FIELD OF THE INVENTION
[0001] This invention relates to a security device for deterring theft of the apparatus
or equipment to which it is fitted or into which it is incorporated.
BACKGROUND TO THE INVENTION
[0002] Various proposals exist to render stolen equipment inoperable and thus prevent use
by the thief. Some automobile audio systems include a feature whereby on interruption
of the power supply, for example due to temporary or permanent removal from the automobile,
the audio system will not function properly until a code is keyed in. There also exist
schemes in which an automobile is fitted with an immobiliser which is activated on
receipt of an instruction from a remote security centre. Elsewhere it has been proposed
to provide electronic goods such as televisions, video tape recorders, etc with a
disabling unit which can be activated by a remote control station.
[0003] However, these latter systems all require the remote control station to issue a signal
instructing immobilisation or disablement, and so are not effective if the stolen
equipment is taken outside the range of the remote station, or if communication with
the remote unit is deliberately or otherwise broken. Furthermore, the security of
these systems may be circumvented by the reasonably knowledgeable crook by by-passing
the disabling unit or immobiliser.
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
[0004] We have designed a system in which the equipment to which the security device is
fitted periodically initiates a validation routine which, to be completed successfully,
requires a specific instruction signal from a security station.
[0005] Accordingly, in one aspect, this invention provides a security device for use with
apparatus and for allowing continued operation of said apparatus dependent on a specific
instruction signal from a security station, said device including signal receiving
means for receiving a specific instruction signal from said security station and interrupt
means responsive to said signal receiving means in a validation routine for inhibiting,
preventing, or interfering with operation of said apparatus if said specific instruction
signal is not received.
[0006] Thus in this device, if the owner has notified the security station that the apparatus
has been stolen, the security station will ensure that the appropriate instruction
is not transmitted in the next validation routine and so the apparatus will not function
properly thereafter. Also, if for any reason the apparatus is not in communication
with the remote centre during a validation routine, it will not function properly.
[0007] In a simple system there may be only one-way communication from the remote centre
to the security device, to provide just the required specific instruction signal,
with the initiation of the validation routine being effected indirectly, perhaps by
the device alerting the owner to contact the remote station by telephone. However
it is preferred for this to be done automatically, with the security device including
signal transmitting means for transmitting a challenge signal to request said security
station to transmit said specific instruction signal.
[0008] The device preferably implements a challenge/response routine, whereby the specific
instruction signal issued by said security station is a specific response to said
challenge signal, and the security device includes means for authenticating said specific
response signal.
[0009] The challenge and response signals are preferably encrypted on transmission and decrypted
on receipt. The security device preferably includes secure memory means, such as a
Write Once Read Many (WORM) memory accessible only internally by the security device
for storing one or more keys for use in the encryption/decryption process. The encryption/decryption
process may be any one of several suitable types, for example public key or symmetric
key systems.
[0010] Preferably, communication between said security device and said security station
is
via a communications network, and said challenge signal includes data identifying the
network address of said security device, whereby the security centre may determine
the logical location of a security device, and send the response signal to that location.
[0011] The security device is preferably incorporated in an integrated circuit which in
use exerts at least a major part of the control function of the equipment. As integrated
circuit technology develops further, so more and more functionality is integrated
into larger and larger chips, and preferred embodiments take advantage of this by
incorporating the security device into an application specific integrated circuit
(ASIC) together with circuits representing most of the functionality of the equipment.
This provides an important level of security as it is extremely difficult, if not
virtually impossible, for someone to circumvent the security device, at least at economically
realistic levels.
[0012] A further point is that it is highly desirable that a security system does not interfere
with routine maintenance and repair of equipment, for example by restricting supply
of replacement chips to legitimate owners or service personnel. Thus, if the security
device is securely embedded into the ASIC, ready availability of replacement ASICs
should not significantly degrade security of the system, because by their design the
replacement ASICs will also require periodic permission from the security station,
to function properly.
[0013] There are various ways of ensuring that the security device checks routinely for
an instruction signal from the security station. Thus, if the apparatus is connected
to power permanently or for long periods, the device preferably includes a timer and
initiates a validation routine each time the timer times out. Alternatively, or in
addition, where the apparatus is operated for shorter periods, the device may include
a non volatile counter means which increments each time the apparatus is operated
or powered up, the device initiating a validation routine every time the counter means
reaches a predetermined number or multiple thereof.
[0014] Communication between the security device and the security station may be set up
in a variety of ways. For apparatus such as a video tape recorder which is semi-permanently
located, communications may be
via the plain old telephone system (POTS). For other applications, e.g. with mobile equipment
or vehicles, communication may be
via a cellular telephone network, radio, infra-red data links and so on, or combinations
of these, and suitable communication systems will be apparent to those skilled in
the art.
[0015] Whilst the invention has been described above, it extends to any inventive combination
of the features set out above or in the following description.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0016] The invention may be performed in various ways and, by way of example only, an embodiment
thereof will now be described in detail, reference being made to the accompanying
drawings, in which:-
- Figure 1
- is a schematic diagram of equipment fitted with an embodiment of security device in
accordance with this invention, and
- Figure 2
- is a flow chart showing the operation of the security device of Figure 1.
DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENT
[0017] In this example, the security device 16 is incorporated in a video tape recorder
(VTR) 10, semi-permanently connected to a power supply by lead 12. The VTR 10 follows
conventional design except that most of the functionality of the apparatus is integrated
into an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) 11. Thus the ASIC has a collection
of functional circuit elements 14 which control most of the mechanical and electrical
functions such as tape and cassette transport, tuning, programming, timing, etc operations,
to the extent that the VTR 10 has minimal resale value without a fully functional
ASIC 11. The ASIC 11 also includes a security device 16 which is capable of disrupting
operation of at least some of the functional circuit elements 14, if certain security
conditions are not met, to be described in further detail below. The disruption may
take the form of inhibiting some or all of the responses to controls and disabling
some or all outputs of the functional circuit elements. This may be done, for example,
by forcing internal signals to a quiescent state, removal of scanning waveforms, forcing
incoming control signals to their quiescent state, forcing outputs to their quiescent
sate, removing clock or power from certain internal circuits, or stopping a microprocessor
from executing normal operations by the use of a conditional test input or interrupt
input. These actions may be forced at various functional circuit elements 14 within
the ASIC 11 by control signals. ASIC conductors are usually difficult to isolate and
it is usually difficult to make an electrical connection to those conductors. However,
in this embodiment they may be buried within the volume of the ASIC 11, so that they
cannot be accessed without irreparably damaging other elements of the ASIC 11, further
to enhance security.
[0018] There may be multiple conductors, each providing the permission signal to different
functional circuit elements 14, each driven by a separate buried buffer from within
the security device, so that multiple connections must be made to override the 'stop'
signal. Each functional circuit element may contain a communication element for communication
with the security device 16, such that each communication element may requires a waveform,
rather than a simple logic level, to allow operation. Each communication element may
require a different waveform so that active inputs, rather than logic levels, are
required to override the 'stop' signal. Thus the level of complexity, and thus immunity
to interference may be selected according to the level of perceived threat.
[0019] Although for ease of illustration the functional circuit elements 14 are shown discrete
from the security device 16, in practice the circuit elements may be interspersed,
to minimize the possibility of successfully circumventing the operation of the security
device 16, as discussed above.
[0020] The security device 16 has a transceiver 18, capable of transmitting and receiving
signals to and from a remote security centre 20, by any suitable communication medium,
here the POTS system. Although shown on the ASIC 11, the transceiver 18 may be separate.
The security device 16 also includes circuitry 22 for implementing a challenge/response
scheme based on cryptographic techniques, and storing the associated encryption data.
Such encryption systems are well known, see for example page 357 - "Peer Entity Authentication"
in "Security for Computer Networks" Davies and Price, John Wiley and Sons, 2nd Edition,
1989, and ISO 9798 "Peer Entity Authentication Mechanism Using An n-bit Secret Key".
There are many possible challenge/response mechanisms. They are of varying degrees
of complexity, but the general basis is for the security device 16 to obtain a random
number, encrypt it using a first key, K1, and send it to the remote security centre
20. This is the challenge. The remote security centre 20 decrypts the challenge with
the key K1, encrypts it with a second key, K2, and sends it back to the security device.
This is the response. The security device decrypts the response with key K2 and checks
that the decrypted number is the same as the original random number. This proves to
the security device that the message came from an entity with knowledge of the keys
K1 and K2, presumed to be the remote security centre 20. The remote security centre
20 provides the response only if the security device 16 is authorized to continue
operation. Thus encryption systems such as public key, symmetric key etc. may be used.
[0021] The security device 16 also includes power-up detect circuitry 24 which detects power
up of the ASIC 11, a timer 26 and a non-volatile counter 28. The ASIC 11 contains
a write once read many memory (WORM), which is preferably a fusible link device, although
it could be an EPROM in a non-transparent package.
[0022] The remote security centre 20 serves many units in an area and includes a transceiver
27 for transmitting and receiving signals to and from the units containing the ASIC
11
via the POTS system. It also includes circuitry 30 for implementing cryptographic techniques
and for storing the associated encryption data, and an operator interface 32 which
allows the operator to prevent transmission of response signals to a selected unit,
if that unit has been identified as stolen.
[0023] In operation of the system, when leaving the factory, the ASIC 11 is programmed with
a key pair preferably in the WORM and the associated key pair is registered with a
central agency which runs the remote security centre 20. Referring to Figure 2, when
the VTR 10 is turned on, the non-volatile counter 28 is incremented and the device
determines whether the counter has reached the predetermined number or a multiple
thereof (Steps 40, 42).
[0024] If the counter 28 has reached the number or a multiple, the device initiates a validation
routine by calling up the remote security centre 20, issuing a challenge and requesting
a response using the encryption and decryption steps referred to above. Unless the
remote security centre 20 has been advised that the VTR 10 has been stolen, the centre
will respond with a response which is then checked by the security device 16 to ensure
that it is as expected and, if so, the device allows the VTR 10 to continue to operate.
The timer 26 and counter 28 are then reset at step 44, and the device goes into a
timed routine 46.
[0025] If the VTR 10 has been disconnected from the communication medium, or the remote
security centre 20 has been alerted not to send the response, non-arrival of the response
triggers the safety device 16 at step 48 to stop normal operation of the VTR 10 using
one of the disruption techniques described above, and to wait for possible manual
initiation of the validation routine.
[0026] If on detection of power up, the counter 28 does not reach the preset number, then
it goes into the timed routine 46. Here the timer 26 runs until it times out, whereupon
the security device 16 initiates the validation routine by calling up the remote centre
20.
[0027] As soon as a legitimate owner becomes aware of the theft of equipment incorporating
the security device 16, he calls up the agency running the remote security centre
20 which, after appropriate checks, instructs the remote security centre not to send
any response signal to the stolen equipment. The equipment, even if connected to the
appropriate communication medium, will become non-functional and of minimal resale
value when the security device is triggered by non-arrival of the response signal.
[0028] As a development of this system, the challenge issued by the security device 16 may
include data representing the identity or location of the user, such as the source
network address of the security device (for example the user's telephone number, if
communications are via the POTS). The remote security centre 20 would then send the
response back to that same network address, possibly after a deliberate break in communication.
This would allow the remote security centre 20 to monitor the logical location of
the security device 16, and possibly provide a tracking facility.
1. A security device for use with apparatus and for allowing continued operation of said
apparatus dependent on a specific instruction signal from a security station, said
device including signal receiving means for receiving a specific instruction signal
from said security station and interrupt means responsive to said signal receiving
means in a validation routine for inhibiting, preventing, or interfering with operation
of said apparatus if said specific instruction signal is not received.
2. A security device according to Claim 1, wherein said security device includes signal
transmitting means for transmitting a challenge signal, to request said security station
to transmit said specific instruction signal.
3. A security device according to Claim 2, wherein in use said security device and said
security station communicate via a communications network, and said challenge signal includes data identifying the
network address of said security device.
4. A security device according to any preceding Claim, wherein said specific instruction
signal from said security station comprises a specific response signal to said challenge
signal, and said security device includes means for authenticating said specific response
signal.
5. A security device according to Claim 4, including means for encrypting said challenge
signal.
6. A security device according to Claim 4 or Claim 5, wherein said specific response
is in encrypted form, and said device includes means for decrypting said specific
response.
7. A security device according to Claim 5 or Claim 6, including a secure memory for storing
one or more keys for said encryption process.
8. A security device according to any preceding Claim, wherein said interrupt means is
incorporated in an integrated circuit which also contains circuitry which exerts a
control function in the apparatus.
9. A security device according to Claim 8, wherein said integrated circuit contains at
least a major part of the control function of the apparatus.
10. A security device according to any preceding Claim, wherein said security device includes
timer means which, on timing out, initiates said validation routine.
11. A security device according to any preceding Claim, wherein said security device includes
power-up detection means for detecting power-up of said apparatus, and non-volatile
counter means for being incremented at each power-up and for initiating said validation
routine when the count on said counter means reaches a predetermined number or multiple
thereof.