threshold may be any finite amount of time. For example, the printing device 140 may
perform a calculation using its computation module 144 and compare the calculation
result in the response to its own calculation result. In embodiments in which the
response time is checked against a pre-defined time threshold, the fact that the cartridge
110 includes a chip 115 that can perform the predefined operation sufficiently fast
to return the verification value to the printing device within the time threshold
may serve as an assurance that the cartridge is a valid cartridge. Exemplary techniques
for attesting a device (e.g., a cartridge) by selecting appropriate time thresholds
are described in
U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 61/792,392, entitled "Systems, Methods and Apparatuses for Device Attestation Based on Speed
of Computation," and filed on March 15, 2013, the entirety of which is incorporated
herein by reference.
[0038] If the calculation result in the response matches the expected value (and optionally
is received within a pre-defined time threshold), the process 400 may proceed to block
412, at which the print job may be performed by dispensing toner from the cartridge
110. As described above, authorized cartridges may have chips that are capable of
performing the pre-defined operation sufficiently fast such that the amount of time
that passes from when the command is sent by the printing device to the time that
the response is received by the printing device is within a predefined time threshold.
Thus, by checking that the calculation result is received within the certain time
threshold, the process 400 may ensure that an authorized cartridge has been used for
this print job. In one embodiment, if the interface 130 between the printing device
140 and cartridge 110 is serial, the time it takes to receive the calculation result
may be measured from when the last bit of the RR (or R) is transmitted until when
the first bit of the response containing the calculation result is received.
[0039] If, however, the calculation result check fails (and/or the result is received outside
the pre-defined time threshold), then process 400 may proceed to block 414, at which
the print job may be aborted and an error may be reported (e.g., on a user interface
of the printing device 140, and/or sent to a computer that sends the print job, and/or
sent to a monitoring device coupled to the printing device 140).
[0040] FIG. 4B is a flow diagram of an exemplary process 420 performed by a cartridge during
a printing operation. At block 422, the cartridge 110 may receive a command and an
operation input value. The command and operation input value may be the command and
operation input value RR (or R) sent at block 406 by a printing device 140. As described
above with respect to block 406, the command may include the estimated value DINC
for the amount of toner needed to perform the print job. Then at block 424, the cartridge
chip 115 may check to determine if there is sufficient toner left in the cartridge
to perform the print job. For example, the cartridge chip 115 may check if the value
DINC is less than the amount of toner recorded in the memory 120. If there isn't enough
toner, the process 420 may proceed to block 430, at which a report may be generated
(e.g., on a user interface of the printing device 140, and/or sent to a computer that
requests the print job, and/or sent to a monitoring device coupled to the printing
device 140) and the process 420 may be aborted.
[0041] If there is enough toner, the process 420 may proceed to block 426, at which the
cartridge chip 115 may perform calculation of a pre-defined operation and return the
calculation result back to the printing device 140. The calculation may be performed
by the computation module 128 based on the received value of RR (or R). As described
above, the computation module 128 may be a special purpose hardware computation module
configured to perform fast computation of the pre-defined operation, and the printing
device may rely on the fact that it received the expected (or verification) value
within the predefined time threshold as an assurance that the computation was performed
by a computation module 128 of a valid cartridge rather than, for example, a software
emulator.
[0042] At block 428, the process 420 may reduce the amount of toner recorded in memory 120
for the print job. For example, the cartridge chip 115 may decrement the amount of
toner recorded in memory 120 by the estimated value DINC. It should be noted that
the blocks 426 and 428 may be performed in any order, interleaved, or parallel. However,
it should be noted that in some embodiments, the calculation result generated at block
426 may need to be sent back to the printing device as fast as possible for the purposes
of device attestation.
[0043] It is to be recognized that the method 420 may be modified without departing from
the scope of the present invention. By way of example and not limitation, the determination
at block 424 may be performed by tracking the amount of toner used from the cartridge
(instead of the amount of toner remaining in the cartridge). More particularly, for
example, the cartridge chip may record the amount of toner used from the cartridge
by keeping a cumulative sum of the amounts DINC and comparing that cumulative sum
to the maximum capacity of the toner cartridge. In other words, the comparison at
block 424 may be performed by subtracting the amount of toner that would be used (i.e.,
all amounts used since the toner was last filled or refilled and the amount to be
used presently) from the maximum toner capacity of the cartridge. In such an embodiment,
at block 428 the process 420 may add the amount of toner used during the current print
job to the amount of toner used in all print jobs since the cartridge was last filled
or refilled and store that value in the memory 120.
[0044] In another non-limiting embodiment of the present disclosure, instead of the cartridge
chip 115 performing the calculations to determine whether there is sufficient toner
to perform the print job and the amount of toner remaining after the print job has
occurred, these determinations may be made by another device or component and a new
toner amount may be provided to the cartridge chip 115 and recorded in the memory
120. By way of example and not limitation, the cartridge chip 115 may provide the
amount of toner to the printer 140 and the printer may calculate a new amount of toner
after accounting for the current print job. The printer may then send the new amount
of toner to the cartridge chip 115 to be stored in the memory 120 as the new or updated
amount of toner. The cartridge chip 115 may verify that this new amount of toner is
less than the amount of toner currently stored in the memory 120 before allowing the
amount of toner in the memory to be updated. In such an embodiment, the cartridge
chip 115 may allow the update request to be non-signed if it decreases the amount
of toner but require that the update request to be signed if it increases the amount
of toner.
[0045] In some embodiments, the calculation of a pre-defined operation by the cartridge
110 at block 426 (and, correspondingly, the verification whether the response matches
an expected value and is received within a pre-defined time threshold performed by
the printing device 140 at block 410) may be omitted. In these embodiments, the chip
115 need not have a computation module 128, and the printing device 140 need not have
a computation module 144 and RNG 142.
[0046] In certain circumstances, for commercial or implementation reasons, it may be desired
that the cartridge 115 not be capable of being refilled while still desiring to maintain
the capability to perform a verification before allowing a print job. In such an embodiment,
the chip 115 incorporated into the cartridge 110 need not have a RNG 122, key 124
and signature verification module 126.
[0047] In some embodiments, a printer device according to the present disclosure may implement
protection measures against unauthorized attempts to reprogram the device. FIG. 5
shows a block diagram of an exemplary system 500 for using an exemplary printer device
140A according to the present disclosure. The exemplary printer device 140A may be
an embodiment of the printer device 140 and may use a cartridge 110 for printing jobs.
The cartridge 110 may be identical to the cartridge 110 shown in FIG. 1 and the chip
115 in FIG. 5 may also be identical to the chip 115 in FIG. 1 (details of the chip
115 in FIG. 5 are omitted for simplicity). The printer device 140A may comprise an
ink supplying mechanism 146, a printing logic block 148, and a cartridge verification
block 150. The printing logic block 148 may implement the printing logic in hardware,
software, or combination of hardware and software. For example, the printing logic
block 148 may be a micro controller unit (MCU) or a central processing unit (CPU)
at which code responsible for performing printing operation may be executed.
[0048] The cartridge verification block 150 may be, for example, an ASIC. The ASIC may include,
for example, an RNG 142 and a computation module 144 as shown in FIG. 1, and may implement
the verification process 400 as described above. If the verification is passed successfully,
the verification block 150 may inform the block 148, which then forms commands for
the ink supplying mechanism 146. To avoid unauthorized printing even if the block
148 is reprogrammed, all commands from the block 148 to the ink supplying mechanism
146 may be sent through the verification block 150. Thus, the verification block 150
may effectively serve as a switch, allowing commands to go through if the cartridge
verification is passed, and blocking commands otherwise. Correspondingly, in such
embodiments, unauthorized reprogramming of the printing logic 148 will not lead to
any unauthorized printing operations.
[0049] In some embodiments, as an additional protection measure (for example, against attacks
that attempt to expose the cartridge 110 or the chip 115 to certain environmental
conditions, such as high or low temperatures, electric and/or magnetic fields, etc.),
a checksum (for example, a CRC-32 checksum) may also be stored (for example, within
non-volatile memory 120) in addition to the amount of toner remaining in the cartridge
or amount of toner used from the cartridge. The checksum can be used to ensure that
the amount of toner read from memory is correct and, if it is not, the chip 115 may,
for example, return an error message to the printing device. To avoid accidental checksum
failure, the chip 115 may optionally store (in addition to the checksum or instead
of the checksum) an error correction code. Exemplary error correction codes may include
variations of a Hamming code (for example, the Hamming (39,32) code), Reed-Solomon
codes, multidimensional parity check codes, triple modular redundancy codes, or any
other type of error correction code, known in the art, or developed in the future.
Such an error correction code may be formed and checked, for example, in a memory
controller (not shown) of the chip 115. If an error occurs and is capable of being
corrected, the chip 115 may correct the error and proceed with the methods and techniques
described herein using the amount of toner obtained from the error correction process.
[0050] Further, the checksum and/or the error correction method may be selected such that
it can detect when the memory appears to be in a certain default state (e.g., all
of the bits of the memory 120 become set to 1) as a result of exposure to certain
environmental conditions (e.g., extreme heat or extreme cold). For example, in an
embodiment in which the default state of the bits in the memory is 1, the checksum
of a memory bit sequence with all bits being 1 should not have a value with the binary
representation of all Is because, being stored in the same memory 120, such a checksum
may also become a value with all bits set to 1 as a result of the exposure to the
same environmental conditions.
[0051] It should be noted that a value representing a current state of the RNG 122 may be
protected by adding checksums and/or error correction codes as described above with
respect to the amount of toner remaining in the cartridge or the amount of toner used
from the cartridge.
[0052] As additional measures of protection against attacks directed to exposing the cartridge
chip 115 to certain conditions, the chip 115 may be configured to detect changes in
environmental parameters. By way of example and not limitation, such parameters may
include temperature, power supply voltage, frequency of clock generator (if a clock
signal is generated externally), and the like. If changes to one or more of these
parameters beyond permissible bounds are detected, the chip may be configured to stop
operating (temporarily or permanently), to report an error, or to take other corrective
action.
[0053] In one or more embodiments, the data transmission rate of the interface 130 between
the cartridge and the printing device may be performed at a high frequency (e.g.,
on the order of the Mbit/s or faster) to prevent attacks by interception. For example,
an unauthorized cartridge may pretend to be an authorized cartridge by passing the
received RR (or R) to a high-speed CPU/GPU that runs a software emulator and perform
the computation using the CPU/GPU, and pass the result back. To protect against such
attacks, the data transmission rate of the interface 130 may be set to at least 10MBit/s
and even as high as approximately 100MBit/s.
[0054] In some embodiments, checksums (such as cyclic redundancy check) may be sent over
the interface (e.g., the interface 130) from the printing device to a cartridge. For
example, checksums may be sent for each command and sometimes even for data chunks
smaller than a single command. When checksums are used, the cartridge chip may send
a checksum error back as soon as the first checksum check fails. In one embodiment,
if a checksum check fails, the printing device may be configured to generate completely
new R and RR and restart the process instead of trying to retransmit the data chunk
that failed the checksum check. Moreover, in cases of checksums being used for small
data chunks, the printing device may collect statistics on the communications with
the cartridge. If checksum errors occur too often, or errors are skewed towards the
last chunks (which may indicate an attempt to attack), the printing device may show
error messages on a user interface (either directly on the printing device, or to
the device which generates the print job). In some embodiments, the error message
may prompt a user to replace the cartridge or to re-insert the cartridge. In a non-limiting
embodiment, the printing device may implement a time-out (e.g., a few seconds) before
retrying to communicate with the cartridge.
[0055] In some embodiments, checksums may also be added by the cartridge when transmitting
data to the printing device. The checksums may be added to a reply message to be sent
to the printing device or may be added to data chunks smaller than the reply message.
The printing device may also collect statistics on successful/unsuccessful validation
of these checksums. If the statistics show that checksums are failing too often, the
printing device may show an error message to ask the cartridge to be re-inserted or
replaced, and may implement a time-out before retrying to communicate with the cartridge.
In addition, even if some checksums for some data chunks have already failed, the
printing device may still check the checksums of other data chunks to determine whether
the content of the other checksums is correct. If the other checksums are also incorrect,
then there is a possible attack and the printing device may, for example, prompt a
user to re-insert or replace the cartridge after a timeout.
[0056] In one embodiment, the data may be passed over the interface 130 in a serial manner.
The full set of data to be transmitted may include multiple parts, for example, some
parts may contain bits that are easier to predict (such as, for instance, (unencrypted)
value of DINC) and some parts may contain bits that are harder to predict (such as,
for instance, the value of RR). If the portion of the data containing easy to predict
bits is sent after the portion of the data containing hard to predict bits, an attacker
may start computations before receiving all the bits. For example, the attacker may
start computation after receiving the data bits that are hard to predict and then
start computation based on statistical predictions of the data not yet received with
a hope that the predictions match the data bits actually received later. Alternatively,
the attacker may perform computations for a few different predictions in parallel
and hope one prediction will match the data bits actually received later. Thus, if
the data bits are not transmitted in an easy to predict then hard to predict order,
the attackers may get extra time for computations. To address this issue, in one or
more embodiments, the data bits that may be easy to predict may be transmitted earlier
than the data bits that may be hard to predict.
[0057] In one embodiment, the computation module 126 may comprise separate sub-modules to
perform different calculations. In some implementations for these embodiments, the
printing device 140 may send an instruction to select one of the sub-modules for a
specific calculation to be performed when issuing a command to reduce an amount of
toner.
[0058] In yet another embodiment, during a refill operation, the signed reply from the central
server 230 may contain additional information (such as a refill device identifier
216, toner container identifier 213, etc.) which the cartridge chip 115 may store
in the memory 120. This additional information may be accessible to the printing device
140 by special commands via the interface 130. In one non-limiting embodiment, this
information may be used to help analyze cartridge failures caused by toner.
[0059] In another embodiment, during the refill operation, the signed reply from the central
server 230 may also contain information about the type of toner. This information
may be stored by the chip 115 and accessible by the printing device 140. In one embodiment,
this may help reuse the same cartridge 110 for different types of toner by allowing
the printing device 140 to check that the cartridge in the printing device slot has
the correct type of toner. Reuse cartridges may help, for example, reduce storage
requirement for empty cartridges.
[0060] In some embodiments, the central server 230 may collect real-time information about
the cartridges requesting a refill and the refill device performing the refill. In
one non-limiting embodiment, the central server 230 may use such information to perform
a variety of functions. For example, the central server 230 may use the information
about the refill device to impose restrictions on refill operations (e.g., it is known
that this refill device should only be in operation from 8am to 6pm, so if a request
is received from it at 3am then something is probably wrong; and/or if a refill device
is known to be located in United States, but a request purportedly from the refill
device is received from an IP address registered in England, then something is probably
wrong). In addition or alternatively, the central server 230 may use the information
to perform statistical analysis, such as calculating statistics for remaining stocks
of toner at the refill device, geographical locations of the refill operation, etc.
[0061] It is to be understood that the various embodiments disclosed herein are not mutually
exclusive and that a particular implementation may include features or capabilities
of multiple embodiments discussed herein.
[0062] While specific embodiments and applications of the present invention have been illustrated
and described, it is to be understood that the invention is not limited to the precise
configuration and components disclosed herein. The terms, descriptions and figures
used herein are set forth by way of illustration only and are not meant as limitations.
Various modifications, changes, and variations which will be apparent to those skilled
in the art may be made in the arrangement, operation, and details of the apparatuses,
methods and systems of the present invention disclosed herein without departing from
the scope of the invention as claimed. By way of non-limiting example, it will be
understood that the block diagrams included herein are intended to show a selected
subset of the components of each apparatus and system, and each pictured apparatus
and system may include other components which are not shown on the drawings. Additionally,
those with ordinary skill in the art will recognize that certain steps and functionalities
described herein may be omitted or re-ordered without detracting from the scope or
performance of the embodiments described herein.
[0063] The various illustrative logical blocks, modules, circuits, and algorithm steps described
in connection with the embodiments disclosed herein may be implemented as electronic
hardware, computer software, or combinations of both. To illustrate this interchangeability
of hardware and software, various illustrative components, blocks, modules, circuits,
and steps have been described above generally in terms of their functionality. Whether
such functionality is implemented as hardware or software depends upon the particular
application and design constraints imposed on the overall system. The described functionality
can be implemented in varying ways for each particular application--such as by using
any combination of microprocessors, microcontrollers, field programmable gate arrays
(FPGAs), application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), and/or System on a Chip
(SoC)--but such implementation decisions should not be interpreted as causing a departure
from the scope of the present invention.
[0064] The steps of a method or algorithm described in connection with the embodiments disclosed
herein may be embodied directly in hardware, in a software module executed by a processor,
or in a combination of the two. A software module may reside in RAM memory, flash
memory, ROM memory, EPROM memory, EEPROM memory, registers, hard disk, a removable
disk, a CD-ROM, or any other form of storage medium known in the art.
[0065] The methods disclosed herein comprise one or more steps or actions for achieving
the described method.
[0066] Additional aspects of the present invention are defined by the following clauses:
Clause 1: A chip for a cartridge with dispensable material, comprising:
a non-volatile memory for storing a number tracking amount of dispensable material
in the cartridge;
a key storage, the key storage storing an encryption key;
a signature verification module; and
circuit components configured to:
receive a first message comprising a first command and an operation input value for
a print job at the cartridge;
process the first message, comprising decreasing the amount of dispensable material
in the cartridge;
receive a second message comprising a second command to increase the amount of dispensable
material;
validate the second message using the signature validation module and the encryption
key; and
update the amount of dispensable material in the cartridge if the validation of the
second message succeeds.
Clause 2: The chip of clause 1, wherein to process the first message the circuit components
are further configured to generate a reply.
Clause 3: The chip of clause 2, further comprising a random number generator, and
wherein the circuit components are further configured to:
generate a first nonce using the random number generator;
send the first generated nonce to a refill device; and
validate a second nonce contained in the second message, and, optionally, wherein
the random number generator is a hardware or software based generator.
Clause 4: The chip of clause 3, wherein to validate the second nonce the circuit components
are further configured to verify that the second nonce is equal to the first nonce,
and/or
wherein to validate the second message the circuit components are further configured
to determine that a time period from sending the first nonce till receiving the second
message is within a pre-defined threshold.
Clause 5: The chip of clause 2, wherein the circuit components are further configured
to:
determine if there is enough dispensable material in the cartridge using the number
stored in the non-volatile memory; and
add an error report to the reply, if the amount is insufficient.
Clause 6: The chip of clause 2, further comprising a dedicated computation module,
wherein the dedicated computation module is configured to perform a pre-defined calculation
operation, and, optionally,
wherein an input for the dedicated computation module is taken from the first message
and a result of the computation is added to the reply.
Clause 7: The chip of clause 6, wherein the dedicated computation module comprises
separate sub-modules to perform different calculations, and the circuit components
are further configured to receive an instruction from a printing device to select
one of the sub-modules for a specific calculation.
Clause 8: A method for performing operations by a chip of a cartridge with dispensable
material, comprising:
receiving a first message comprising a first command and an operation input value
for a print job at the chip;
processing the first message, comprising decreasing a number tracking amount of dispensable
material in the cartridge, the number being stored in a non-volatile memory of the
chip;
receiving a second message comprising a second command to increase the amount of dispensable
material;
validating the second message comprising verifying a signature of the second message
using an encryption key stored in the chip; and
updating the amount of dispensable material in the cartridge if the validation of
the second message succeeds.
Clause 9: The method of clause 8, further comprising generating a reply when processing
the first message.
Clause 10: The method of clause 9, further comprising:
generating a first nonce;
sending the first generated nonce to a refill device; and
validating a second nonce contained in the second message.
Clause 11: The method of clause 10, wherein validating the second nonce comprises
verifying that the second nonce is equal to the first nonce, and/or,
wherein validating the second message comprises determining that a time period from
sending the first nonce till receiving the second message is within a pre-defined
threshold.
Clause 12: The method of clause 10, wherein the first nonce is generated using a hardware
or software based random number generator in the chip.
Clause 13: The method of clause 9, further comprising:
determining if there is enough dispensable material in the cartridge using the number
stored in a non-volatile memory of the chip; and
adding an error report to the reply, if the amount is insufficient.
Clause 14: The method of clause 9, further comprising performing a pre-defined calculation
operation at the chip using a dedicated computation module, and, optionally,
further comprising receiving an instruction from a printing device to select one specific
calculation sub-module to perform the pre-defined calculation operation, wherein the
chip comprises separate sub-modules to perform different calculations.
Clause 15: The method of clause 14, wherein an input to the pre-defined calculation
operation is taken from the first message and a result of the computation is added
to the reply.